Copyright © 2022-2026 Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP), All rights reserved.
This document is the Core Specification of the Originator Profile Framework (OPF). It specifies the part of the framework that every use case shares: the identifiers and data models of the Core Profile, the Profile Annotation and the Content Attestation, and the Root Core Profile and the Accreditation Chain. It also specifies the publication in the DNS, under DNSSEC, of the records of issuers' keys, of Originators' keys and of revocations, and the part of the verification procedure that does not depend on how content is delivered. Use-case-specific matters, such as how an Originator Profile reaches the Recipient and how the identity the Recipient sees is bound to the Originator, are specified by separate documents that build on this one.
This document is a description of the current design of the Originator Profile Framework (OPF) developed by the Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP). It is in DRAFT status, which means it has no official standing of any kind and does not represent the consensus of the OP-CIP Membership.
The Originator Profile Framework gives a [=Recipient=] of content a verifiable profile of the [=Originator=] of that content, composed of a [=Core Profile=] issued by a [=Core Profile Issuer=] and [=Profile Annotations=] issued by independent [=Profile Annotation Issuers=]. The framework is described at an architectural level in the Architectural Overview [[?OPF-AOV]]. This document specifies the shared, use-case-independent part of the framework in normative terms.
The framework exists because a [=Recipient=] of content has little on which to judge who stands behind what reaches it. [[?OPF-AOV]] sets out that problem and the reasoning behind the design. This document states what has to be built and operated for the resulting profile to be verifiable. Those are the identifiers, the properties the signed documents carry, what is published in the DNS and what its presence and absence mean, and the procedure by which a [=Verifier=] reaches an outcome.
This document specifies what is common to every use case. That is:
This document does not specify the following.
This document sits between the Architectural Overview [[?OPF-AOV]], which explains the framework, and the documents that build on this one.
The Internet-Draft [[OPF-DNS]] defines
the OPKEY record type, its placement and its transitional
publication, and is a normative reference of this document. Where
[[OPF-DNS]] speaks of a record publisher, a CP issuer or a PA
issuer publishing records under _op, this document
speaks of an [=issuer=] (). An
[=Accreditation Body=] and a [=Root Issuer=] are PA issuers in the
terms of [[OPF-DNS]], since the [=Issuer Accreditations=] they
issue are [=Profile Annotations=]. A [=Root Issuer=] is also a CP
issuer in those terms, for the [=Core Profiles=] it issues
().
Each [=Use Case Specification=] (Web Media, Email, and the planned Web Advertisement) defines delivery, identity binding, the place and time of verification and the security considerations that follow from those choices. The Operational Governance Requirements [[?OPF-GOV]] state what the parties that operate the framework are required to do, and the Operations document [[?OPF-OPS]] carries the values, the service levels and the procedures by which they meet those requirements. Neither of those two documents is published yet.
The Originator Profile Blueprints [[Originator Profile Blueprints]], published by the Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership, describe the documents and resources of the framework as they are implemented today, and this document takes from them the property names of the signed documents (). On the following points the Blueprints, as they stand, differ from this document, and the work of bringing them into line with it is in progress:
What is normative, and what a sentence without a key word does. Sections marked as non-normative, together with all notes, examples and appendices, are informative; everything else is normative. In normative text, a sentence that uses none of the key words either restates, with a reference to its source, a requirement stated elsewhere, defines a term or a value, or explains; a requirement that is stated nowhere else is stated with a key word.
How DNS names are written. DNS names in this
document are written as fully qualified domain names without a
trailing dot. The labels <originator> and
<cp-issuer> stand for the FQDN of the
respective party; <cp-issuer> is the issuer
of the [=Core Profile=] concerned, a [=Root Issuer=] where it
issued that [=Core Profile=]
().
<issuer> stands for the FQDN
of any issuer (),
<record-label> for a [=record label=], the opaque
leftmost label that the issuer chooses for each name it assigns
(; a UUID in the examples of
), and <host> for the
name of a host. Any other label in angle brackets, such as
<name>, is explained where it is used.
Validation states and SVCB field names. The
DNSSEC validation states of [[RFC4035]] are written in italics, as
in Secure and
Insecure, also where they qualify a
noun, and the field names of the SVCB record [[RFC9460]], such as
ServiceMode and TargetName, are written
in code type.
The document is arranged so that what a party must do can be read from the section that concerns it.
_op, what the presence and absence of records at
each of them mean, and the requirements on the parties that
publish them. It is written so that a reader concerned only with the
DNS can read it on its own.
This specification defines conformance for six classes, and every requirement in it is addressed to one of them.
This document defines the terms of the framework that the [=Use Case Specifications=], the operational documents and the Architectural Overview [[?OPF-AOV]] rely on. Where another document of the series repeats one of these definitions, this document prevails.
This section specifies the identifiers by which the framework names [=Originators=], issuers and keys, and the DNS names that signed documents carry so that the [=Verifier=] can look them up without deriving them.
What an Identity is. An [=Originator=]'s
[=Identity=] is a fully qualified domain name. A [=Core Profile=]
MUST carry the [=Identity=] of its subject as a dns:
URI [[RFC4501]] whose value is that name. A subdomain is an
identity in its own right: an organization that keeps separate
[=Originator Profiles=] for separate purposes does so by using a
separate [=Identity=] for each, and a [=Profile Annotation=]
issued for one [=Identity=] says nothing about another.
What the identity is used for. The [=Identity=] is the value with which the [=Presented Identity=] is compared, by the rule the [=Use Case Specification=] defines. It is not a name the [=Verifier=] resolves. The names the [=Verifier=] looks up for the issuers' records are the ones the documents carry, as specified in , and the [=Identity=] is never used to construct them; the only names built from the [=Identity=] are those of the [=Originator=]'s own records ().
Canonical form. A domain name is in canonical form when:
A dns: URI is in canonical form
when it carries such a name and nothing else: it has neither an
authority nor a query, which [[RFC4501]] would otherwise permit.
Equal, lies below, at or below. Two names are
equal when their canonical forms are
equal octet for octet. One name lies below another when the
canonical form of the first ends with a label separator followed
by the canonical form of the second, so that the match falls on a
label boundary: www.example.com lies below
example.com, but badexample.com does
not. One name is at or below another when the two are equal or
the first lies below the second.
The signer's obligation. Every party that signs a document of this specification, an [=Originator=] signing a [=Content Attestation=] included, MUST write in canonical form every domain name that falls within a signature it makes. Those names are the [=Identity=] the document is about, the [=Identity=] it carries as its issuer (), and the [=Originator Key Record Name=] or [=Revocation Record Name=] it carries ().
The Verifier's comparison. A [=Verifier=] MUST put both sides into canonical form before it compares two domain names, and a value that cannot be put into canonical form MUST be treated as a failure of the check that needed it.
A name that is not in canonical form. A [=Verifier=] MUST accept a name that the DNS returned and that is not in canonical form, such as the TargetName of an SVCB record written with upper-case letters or a trailing dot, by putting it into canonical form first. A difference of case or a trailing dot in such a name is not a failure. A [=Verifier=] MAY accept, in the same way, a value that is not in canonical form in a document. In either case it MUST NOT treat as a match two values whose canonical forms differ.
Where the rule applies. The rule of this section, canonical form and then comparison, applies to every comparison of domain names this document requires:
Where a [=Presented Identity=] is compared with an [=Identity=], the [=Use Case Specification=] defines what the [=Presented Identity=] is, how the [=Verifier=] obtains it and how it is put into canonical form (); the comparison itself is the rule of this section.
An issuer and its name. A [=Core Profile Issuer=], a [=Profile
Annotation Issuer=], an [=Accreditation Body=] and a [=Root
Issuer=] are each
identified by a fully qualified domain name; this document calls
any of them an issuer. Every document
an issuer signs MUST carry that name as its issuer, in the same
dns: URI form as an [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=]. It is
written in canonical form and compared by the same rule
().
Where an issuer publishes. That name is also the name under which the issuer publishes its [=Issuer Key Record=] and, by its role, its [=Originator Key Records=] or [=Revocation Records=], as specified in . An issuer that cannot publish under the name it carries as issuer cannot be verified.
An issuer's own Core Profile. Every issuer is itself an [=Originator=]. An issuer other than a [=Root Issuer=] holds a [=Core Profile=] of its own, issued under its own name as its [=Identity=], and its standing as an issuer is stated by an [=Issuer Accreditation=] on that [=Core Profile=], as specified in . Such an issuer obtains that [=Core Profile=] from the [=Root Issuer=] or from a [=Core Profile Issuer=] [=toward the root=] on its own [=Accreditation Chain=]; a [=Core Profile=] from any other issuer is not used in verifying the chain ().
What a Key Identifier is. A [=Key Identifier=] is a digest of the public key it identifies. The key is expressed as a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo [[RFC5280]], normalized as [[OPF-DNS]] defines, and the digest is computed over that encoding. The same key thus has the same [=Key Identifier=], and two [=Key Identifiers=] computed with the same digest algorithm are equal if and only if they identify the same key. A [=Key Identifier=] is compared only with one computed with the same algorithm, so the party that uses a value has to know which algorithm produced it. For a value a signed document carries it is SHA-256; for a value in the DNS, the Matching Type of the record names it.
SHA-256 for every party, and other algorithms in addition. A [=Verifier=] MUST support SHA-256, SHOULD support SHA-512, and MAY support the other digest algorithms for which [[OPF-DNS]] defines a Matching Type. An issuer () MUST publish the SHA-256 form of every [=Key Identifier=] it publishes in the DNS, so that a form every [=Verifier=] supports is always present, and MAY publish other forms in addition. The [=Key Identifier=] that a signed document carries MUST be the SHA-256 form; the document carries no indication of the algorithm, and a document that instead carries enough to determine the [=Key Identifier=] () is read as carrying the SHA-256 form. This document does not fix the property that carries it; see .
The records in the DNS. An OPKEY record set under this document carries [=Key Identifiers=] and nothing else. A record is usable for a [=Verifier=] only where its field values are those [[OPF-DNS]] accepts and the [=Verifier=] supports its Matching Type. The accepted values are Certificate Usage 3, Selector 1, and Matching Type 1 (SHA-256) or 2 (SHA-512), with Certificate Association Data of the length that the Matching Type requires. A [=Verifier=] ignores every other record, as the Field Values of [[OPF-DNS]] require, and a record it ignores identifies no key; Matching Type 0, which would carry the key itself, is not used in this framework.
The issuer's forms. An issuer that publishes a form for one key in a record set MUST publish that form for every key in the record set. An issuer that removes a key from a record set MUST remove, at the same time, every record in it that identifies that key, whatever its Matching Type. A record left in one form would otherwise let a [=Verifier=] that matches against that form go on accepting signatures with the key.
What the Verifier looks for. A [=Verifier=] matches a key against the record set it retrieved at the name it queried: the [=Originator Key Record Name=] the [=Core Profile=] carries (step 6 of ), or the name of an issuer's [=Issuer Key Record=] (). The [=Key Identifier=] it looks for in that record set MUST be one it computes from the key it has selected and with which it verifies the signature. A value the document carries, or one the [=Core Profile=] associates with the key, serves only to select the key.
Which form the Verifier matches against. Where the record set carries [=Key Identifiers=] in more than one form, the [=Verifier=] MUST match the key against the strongest form that it supports and that the record set carries. The key matches only if its [=Key Identifier=] in that form is present. A record set that carries no usable record matches no key, though it is present in the sense of and .
Matching against the strongest form is what gives a stronger form its value: were any one form enough, the match would be as strong as the weakest form the record set carries.
The same matching is why an issuer publishes a form for every key or for none (The issuer's forms): a key that lacked the form the [=Verifier=] matches against would not match at all.
What the names are, and what a Verifier learns at them. A [=Core Profile=] other than a [=Root Core Profile=] MUST carry its [=Originator Key Record Name=], and a [=Profile Annotation=] MUST carry its [=Revocation Record Name=], as a complete fully qualified domain name. At the [=Originator Key Record Name=], the presence of a record set means that the [=Core Profile=] has not been revoked, and its records list the keys that are current (; step 6 of ). At the [=Revocation Record Name=], the presence of a record set means that the annotation has been revoked (; step 8 of ).
Where the name lies, and its labels. The issuer
of the document assigns the name: the [=Core Profile Issuer=]
assigns an [=Originator Key Record Name=], and the issuer of the
annotation assigns a [=Revocation Record Name=]. An
[=Originator Key Record Name=] lies below the issuer's Originator
Key Record node _originator-key._op.<cp-issuer>,
and a [=Revocation Record Name=] below its Revocation Record node
_revocation._op.<issuer>
(,
). The leftmost label of either
name, which is never a label of the node, is its record
label, as
[[OPF-DNS]] defines the term; the issuer chooses it. Labels between
the [=record label=] and the node are permitted and carry no
meaning for the [=Verifier=]: an issuer MAY use them to divide its
records into separate zones.
The record label is opaque, and a name is never reused. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT interpret the [=record label=]. An issuer MUST NOT reuse a record name: a name that has been assigned to one [=Core Profile=], or to one issuance of a [=Profile Annotation=], is never assigned to another. An issuer chooses how it generates [=record labels=], and MAY change that choice for new names at any time, since no other party derives them.
One name for each Core Profile and each issuance. An [=Originator Key Record Name=] identifies one [=Core Profile=]. A [=Core Profile Issuer=] MUST assign a new one each time it issues a [=Core Profile=], whether the [=Originator=]'s keys change or only the [=Signature Validity Period=] is renewed. A [=Revocation Record Name=] identifies one issuance of one [=Profile Annotation=]. A [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] MUST assign a new one each time it issues the annotation again. Revoking an earlier [=Core Profile=], or an earlier issuance of an annotation, then does not reach a later one.
How a Verifier uses the name. A [=Verifier=] MUST use the name as carried, and MUST NOT derive an [=Originator Key Record Name=] or a [=Revocation Record Name=] from an [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] or from an identifier of the document. The name is the issuer's to assign; nothing in this document relates it to the [=Identity=] or to the document. A [=Verifier=] builds no name from an [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] other than those of , built from the [=Identity=] and, for the [=Permitted Host Record=], from the host as well. The names of an issuer's [=Issuer Key Record=] and of its nodes are built from the issuer's [=Identity=], as , and specify.
The check before querying. Before querying, a [=Verifier=] MUST check that the name lies below the issuer's Originator Key Record node or Revocation Record node, as and specify. The two names are compared as specifies, so that the match falls on a label boundary; a record name that is the node itself does not lie below it and fails the check. The check keeps a record outside the issuer's own name space from being consulted.
This section specifies the properties of the framework's signed documents that this document depends on and their semantics: what each document carries, which properties are within the signature, how a [=Profile Annotation=] is bound to a [=Core Profile=], and what an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] contains. It does not define the serialization of the documents beyond naming the securing mechanism.
What every signed document carries. Every signed document that this document relies on, that is, every instance of [=Signed Data from Originator=], carries, for the purposes of this document:
One period is compared with a time. Wherever this document asks whether a document is valid at some time, it asks whether the document's [=Signature Validity Period=] contains the time; no other period is compared with a time. A [=Profile Annotation=] can also carry a [=Content Validity Period=]. That period only has to contain the [=Signature Validity Period=] (). The RRSIG validity period of a zone is a property of the zone, not of a signed document ().
How the documents are expressed, and what is within the
signature. The documents MUST be expressed in the
Verifiable Credentials data model [[vc-data-model-2.0]] and secured
as a JSON Web Signature [[RFC7515]] whose type is
vc+jwt, the JOSE form of [[vc-jose-cose]]. Those properties, and the record names of
, MUST be within the signature: a
document without them cannot be checked against the DNS, and the
verification then fails.
The period the signature states, and property
names. Where the securing mechanism can state the
period for which a signature is to be relied on, this document takes
that period as the [=Signature Validity Period=]. The mechanism
above is such a mechanism: the period runs from the
iat to the exp claim [[RFC7519]] of the
token. A [=Content Validity Period=], by contrast, is stated in
the data model, not by the securing mechanism
(). This document names
properties by what they hold, not by the property names of a
serialization, apart from the two claims of the securing mechanism
named above; those names, and where each property sits in the
document, are defined by the [[Originator Profile Blueprints]].
What a Core Profile carries. A [=Core Profile=] carries, besides the common properties:
The set of keys is fixed. The keys a [=Core Profile=] carries are the set the [=Originator=] is permitted to sign with while this [=Core Profile=] is in force, and they are fixed at issuance. A [=Core Profile=] that has been signed is not altered: when the [=Originator=]'s keys change, its [=Core Profile Issuer=] issues a new [=Core Profile=] that carries the new set, and the earlier one remains in force until it expires or is revoked.
One record for each Core Profile. Each, other than a [=Root Core Profile=], carries an [=Originator Key Record Name=] of its own (), at which its own [=Originator Key Record=] is published. As requires, a [=Verifier=] treats the keys of the [=Core Profile=] and the [=Key Identifiers=] of its [=Originator Key Record=] together: a key is usable only where both carry it.
More than one key, a replaced key, and every key alike. A [=Core Profile Issuer=] MAY put more than one key in a [=Core Profile=], whatever the reason. When it issues a [=Core Profile=] in order to replace a key, it SHOULD NOT include the key being replaced. A replaced key that the new [=Core Profile=] carried would stay usable until that [=Core Profile=] expired or was revoked, rather than until the earlier one did. This document gives a key no role beyond that. It defines no way to mark a key as one that is kept for checking signatures but no longer used to make them, and a [=Verifier=] MUST treat every key the [=Core Profile=] carries alike.
Content signed with a replaced key stays verifiable. Two conditions keep content signed with a replaced key verifiable. A [=Core Profile=] that carries that key is in force and carried in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], and the key's record stays in the [=Originator Key Record=] of that [=Core Profile=] as a [=retired=] key, in the sense of . It is that [=Core Profile=] and its [=Originator Key Record=] that answer for the key, at the cost that states.
What a Profile Annotation carries, and that each issuance is distinct. A [=Profile Annotation=] carries, besides the common properties, its [=Revocation Record Name=], an identifier that distinguishes one issuance of it from another, and an identifier of the kind of annotation it is. When a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] issues an annotation again, the result is a new issuance with its own identifier and its own [=Revocation Record Name=] (), and the revocation of the earlier issuance says nothing about the later one.
A second period, for what the annotation states. A [=Profile Annotation=] MAY also carry a [=Content Validity Period=]. Where it carries one, its [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] MUST choose it so that it contains the annotation's [=Signature Validity Period=], beginning no later and ending no earlier. A [=Verifier=] checks that it does (step 8 of ).
How a Profile Annotation is bound to a Core Profile. A [=Profile Annotation=] is bound to a [=Core Profile=] by the [=Identity=] both are about: as check (a) of step 8 of requires, the [=Verifier=] checks that the [=Identity=] the annotation names is the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries. An annotation MUST NOT refer to a particular [=Core Profile=] document or to a particular key, so that a new [=Core Profile=] for the [=Originator=], with or without a change of its keys, leaves the annotations in force.
What a Content Attestation attests. A [=Content Attestation=] attests that a piece of [=Content=] originated from the [=Originator=]. What the attestation covers, and how it describes the [=Content=], is defined by the [=Use Case Specification=]; this document depends only on the properties below.
What a Content Attestation carries. A [=Content Attestation=] carries the [=Key Identifier=] of the [=Originator Verification Key=] that corresponds to the key it was signed with, or enough to determine it (). The [=Verifier=] selects that key from the [=Core Profile=] by what the attestation carries and then asks the DNS whether the key is current (step 7 of ), matching the key as specifies. The [=Identity=] of the [=Originator=] it is attributed to is carried as the issuer of the attestation.
What an Issuer Accreditation is. An issuer's standing is stated by an [=Issuer Accreditation=]: a [=Profile Annotation=] on the issuer's own [=Core Profile=], issued by the body that accredited the issuer. It says that the issuer is a [=Core Profile Issuer=], a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] or an [=Accreditation Body=], or more than one of these. Being a [=Profile Annotation=], it carries a [=Revocation Record Name=] and can be revoked like any other. An [=Accreditation Body=], as defined in , is a party that is permitted to issue [=Issuer Accreditations=].
The chain and its direction. An [=Accreditation Chain=] is the sequence of such accreditations from an issuer toward the root, together with the [=Core Profile=] of each issuer along the way. It ends at a [=Root Core Profile=]: a [=Core Profile=] signed with a key it carries itself, which no issuer accredits. This document names positions in a chain by that direction: the parent issuer of an issuer is the issuer that issued its [=Issuer Accreditation=], and one step lies toward the root of another when it is nearer the [=Root Core Profile=] than that other is.
The Root Core Profile. A [=Root Core Profile=]
carries no [=Originator Key Record Name=], and no
[=Originator Key Record=] is looked up for it. The [=Issuer Key
Record=] of its [=Root Issuer=], which is published at
_issuer-key._op.<issuer> like that of any issuer
(), is nevertheless consulted for
the topmost step of every chain, since that step is signed with a
key the [=Root Core Profile=] carries
(). A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT
treat the [=Signature Validity Period=] a [=Root Core Profile=]
states as a
condition of verification. A [=Root Core Profile=] does not expire
but is replaced, through the channel of
, and the dates it carries
are a plan for that replacement.
Where a Root Core Profile comes from. A [=Verifier=] holds the [=Root Core Profiles=] it accepts, and accepts no others (). They reach it with its verification software; this document defines no way to obtain a [=Root Core Profile=] through the protocol, and no record in the DNS points from an issuer to its parent issuer. A chain is therefore verified from the documents that accompany the content, as specified in .
A Root Issuer as a Core Profile Issuer. A [=Root Issuer=] issues [=Core Profiles=] without holding an [=Issuer Accreditation=] as a [=Core Profile Issuer=], since no issuer accredits it. The [=Core Profile=] of the issuer at the topmost step of a chain is issued by the [=Root Issuer=], and so may be the [=Core Profile=] of any issuer or [=Originator=] (step 5 of ).
The Originator Key Records of the Core Profiles a Root
Issuer issues. For the [=Core Profiles=] it issues,
a [=Root Issuer=] is a [=Core Profile Issuer=] in the sense of
that term. It assigns their [=Originator Key Record Names=] below
_originator-key._op.<issuer> under its own name
() and publishes their [=Originator Key
Records=], as requires of a
[=Core Profile Issuer=] (). A
[=Verifier=] therefore finds the [=Originator Key Record=] of such a
[=Core Profile=] under the [=Root Issuer=]'s name in step 6 of
, as it does for any [=Core Profile
Issuer=]; the [=Root Core Profile=] alone has none.
Who accredits, and what accrediting does not give. An [=Issuer Accreditation=] is a step of an [=Accreditation Chain=] only if its issuer is the [=Root Issuer=] or a party established as an [=Accreditation Body=] [=toward the root=] in the same chain. An [=Accreditation Body=], like a [=Root Issuer=], MAY state any standing, that of an [=Accreditation Body=] included. What a body may grant and what it may issue itself are separate. To issue a document itself, an [=Accreditation Body=] needs the standing for it:
The kinds an Issuer Accreditation grants. An [=Issuer Accreditation=] that states the standing of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] also carries the set of kinds of annotation that issuer may issue. [=Issuer Accreditation=] is itself a kind of annotation, and only a [=Root Issuer=] and an [=Accreditation Body=] may issue it. The check of kind in step 8 of applies to every [=Profile Annotation=], [=Issuer Accreditations=] included.
The kind the standing itself carries. The standing of an [=Accreditation Body=] carries the kind [=Issuer Accreditation=] and no other, and so does being a [=Root Issuer=]. For any other kind, an [=Accreditation Body=] holds what its own [=Issuer Accreditation=] as a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] grants it, as any issuer does, and a [=Root Issuer=], which no issuer accredits, holds none. A [=Root Issuer=] that is to issue annotations of another kind does so under a separate [=Identity=] it accredits as a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] ().
When a party counts as an Accreditation Body. A party counts as an [=Accreditation Body=] only where the [=Verifier=] verifies an [=Accreditation Chain=] that establishes it as one, including the checks in the DNS of for that chain. Such a party need not also hold the standing of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] to issue [=Issuer Accreditations=]. In steps 2 and 8 of , the chain that establishes it as an [=Accreditation Body=], or its [=Root Core Profile=], serves as the chain of the issuer of the accreditation. For the [=Issuer Accreditations=] it issues, such a party is nonetheless a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] in the sense of that term, and it counts as one toward bound 2 of .
More than one accreditation, more than one chain. Where an issuer has more than one [=Issuer Accreditation=], it holds a kind if any of them that the [=Verifier=] verifies grants it. Where the accreditation can be reached by more than one chain, the [=Verifier=] uses the first it verifies in the order of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], defined as follows. The order is built from the step nearest the issuer, toward the root:
The chain used is the first in that order that verifies locally. The checks in the DNS of are made for that chain alone and decide the outcome, and no other chain is tried when they do not succeed.
What a Verifier holds before any query. Before it issues any DNS query, a [=Verifier=] MUST hold locally:
Holding the whole chain is what requires: a [=Verifier=] that had to fetch part of a chain in order to verify it would be issuing queries on behalf of a document it has not yet verified.
How the Originator Profile Bundle reaches the Verifier. The [=Use Case Specification=] defines the route by which the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] reaches the [=Verifier=]. In the use cases defined so far it travels with the content, but this document requires only that it be at hand, so that a [=Use Case Specification=] may obtain parts of it otherwise.
Documents the Verifier does not use. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT fail because the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] contains a document it does not use, a document of a kind it does not know, or the same document more than once. A document carried more than once, as the same sequence of octets, counts once toward the bounds of and is processed once. The [=Verifier=] takes the documents it needs and ignores the rest, so that the contents of an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] can grow without breaking [=Verifiers=] already deployed.
At least one Profile Annotation. An [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries, besides the [=Core Profile=] of the [=Originator=], at least one of its [=Profile Annotations=], as the [=Use Case Specification=] requires (), since an [=Originator Profile=] consists of one [=Core Profile=] and one or more [=Profile Annotations=] (). One annotation is the minimum that this document has each [=Use Case Specification=] require; the terms under which a [=Core Profile Issuer=] registers an [=Originator=] may require more annotations, as [[?OPF-GOV]] provides. A [=Verifier=] does not check this: it checks neither the number of [=Profile Annotations=] an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries nor which annotations those terms expect.
The order of the Profile Annotations. The order in which the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] presents the [=Profile Annotations=] carries meaning: it is the order of preference of the [=Originator=] that assembled the [=Originator Profile Bundle=]. A [=Verifier=] processes the annotations in that order when a bound of stops the [=Verifier=] short of the whole set, and it takes the order as it receives it. Where a [=Use Case Specification=] delivers the annotations by routes that give no single order, it defines the order itself ().
Documents the Originator signs. An [=Originator=] signs other documents with the keys that correspond to its [=Originator Verification Keys=] for the purposes of a particular use case. Such documents are outside the [=Originator Profile=]: they carry no record name of their own, no record in the DNS answers for them, and they are not revoked in the DNS.
The validity of documents the Originator signs. Their validity follows the [=Originator Profile=] and the key that signed them: they are of use only while that key is current, in the sense of , and while a [=Core Profile=] that carries it is in force. A [=Use Case Specification=] defines what such documents contain and what a [=Verifier=] does with them.
Documents a Core Profile Issuer issues. Not every document outside the [=Originator Profile=] is signed by the [=Originator=]. Where a [=Use Case Specification=] defines one that a [=Core Profile Issuer=] issues about an [=Originator=] and does not add it to the [=Originator Profile=], that document is outside the [=Originator Profile=] in the same sense, and its validity likewise follows the [=Originator Profile=] and the key that signed it.
This section specifies the DNS names the framework uses, what the presence and absence of records at each name mean, and the requirements it places on the issuers and [=Originators=] that publish those records. It is written as a self-contained chapter: everything a [=Verifier=] needs to know about the DNS is here or in [[OPF-DNS]], and nothing elsewhere in this document depends on DNS details beyond the semantics stated here.
[[OPF-DNS]] describes, in its Operational Considerations, the load the DNS layer places on the DNS: the number of queries per verification, how much reaches the authoritative servers, response sizes, time to live and negative caching, and the load of signing an issuer's zone. Its figures are estimates from this design and from measurements over signed test zones in a closed laboratory, not from an actual deployment.
The issuers that publish records under _op are what
[[OPF-DNS]] calls record publishers. [[OPF-DNS]] names them by two
roles, CP issuer and PA issuer, where this document names the four
kinds of [=issuer=] of . An
[=Accreditation Body=] and a [=Root Issuer=] are PA issuers in the
terms of [[OPF-DNS]], since the [=Issuer Accreditations=] they issue
are [=Profile Annotations=]; a [=Root Issuer=] is also a CP issuer in
those terms, for the [=Core Profiles=] it issues
().
_op Name Space
The names, and what each means. Every name this
framework uses in the DNS is placed under the
_op label, and the label immediately below
_op, where there is one, says which part of the
framework the name concerns. The names are the following,
and this document defines no others.
The names side by side. An issuer publishes its
[=Issuer Key Record=] at
_issuer-key._op.<issuer>, and, by its role in the
table above, its records below
_originator-key._op.<issuer> and
_revocation._op.<issuer>. These are separate
names side by side under _op.<issuer>, so that
the [=Key Identifiers=] of its own [=Verification Keys=] never share
a name with the [=Originator Key Records=] and [=Revocation Records=] it
publishes. Labels can be
inserted between the [=record label=] and _originator-key or
_revocation, as permits.
Aliases and wildcards. The records are published
at these names and at no others. An [=Originator=] or an issuer
MUST NOT publish a CNAME, DNAME or wildcard record whose owner
name is _op.<name> or any name below it, where
<name> is its own name.
An alias at one of these names would hand the answer to whoever holds its target, while the check of reaches only the name the document carries. The record that decides whether a [=Core Profile=] or an annotation is revoked would then be whichever record the holder of the target publishes, outside the issuer's own name space. Delegation with NS records divides the name space without that effect.
A wildcard at or below _op.<name> would make
every name under it appear present. At
_originator-key._op every [=Core Profile=] would appear
in force and none could be revoked by removing its record; at
_revocation._op every annotation would appear revoked;
and at _site._op a wildcard reading
v=op1 would permit every host.
The signing of an issuer's zone. Every zone that
holds any of an issuer's names MUST be signed so that the
absence of a name below _op.<issuer> is a
Secure proof: with NSEC records, or with NSEC3 records that do not
carry the Opt-Out flag. A zone signed with NSEC3 and Opt-Out
([[RFC5155]], Section 6) does not provide the proof: a
validator cannot set the AD bit on such a denial ([[RFC5155]],
Section 9.2), so a [=Verifier=] reads it as an Insecure answer.
An Insecure answer is a failure at every name an issuer
publishes ().
Delegation. An issuer that wants another party to operate part of its name space delegates a subtree of it with NS records; this keeps the names where this document places them (). A zone to which the issuer has delegated part of its name space holds the issuer's names, and is signed as the signing of an issuer's zone requires. It has also to be joined to the issuer's zone in the chain of trust: the issuer publishes the DS record of the delegated zone in its own zone, since without the DS record every answer from the delegated zone is Insecure.
The Originator's zone. An [=Originator=]'s zone is
not subject to the requirement on the signing of an issuer's zone:
at the [=Originator=]'s names an
Insecure denial and a Secure one are read
alike. A wildcard or a DNAME elsewhere in an
[=Originator=]'s zone, such as one at its apex, is outside the
prohibition of this section on aliases
and wildcards at _op.<name> and below. A
wildcard does not reach _op.<originator> once
that name exists, and an [=Originator=] that publishes any record
at or below that name creates it.
A wildcard at the apex before
_op.<originator> exists. Until an
[=Originator=] creates _op.<originator>, a wildcard TXT
record at the apex that reads v=op1 is synthesized at
every [=Permitted Host Record=] name and permits every host. That
is what the wildcard under _site._op that this section
forbids would do, and a [=Verifier=] does not distinguish the two
(). A wildcard TXT
record with any other content, such as an SPF record, permits
nothing ().
A DNAME at the apex of an Originator's zone. An
[=Originator=]
whose zone has a DNAME at its apex has first to remove it before it can publish
at _op.<originator>, since no record can exist
below the owner of a DNAME ([[?RFC6672]], Section 2.4). Where the
name does not exist, the query can be
answered through an alias; a [=Verifier=] reads such an answer as
it reads an Insecure one
(), so that an
[=Originator=] that publishes nothing is unpinned, as it would be
without the wildcard.
What the OPKEY specification defines, and what this
document defines. The OPKEY record type, its transitional
publication and the registration of the _op underscored name are defined
in [[OPF-DNS]]. The meaning of each name in the table of this
section, and what a
[=Verifier=] does with the records found there, are defined by
this document.
Where the record is published. An [=issuer=],
that is, a [=Core Profile Issuer=], a [=Profile
Annotation Issuer=], an [=Accreditation Body=] or a [=Root Issuer=]
(), MUST publish its [=Issuer Key
Record=] as an OPKEY record set at
_issuer-key._op.<issuer>, where
<issuer> is the name by which the issuer is
identified ().
What presence means. The record set lists the [=Key Identifiers=] of the keys whose signatures on the issuer's documents a [=Verifier=] accepts: the key the issuer signs with, and the keys the rest of this section has it keep beside that key. The presence of a [=Key Identifier=] in that record set means that signatures with the key are accepted; its absence means that they are not, whatever the documents signed with it say.
What the record carries. An [=Issuer Key Record=] carries the [=Key Identifiers=] of the issuer's own keys only. The keys of an [=Originator=] are listed at separate names (), and no record in the DNS points from an issuer to its parent issuer: the [=Accreditation Chain=] is verified from the documents, as specified in .
The Verifier's check. A [=Verifier=] MUST establish, for every document whose signature it verifies with an issuer's key, that the [=Key Identifier=] of that key is present in the issuer's [=Issuer Key Record=]. A [=Root Core Profile=] itself is not such a document: a [=Verifier=] holds it rather than verifies it against the DNS (). The [=Issuer Accreditations=] and the other [=Core Profiles=] that a [=Root Issuer=] signs are such documents: like those at any other step of a chain, they are checked against the [=Issuer Key Record=] of the issuer that signed them ().
Changing the signing key. An issuer changes the key with which it signs by publishing the [=Key Identifier=] of the new key alongside that of its previous key. As requires, it lets the time to live of its [=Issuer Key Record=] pass before it issues a document signed with the new key. The new key also has to be carried by a new [=Core Profile=] of the issuer before a document signed with the new key can verify, since a [=Verifier=] takes an issuer's key from the issuer's own [=Core Profile=] (). That [=Core Profile=] is issued by the issuer from which the issuer obtains its [=Core Profile=] (), or is a new [=Root Core Profile=]. [[?OPF-OPS]] gives the sequence of these steps.
Keeping the previous key. An issuer keeps the [=Key Identifier=] of the previous key published for at least as long as the longest remaining validity of any document it has signed with that key and has not revoked, and for the [=retention margin=] of beyond that validity, as requires. A document that is valid by its own dates, or one still within a [=Verifier=]'s tolerance, would otherwise become unverifiable. An issuer whose key is compromised MUST remove its [=Key Identifier=] at once, which invalidates every document signed with it.
What the record is, and what it does not carry. A [=Core Profile Issuer=] MUST publish an [=Originator Key Record=] for each [=Core Profile=] it has issued and has not revoked. The record is an OPKEY record set at the [=Originator Key Record Name=] carried in that [=Core Profile=]; it contains one record for each form of the [=Key Identifier=] of each [=Originator Verification Key=] in that [=Core Profile=] (). A [=Verifier=] does not learn from an [=Originator Key Record=] where the [=Core Profile=] itself can be obtained: this document places no record there for that purpose.
Presence and absence. Presence and absence carry the following meanings, and a [=Verifier=] MUST read them as such.
The registration. The registration of an [=Originator=] with a [=Core Profile Issuer=] is in force while at least one [=Originator Key Record=] of that [=Originator=] is published; the [=Core Profile Issuer=] ends it by removing all of them.
The Verifier's rule. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT accept a key that appears in the [=Core Profile=] but not in its [=Originator Key Record=]. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT accept a key that appears in the [=Originator Key Record=] but not in the [=Core Profile=] either, since the [=Verifier=] verifies signatures with the keys the [=Core Profile=] carries.
Two ways in which a key leaves use. An [=Originator Verification Key=] leaves use in one of two states, retired or withdrawn. A key is retired when it is no longer used for new signatures but its record is kept in the [=Originator Key Record=] of each [=Core Profile=] that carries it. Content signed with it remains verifiable, and nothing in the documents or records marks it as retired (). A key is withdrawn when its record is removed from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it; content signed with it no longer verifies.
The Core Profile Issuer's requirements. A [=Core Profile Issuer=] meets the following requirements, which states, and on which the correctness of a [=Verifier=] depends.
Publish the [=Originator Key Record=], and let the negative caching period of the zone pass, before issuing the [=Core Profile=] that carries its name. Every [=Core Profile=] carries a new name (); the wait therefore precedes every issuance, including that of a [=Core Profile=] that only renews the [=Signature Validity Period=] and that of one that changes the keys.
When the [=Originator=]'s keys change, issue a new [=Core Profile=], with its own [=Originator Key Record=] published first as the first requirement states. Keep the [=Originator Key Record=] of the earlier [=Core Profile=], and in it the record of the retired key, until that [=Core Profile=] has expired or been revoked, as requires.
This document calls the short further period that follows the retention margin: it absorbs the time to live of the records and the differences between the clocks involved. Once a [=Core Profile=] has expired and the retention margin has passed, its [=Originator Key Record=] MAY be removed.
A compromised key MUST be withdrawn at once, from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it; the [=Core Profile Issuer=] accepts that signatures made with it stop verifying.
What a Revocation Record is. A [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] revokes a [=Profile Annotation=] before it expires by publishing a [=Revocation Record=]: a TXT record set at the [=Revocation Record Name=] that annotation carries, which names that one issuance of it (). Presence means that the annotation is revoked, and absence means that it is not; only revoked annotations have a record. A body that issues [=Issuer Accreditations=] revokes an [=Issuer Accreditation=] it has issued in the same way, and the requirements of this section on a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] apply to it ().
The form of the record. The record set holds one
TXT record of one character-string. A [=Profile Annotation
Issuer=] MUST give it the form
v=op1; revoked=<time>, where op1
is the version of the content defined here and
<time> is the time at which the annotation was
revoked, written as an Internet date and time [[RFC3339]]. This
document defines no judgement as of the time of signing
(), and nothing in
reads the value. No other field is
defined; in particular the record carries no reason for the
revocation.
The Verifier's rules. A [=Verifier=] MUST decide
on presence alone. It MUST treat a record set whose content it
cannot parse, or whose version is not op1, as a
revocation, so that an error in the content cannot turn a
revocation into silence. It treats the two forms
of a Secure proof that the name holds no such record set as
equivalent, as
requires.
An Insecure answer
at a [=Revocation Record Name=] is a failure of the check, not an
absence.
op1 form
readable, since otherwise a record could not be changed without
being read as a revocation by [=Verifiers=] already deployed.
How long the record is kept, and when none is needed. A [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] MUST keep a [=Revocation Record=] published until the [=Signature Validity Period=] of the revoked [=Profile Annotation=] has ended and the tolerance that allows a [=Verifier=] beyond that end has passed. After that the annotation no longer verifies on any [=Verifier=]'s clock, and the record MAY be removed. The longest such tolerance is the upper limit set in . An annotation that simply ceases to be renewed needs no record: it stops being in force when it expires. A [=Revocation Record=] is for ending an annotation before that time.
An annotation whose period has ended. The absence of a [=Revocation Record=] is meaningful only for an annotation whose [=Signature Validity Period=] has not ended at the time of the query, judged with the tolerance of . Once the period has ended, judged in the same way, the record can be removed, as the rule on how long the record is kept permits. For an annotation whose period has ended by the time of verification, judged with that tolerance, absence therefore means nothing. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT treat such an annotation as in force, whatever the time of judgement a [=Use Case Specification=] names ().
How quickly a revocation is seen. The negative caching parameters of the [=Profile Annotation Issuer=]'s zone and the RRSIG validity period of the zone bound how soon a revocation is seen. Those bounds are properties of the operation of the zone, not of this protocol; see .
Two records an Originator may publish. An [=Originator=] MAY publish two kinds of record in the zone of its [=Identity=]. Neither is required by this document; whether a [=Use Case Specification=] requires them, and when a [=Verifier=] consults them, is defined by that specification. Both have effect only where the zone is signed, because a [=Verifier=] acts on them only when the answer is Secure at the name it queried ().
_op.<originator> with NS
records, as an issuer may delegate part of its name space
(). The delegated zone then has to be
signed and its DS record published in the [=Originator=]'s zone;
without the DS record every answer from it is Insecure and the
records have no effect. A CNAME or DNAME at that name is not a
delegation, and forbids it.
The Issuer Pinning Record. The first, the
[=Issuer Pinning Record=], names the [=Core Profile Issuers=] that
are permitted to issue for this [=Originator=]. It is an SVCB record set [[RFC9460]] at
_op.<originator>; [[OPF-DNS]] is the protocol
mapping document that [[RFC9460]] requires for it, and what each
record means for verification is defined here. In what follows,
"the root" is the root of the DNS (.).
ServiceMode names in its TargetName one permitted
[=Core Profile Issuer=].ServiceMode names no issuer at all if its
TargetName is the root.AliasMode whose TargetName is the root declares
that this [=Originator=] has no [=Originator Profile=] (the
denying form of the record set).
An [=Originator=]
MUST NOT publish records in ServiceMode and a
record in AliasMode at the same name.
How a Verifier reads the records. A [=Verifier=]
MUST NOT follow an AliasMode TargetName; a record in
AliasMode whose TargetName is not the root is read as the
declaration of the denying form, and verification fails. A record
that carries the mandatory parameter
([[RFC9460]], Section 8) is unusable, since this document defines
no parameter a [=Verifier=] could recognize; other parameters are
ignored. A Secure ServiceMode record set in which no record is usable is a
failure; it does not leave the [=Originator=] unpinned.
How a Verifier compares the TargetNames. A
[=Verifier=] MUST compare each TargetName with the issuer of the
[=Core Profile=] as a domain name
() and MUST NOT resolve the
TargetName. The records in ServiceMode are read as a set: the
SvcPriority of a record ([[RFC9460]]) carries no meaning here
beyond telling ServiceMode from AliasMode, and a [=Verifier=] MUST
NOT prefer one TargetName to another, or disregard one, on account
of SvcPriority.
The name queried. A [=Verifier=] MUST build the name it queries from the canonical form of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] (). An [=Identity=] that cannot be put into canonical form is a failure of the verification; the [=Verifier=] MUST NOT proceed as though the [=Originator=] were unpinned.
The outcomes. A [=Verifier=] that consults this record set MUST treat the outcomes as follows.
ServiceMode answer: the [=Originator=] is pinned. If
the issuer of the [=Core Profile=] is not among the TargetNames,
verification fails. A record set in which no record is usable
names no issuer, and verification fails; a record set whose only
TargetName is the root (.) is one.AliasMode answer, whatever its TargetName:
verification fails. This holds also where the record set,
contrary to the [=Originator=]'s requirement on the two modes,
holds records in ServiceMode as well: a
[=Verifier=] MUST NOT read such a record set as a ServiceMode
answer.
The Permitted Host Record. The second is the
[=Permitted Host Record=], a TXT record set at
<host>._site._op.<originator>, whose
Secure presence permits that host to present the
[=Originator Profile=] of this [=Originator=]. The record set
holds one TXT record of one character-string. A permission is
given host by host. An [=Originator=] that permits
several hosts, including hosts that are subdomains of one another,
publishes a record for each; a host whose name would make that
record name longer than the DNS allows cannot be permitted by a
record.
The Originator's requirements. The host MUST be
written in the name in lower case, as an A-label, without a
trailing dot (the canonical form of
). An [=Originator=] MUST give
the record the form v=op1: the version of the content
defined here, and nothing further, since everything the record
says is said by its being there. As
requires, an [=Originator=] publishes no wildcard record under
_site._op; a wildcard would permit every host at
once.
The Verifier's rules. A [=Verifier=] MUST query
the name built from the host as presented, and no other name. A
[=Verifier=] MUST treat the host as permitted only if the record
set holds a TXT record whose single character-string is
v=op1; a record set that holds no such record, for
example one synthesized from a wildcard elsewhere in the zone, is
read as absence. A [=Verifier=] consults the record only for a
host the [=Use Case Specification=] tells it to check (step 3 of
). It MUST treat a
Secure proof of absence, an Insecure answer and an answer reached
through an alias each as a refusal, since the record is consulted
only where something has claimed the host.
What changes the records. Both records are static: they do not change when the [=Originator=]'s keys change, when a new [=Core Profile=] is issued for it, or when a [=Profile Annotation=] is revoked. They change when the [=Originator=] changes [=Core Profile Issuer=], declares that it has none, or permits a host or stops permitting one.
The four validation states. The outcomes named Secure, Insecure, Bogus and Indeterminate are the security states of [[RFC4035]], Section 4.3. Every statement this document makes about the presence or absence of a record is a statement about a DNSSEC validation state.
How a Verifier establishes the state. A [=Verifier=] MUST determine that state for itself, by one of two means:
A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT rely on an unauthenticated indication that an answer was validated. A [=Verifier=] that has neither of the two means cannot carry out the procedure of this document. How a [=Verifier=] establishes the validation state of an answer is the same at the names a [=Use Case Specification=] directs it to query; what the state means at such a name is that specification's.
A Verifier that relies on a resolver. A [=Verifier=] that obtains the state from a resolver MUST have assurance, by configuration or by test, that the resolver validates. An answer from a resolver that does not validate carries no validation state, and MUST NOT be read as Insecure.
Aliases. At the names this document defines (), a [=Verifier=] MUST use a record only at the name it queried and MUST NOT follow an alias. This rule does not apply to names that a [=Use Case Specification=] directs a [=Verifier=] to query.
An answer reached through an alias. An answer in which the record set belongs to another owner name, because a CNAME or DNAME record redirected the query, whether that record was published or synthesized from a wildcard, is a failure for every record an issuer publishes, whatever its validation state. For the [=Originator=]'s records () such an answer is read as an Insecure answer would be, unless its validation state is Bogus or Indeterminate, in which case the last row of the table of outcomes applies. The records found at the alias target are never used. An answer synthesized from a wildcard for the queried name is not distinguished from any other answer.
How each outcome is read. The outcomes are read as follows.
The last row. An Indeterminate outcome is one
for which the [=Verifier=] could not determine the state at all;
it is read as this row, and at _op.<originator>
it does not lead to the unpinned path. That is what keeps an
attacker from turning a record it cannot forge into one that is
simply not there. Whether, and how often, a
[=Verifier=] retries before concluding that there is no usable
answer is its own matter.
A [=Verifier=] that obtains the state from a resolver sees an Indeterminate outcome as the resolver reports it, which is commonly as it reports an Insecure one; the last row applies in full only to a [=Verifier=] that validates for itself. With a trust anchor for the root, and under the assurance required of a [=Verifier=] that relies on a resolver, an Indeterminate outcome does not arise in practice. What remains is the case in which the DNSSEC records cannot be obtained, which is a resolution failure.
A [=Verifier=] that validates for itself and reaches the DNS through a recursive resolver sets the CD bit ([[RFC4035]], Section 3.2.2; [[RFC6840]], Section 5.9), so that it receives the data the resolver would otherwise withhold and reaches its own verdict; a [=Verifier=] that relies on the resolver's result does not set it. Either way the outcome is read as this row.
Four layers, each ended in two ways. At each of the four layers of the following table, validity ends either by an act in the DNS, of the issuer or of the [=Originator=], or by the document expiring without being issued again.
| Layer | Ended by an act in the DNS | Ended by expiry |
|---|---|---|
| One [=Originator Verification Key=] | The [=Core Profile Issuer=] removes that key's record from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it | Every [=Core Profile=] that carries the key expires |
| One [=Core Profile=] | The [=Core Profile Issuer=] removes the whole [=Originator Key Record=] of that [=Core Profile=] | That [=Core Profile=] expires |
| The registration of an [=Originator=] | The [=Core Profile Issuer=] removes every [=Originator Key Record=] of that [=Originator=]; or, where the [=Use Case Specification=] has the [=Verifier=] consult the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], the [=Originator=] declares in its own zone that it has no [=Originator Profile=] | Every [=Core Profile=] of that [=Originator=] expires and no new one is issued |
| One [=Profile Annotation=] | The [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] publishes the [=Revocation Record=] | The annotation expires and is not issued again |
What an Originator and its Core Profile Issuer can each do. An [=Originator=] and its [=Core Profile Issuer=] are not symmetric in what they can do to an [=Originator Profile=]. Each can stop it independently of the other, the [=Originator=] where the [=Use Case Specification=] has the [=Verifier=] consult its [=Issuer Pinning Record=] (). But only an issuer can extend the [=Signature Validity Periods=] of an [=Originator Profile=]: those periods are signed by the issuers, and an [=Originator=] cannot lengthen a [=Signature Validity Period=] that someone else has signed. An [=Originator=] whose zone is not signed has no means of its own at all, and depends on its [=Core Profile Issuer=] acting.
The issuers' requirements. Issuers meet the following requirements, which keep a document that is valid by its own dates always verifiable.
An issuer MUST publish a record before issuing the document that depends on it, and MUST let a period pass between the two, since a [=Verifier=] might otherwise hold a cached answer that lacks the record. That period is the negative caching period of the zone where the name is new (), or the time to live of the record set where the record is added to a set that already exists.
How quickly an act is seen, and the replay window. The caching parameters of the zone decide how quickly an act in the DNS is seen, and its RRSIG validity period the window in which an old proof can be replayed. This document fixes no values for either; see .
The RRSIG validity period of a zone. A zone's RRSIG validity period is the period within which the RRSIG records of the zone, and so the DNS answers they sign, can be relied on; it belongs to the zone, not to any signed document, and it bounds only how long an answer, a proof of absence among them, can be replayed. This document places no requirement on the RRSIG validity period of a zone; it treats that window, whose cost sets out, as a given limit rather than requiring a value for it. The value recommended where that period can be set belongs to the operational rules under which issuers run their zones [[?OPF-OPS]].
Until the OPKEY type value is allocated. Until a type value has been allocated for the OPKEY record, the record cannot be published as such. For that period [[OPF-DNS]] defines a transitional form, and the [=Issuer Key Records=] and [=Originator Key Records=] of this document are published in that form. An [=issuer=] that keeps both forms at a name after the allocation keeps them identical, as [[OPF-DNS]] requires. A [=Verifier=] MUST implement the fallback rule of [[OPF-DNS]], since during that period there is nothing else to find. Nothing else in this document changes during the transition: the names, what presence and absence mean at each of them, and the procedure of are the same before and after the allocation.
This section specifies the procedure by which a [=Verifier=] decides whether the [=Content Attestation=] is valid and which [=Profile Annotations=] are in force. The [=Verifier=] is given an [=Originator Profile Bundle=], the [=Content Attestation=] or what the [=Use Case Specification=] has stand for it, and a [=Presented Identity=]. The section fixes the order of local and DNS steps, the inputs a [=Use Case Specification=] supplies, and the outcome the procedure produces.
What a Verifier holds. Before it carries out the procedure, a [=Verifier=] MUST hold the following.
Documents held in advance. A [=Verifier=] MAY hold [=Issuer Accreditations=] and issuers' [=Core Profiles=] in advance, but MUST NOT require them.
The inputs a Use Case Specification defines. The procedure is carried out on inputs that a [=Use Case Specification=] defines, listed here so that a [=Verifier=] knows what it is given and a [=Use Case Specification=] knows what it owes under .
Everything else in this procedure is the same in every use case. As requires, a [=Use Case Specification=] does not weaken a requirement of this document.
Three groups of steps. The steps of are numbered by what depends on what, not by the order in which they run. They fall into three groups: what a [=Verifier=] does locally, what it asks the DNS, and the judgement it derives at the end.
Local verification before any query. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT issue a DNS query for a name it took from a document in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] before it has verified that document's signature through an [=Accreditation Chain=] that ends at a [=Root Core Profile=] it accepts. A [=Verifier=] SHOULD also verify the signature on the [=Content Attestation=], with the key it selects from the [=Core Profile=] (step 7 of ), before it issues any DNS query.
No signature in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] or on the [=Content Attestation=] needs the DNS to be verified: the key of each issuer arrives in that issuer's [=Core Profile=]. The DNS is asked only whether a key that has already verified a signature is still current, and whether a [=Core Profile=] or an annotation is still in force.
The check of the [=Content Attestation=] is local. It keeps a [=Content Attestation=] that is not genuine from causing any query, even where the [=Core Profile=] and the [=Accreditation Chains=] beside it are genuine, as when they have been copied from another [=Originator Profile Bundle=].
Parallel queries. A [=Verifier=] MAY issue in parallel the queries that follow from documents it has verified; they do not depend on one another. The names of are built from the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries, although the [=Presented Identity=] itself comes from the delivery channel rather than from the [=Originator Profile Bundle=]. The queries for them therefore wait, like every other query, for the chain of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] and for the verification of the [=Core Profile=]'s signature; the comparison in step 3, which needs no query, may be made at once.
The five bounds. Five bounds limit what one verification may cost. This document refers to them by number.
A [=Verifier=] MUST process what falls within all five, and MUST NOT process more. An issuer and an [=Originator=] MUST NOT assemble an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] that exceeds any of the five; in return, what is sent within them is processed in full by every conforming [=Verifier=]. This document fixes the values rather than leaving each [=Verifier=] to choose them, so that they bind the sending side as well.
What counts toward the bounds. A [=Core Profile=]
is about the [=Originator=] where the [=Identity=] it is about is that
of the [=Originator=], compared as
specifies. A [=Core Profile=]
about a name below that [=Identity=], such as a subdomain of it, is
counted as one about another party: where the [=Originator=] is
example.com, a [=Core Profile=] about
news.example.com counts toward bound 4, not bound 5.
Counting under bounds 4 and 5. Bounds 4 and 5 count every document of their kind that the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries, in the order in which it carries them. A document that the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries more than once, as the same sequence of octets, counts once toward every bound and is processed once. An [=Issuer Accreditation=] about the [=Originator=] that falls within bound 3 may also serve as a step of an [=Accreditation Chain=], and is not counted toward bound 4.
Exceeding a bound. Exceeding a bound is not by itself a failure of the verification. What happens depends on the bound:
The reason for the ordering requirement and the bounds is the same. A [=Verifier=] that queried the names it was given before verifying who gave them would let anyone who can present an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] direct queries at any zone, in any number, at no cost to themselves. Verifying locally first means that a forged document produces no query at all, because it has no chain to a [=Root Core Profile=]. The bounds then limit what a party with a genuine chain can ask for.
They also keep the cost of a verification predictable. A [=Verifier=] that has nothing cached issues one query for the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], two for the [=Core Profile Issuer=], one for each [=Profile Annotation Issuer=], one for each [=Profile Annotation=], and three for each step of each chain. At the bounds that is one hundred and fifty-one queries, and one more where the [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted; once the chains are cached, which permits, the same verification costs forty-three. Opaque [=record labels=] leave a zone's negative answers aggressively cacheable, which is what keeps the repeated absence checks cheap for the zones that answer them.
The values are chosen with room above what is deployed rather than at it. A chain is one step long in the arrangement in use, where one body accredits issuers directly; four leaves room for two intermediate bodies, such as a national or sectoral [=Accreditation Body=], and one step in reserve. Depth is kept small because it affects not only the number of queries but also the size of the [=Accreditation Chains=] the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] has to carry, which is paid once per delivery.
Eight annotation issuers is well above the number an [=Originator=] is expected to have, which in the uses foreseen is a single digit. The distribution in real deployments has not been measured, and a bound set narrowly and widened later costs a revision of this document, so it is set wide. Thirty-two annotations allows four per issuer at bound 2. Bound 3 is the one that governs cost: each [=Profile Annotation=] costs a query for its [=Revocation Record=] and a signature verification, and bounds 1 and 2 do not limit how many annotations one issuer may present.
Thirty-six is four steps for each of the nine chains a verification can need, one for the [=Core Profile Issuer=] and one for each of eight [=Profile Annotation Issuers=]. An [=Originator Profile Bundle=] within the other bounds never needs more, and the bound keeps the local work of building chains as predictable as the queries that follow.
Two [=Core Profiles=] about the [=Originator=] are an earlier one and a later one, which stand side by side until the earlier one expires or is revoked (). An [=Issuer Accreditation=] about the [=Originator=] is a [=Profile Annotation=], and counts toward bound 3 instead, even where it also serves as a step of a chain. An [=Originator=] that has accredited an issuer of its own annotations, or that issues annotations itself, needs it there, and it is already bounded.
The bounds limit the number of documents, not the number of chains that can be built from them. The first chain that verifies from a party toward the root depends only on that party and on the steps that remain toward the root. It can therefore be found once and used again, and the local work is bounded by the number of documents and the depth of a chain rather than by the number of chains.
The steps, and what a failure is. A [=Verifier=] carries out the following steps. Unless a step says otherwise, a check that does not succeed is a failure of the verification as a whole. Each step that queries the DNS is marked (DNS); the order in which the queries may be made is at the end of this section and in .
Bind the identity (DNS where the [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted). Establish that the [=Presented Identity=] belongs to the [=Originator=] whose [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries, by the rule the [=Use Case Specification=] defines, comparing domain names as specifies and consulting the [=Permitted Host Record=] where that rule requires it ().
Where no Presented Identity is supplied. Where the [=Use Case Specification=] covers a setting in which the delivery gives no [=Presented Identity=], such as content read from an archive, offline, or from an attachment, this step is not carried out. The [=Verifier=] then reports the binding as not checked (); this alone is not a failure of the verification.
Check the [=Core Profile=] (DNS). Verify the signature on the [=Core Profile=] with the key of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] taken from that issuer's own [=Core Profile=], which step 2 verified or the [=Verifier=] holds as a [=Root Core Profile=]. Check that the [=Core Profile=] is within its [=Signature Validity Period=] at the time of judgement ().
The issuer's standing and its key. Check also that the [=Core Profile Issuer=] is the [=Root Issuer=] or an issuer established as a [=Core Profile Issuer=] by the [=Accreditation Chain=] that step 2 verified for it, as requires of the [=Core Profile=] of each issuer along a chain. A [=Core Profile=] from any other issuer fails this step. Check also that the [=Key Identifier=] of the key that signed it is present in the [=Core Profile Issuer=]'s [=Issuer Key Record=].
More than one Core Profile about the Originator. Where the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries more than one [=Core Profile=] about the [=Originator=], as happens while the [=Originator=]'s keys are being changed, try them one at a time in the order of , within bound 5 of . For each in turn, carry out step 2 for its [=Core Profile Issuer=], step 4, the checks of this step, step 6 and step 7; the [=Core Profile=] used is the first for which all of these succeed.
Verify the [=Content Attestation=]. Where the [=Content Attestation=] carries the [=Identity=] of the [=Originator=], check that the [=Identity=] it carries as its issuer is the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] is about (). Where it does not, the [=Originator=] and its [=Core Profile=] are those the rule of the [=Use Case Specification=] determines (), and that determination stands in place of this comparison.
The signature. Select from the [=Core Profile=] the [=Originator Verification Key=] whose [=Key Identifier=] the [=Content Attestation=] names, or that what it carries in place of the [=Key Identifier=] determines (), and verify the signature on the [=Content Attestation=] with that key. This needs no query ().
The key is current. Then check that the key is [=current=] for that [=Core Profile=]: that its [=Originator Key Record=], retrieved in step 6, carries it, matching it as specifies. As requires, a key that the [=Originator Key Record=] does not carry is not used, and neither is a key that is in the [=Originator Key Record=] but not in the [=Core Profile=]. A key is [=withdrawn=] by removing its record from the [=Originator Key Records=], so a key is current only while the [=Originator Key Record=] carries its [=Key Identifier=].
Check each [=Profile Annotation=] (DNS). Take them in the order of , as far as the bounds of allow. For each one the [=Verifier=] intends to use, check the following.
An annotation that fails any of these is not in force; it does not by itself make the verification fail.
Two chains. The [=Issuer Accreditation=] through which the issuer holds the kind, and its chain, need not be those through which the issuer's key is taken. Each is verified, with the checks in the DNS of , and either failing leaves the annotation out of force.
An [=Issuer Accreditation=] about the [=Originator=]. Such an annotation, whatever standing it states, is a [=Profile Annotation=] like any other: it is checked in this step and counts toward the bounds of .
The queries of these steps wait as follows ():
How a chain is verified. A [=Verifier=] MUST verify an [=Accreditation Chain=] starting from a [=Root Core Profile=] it accepts, using the documents of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] alone. It verifies the topmost [=Issuer Accreditation=] with a key of that [=Root Core Profile=], takes from the [=Core Profile=] of the issuer so accredited the key that verifies the next [=Issuer Accreditation=], and so on until it reaches the issuer whose document it is verifying.
More than one Root Core Profile of a Root Issuer. Where the [=Verifier=] accepts more than one [=Root Core Profile=] of the same [=Root Issuer=], as while that issuer's key is being changed, it verifies the topmost [=Issuer Accreditation=], and any [=Core Profile=] the [=Root Issuer=] issued, with the [=Root Core Profile=] that carries the key which signed it.
The periods of each Issuer Accreditation. The [=Verifier=] MUST check the periods of each [=Issuer Accreditation=] along the chain as step 8 of checks those of an annotation, the time of judgement being that of .
The [=Root Core Profile=], which is not an [=Issuer Accreditation=], is not judged by its dates ().
The Core Profile of each issuer along the chain. The [=Verifier=] MUST NOT accept the [=Core Profile=] of an issuer along the chain unless that [=Core Profile=] was issued by the [=Root Issuer=] or by an issuer established as a [=Core Profile Issuer=] toward the root in the same chain. A [=Core Profile=] that anyone else issued is ignored, as a document the procedure does not use (). It MUST NOT use a [=Core Profile=] so issued until it has verified the signature on that [=Core Profile=] with a key of its issuer and checked that the [=Core Profile=] is within its [=Signature Validity Period=] at the time of judgement ().
Which Core Profile is the next. At each step the [=Verifier=] MUST take the next [=Core Profile=] by the [=Identity=] the [=Issuer Accreditation=] is about, comparing [=Identities=] as specifies. The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] can carry more than one [=Core Profile=] about that [=Identity=] issued by an issuer so established, as happens while the issuer's keys are being changed. The [=Verifier=] MUST then take the first of them in the order of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] whose signature verifies and that is within its [=Signature Validity Period=] at the time of judgement. All of them count toward bound 4 of .
What is not an Accreditation Chain. A party appears at most once along an [=Accreditation Chain=], the [=Root Issuer=] included: a sequence of accreditations that returns to a party already on it is not an [=Accreditation Chain=]. A chain that does not end at an accepted [=Root Core Profile=] is not verified, and neither is a chain longer than allows; no DNS query follows from either.
The checks in the DNS. For each step of a verified chain, the [=Verifier=] MUST then check in the DNS that:
A check that does not succeed. A check (a) to (c) that does not succeed, like a check of the [=Signature Validity Period=] of an [=Issuer Accreditation=], has the following effect, as for a chain that is too deep ():
Every step is checked because an issuer whose own accreditation has been revoked cannot pass on a standing it no longer has.
A cached chain. A cached chain is, for one issuer, the documents of its [=Accreditation Chain=] that the [=Verifier=] has verified and the DNS answers it consulted for them; it is the [=Verifier=]'s own, and it serves only to spare a later verification the same queries. A [=Verifier=] MAY cache a verified chain per issuer.
How long a cached chain may be used. The [=Verifier=] MUST NOT use a cached chain after the shortest time to live of the records it consulted for that chain has elapsed, nor after the end of the [=Signature Validity Period=] of any document in the chain other than the [=Root Core Profile=]. It MUST NOT use it for a time of judgement that any such document does not cover (). It SHOULD keep that cache in storage that outlives a single verification.
A cached chain and the Originator Profile Bundle. A cached chain does not take the place of a document the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries. Where the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries a [=Core Profile=] of an issuer on the chain other than the one the cached chain holds, as while that issuer's keys are being changed, the [=Verifier=] verifies that step with the [=Core Profile=] the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries. Where it carries several, the [=Verifier=] chooses among them as Which Core Profile is the next says.
What the procedure yields. The procedure yields, for one [=Content Attestation=]:
What a Verifier reports. Wherever it passes the outcome on, a [=Verifier=]:
What an outcome with the binding not checked says. Such an outcome says that the [=Content Attestation=] verified, not that the [=Content=] was presented by the [=Originator=] it names. What is done with the outcome, and how it is shown to a [=Recipient=], is not specified here.
The time of judgement. Unless the [=Use Case Specification=] defines otherwise, validity is judged at the time of verification: every check of a [=Signature Validity Period=] in is made against that time. A [=Use Case Specification=] that judges at another time, such as the time at which a message was received, states which time that is and for which of its parties it applies, as requires.
A time the signer wrote is never the time of judgement. A time at which a [=Use Case Specification=] judges validity MUST be one the delivery channel gives the [=Verifier=]. A time the signer wrote, such as the beginning of a document's own [=Signature Validity Period=], or a time carried as an attribute of a signature, MUST NOT be the time at which validity is judged. The party whose document is being judged chooses its value.
No earlier state. A check of presence or absence in the DNS is always a check of the state at the moment of the query, and no time can be substituted for it. The DNS holds no record of what it answered before, and this document defines nothing that would let an earlier state be asked for. A use case that has to show later that something was valid at an earlier time does so from the record of a party that verified it at that time; this document does not define such a record.
What a Verifier may cache, and for how long. A [=Verifier=] MAY cache what it obtains, within these bounds.
What the parameters are. The behaviour of the framework in time is governed by the parameters below. This document names them, says who chooses each and what each governs, and states in the constraints between them.
Where the values are. This document fixes no values for these parameters: those belong to the [=Use Case Specifications=] and to the operational rules under which issuers run their zones. The Operations document [[?OPF-OPS]] that carries those rules has not been published; until it is, the recommended values that concern a use case are stated in its [=Use Case Specification=], and those that concern the time to live, the negative caching and the RRSIG validity period of the issuers' zones in [[OPF-DNS]]. No recommended value has been published for the retention of a [=retired=] key's record or for the overlap period of an issuer's keys; both are bounded below by .
What is a constant instead. The numbers this document does fix, the upper limit on the tolerance of a [=Verifier=]'s clock and the five bounds of , are protocol constants, not parameters in this sense. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT allow a tolerance of more than five minutes when it compares times ().
Two parameters a DNS provider often sets. The negative caching parameters of a zone and its RRSIG validity period are commonly set by a DNS provider rather than by the party that answers for the zone. An issuer that cannot set those two cannot promise how quickly its revocations take effect, nor how soon a new record can be relied on.
What a Use Case Specification defines. A [=Use Case Specification=] applies this document to one way of delivering content. To conform, it MUST define each of the following.
What a Use Case Specification may and may not
do. A [=Use Case
Specification=] MUST NOT define a DNS name under
_op, change what presence or absence means at any name
of , or weaken a requirement of this
document. It MAY impose requirements this document does not, and
MAY require what this document leaves optional. A [=Use Case
Specification=] uses the terms of with
the meanings given there. A [=Use Case Specification=] that adds a
document particular to its use case to the [=Originator Profile=]
() defines what it contains, whether an
[=Originator Profile Bundle=] has to carry it, and how it reaches
the [=Verifier=]. It also defines any check of that document that it
adds to the procedure of , which does not
itself check that document.
This section explains the security properties of the shared design that do not depend on the use case. It states no requirement: every requirement it relies on is stated in and , and this section says why those requirements are there and what they do not cover. Considerations that follow from delivery and identity binding are in the [=Use Case Specifications=]; those specific to the OPKEY record, its size and its transitional form are in [[OPF-DNS]] ().
Every statement this document makes about the DNS is a statement about a DNSSEC validation state (). Without DNSSEC a record could be forged or suppressed by anyone on the resolution path, and the DNS would add nothing to what the documents of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] already say. The framework therefore takes no assurance from a record whose validation state the [=Verifier=] has not established for itself.
A [=Verifier=] establishes that state in one of two ways: it validates with its own trust anchor, or it relies on a validating resolver reached over a channel that authenticates the resolver and protects the answer, and takes the resolver's word for the result. An indication of validation that arrives unauthenticated, such as the AD bit in a plaintext answer, can be set by anyone on the path and gives no assurance. A resolver that does not validate sets no AD bit at all, and a [=Verifier=] cannot tell that from an Insecure answer; this is why requires assurance that the resolver validates.
A [=Verifier=] that has neither means cannot tell a Secure answer from any other, and every DNS step of the procedure fails for it. This is a real constraint on where a [=Verifier=] can be placed. Web browsers and mail clients do not usually validate DNSSEC by themselves, so a [=Use Case Specification=] that places the [=Verifier=] in one of them has to provide one of the two means ().
The operators of the zones involved are trusted parties. Whoever controls an issuer's zone controls what the framework believes about that issuer's keys and about the [=Core Profiles=] or [=Profile Annotations=] it has issued, and whoever controls an [=Originator=]'s zone controls its pinning. The security of a zone's DNSSEC keys and of the interface through which it is provisioned is therefore part of the security of the framework. The requirements that follow are operational and are not stated here.
reads a Bogus answer, an Indeterminate outcome, a SERVFAIL, a timeout and any other absence of a usable answer as a failure of the verification, at every name, and never as absence. The reason is the [=Issuer Pinning Record=].
Suppose a [=Verifier=]
treated a failed query for _op.<originator> as
though the record were absent. An attacker who holds a [=Core
Profile=] for that [=Originator=] from a [=Core Profile Issuer=]
other than the pinned one could then make the pinned [=Originator=]
appear unpinned by disrupting the resolution of that one query.
Pinning would then protect nothing.
At the [=Revocation Record=], where absence means that nothing has
been revoked, the same rule keeps an attacker from hiding a
revocation by blocking the query. At the other names absence
already means failure, so nothing is lost by treating a failure
the same way.
Only two outcomes lead to the unpinned path: a Secure proof that the record does not exist, which is a DNSSEC-backed statement that there is nothing there, and an Insecure answer, which is the state of a zone that is not signed. An answer reached through an alias is read as the second. Neither is a failure of the kind that disrupting resolution produces, as a SERVFAIL is. An Insecure answer is nevertheless never given the weight of a Secure one, which is why an [=Originator=]'s records have effect only where its zone is signed ().
The records that issuers publish are read more strictly: an Insecure answer at any of them is a failure (), including at a [=Revocation Record Name=], where absence is the ordinary answer. An attacker on the path cannot make a signed zone answer Insecure. What produces an Insecure answer at such a name is an error on the issuer's side, such as delegating the zone that holds its records () without signing it.
Were Insecure read as absence there, that error would silently turn every revocation below it into none; read as a failure, it is seen. This is the principle by which a [=Revocation Record=] whose content cannot be parsed counts as a revocation (). The cost is that an issuer cannot publish its records, its [=Revocation Records=] included, in a zone it does not sign, so that in effect every zone in which an issuer publishes has to be signed.
A Secure proof of absence can nevertheless be supplied by an attacker who forges nothing. A proof that the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] did not exist, made before the [=Originator=] published it, remains valid until the signatures in it expire, and an attacker on the path between a [=Verifier=] and the authoritative servers can replay it within that period. The [=Verifier=] then proceeds as for an unpinned [=Originator=], and a [=Core Profile=] from an issuer that the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] does not name is accepted.
The denying form of that record set () is exposed in the same way. Until the older proof of absence has expired, an [=Originator=] that has declared that it has no [=Originator Profile=] is not protected by the declaration against a [=Verifier=] the attacker can reach. This is the replay of applied to the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], with the same bounds: it needs that position on the path, and it ends with the signature.
When an [=Originator=] changes the issuer that its [=Issuer Pinning Record=] names, an earlier answer naming the previous issuer can be replayed in the same way, and a [=Core Profile=] from that previous issuer is then accepted until the signatures on that answer expire. An [=Originator=] that publishes an [=Issuer Pinning Record=], or changes the issuer it names, therefore obtains its full effect only once the signatures on the earlier answers of its zone have expired, a period commonly set by its DNS provider ().
The same asymmetry, that absence means failure at every name but that of the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], also puts a weight on how domain names are compared. requires a [=Verifier=] to put both sides into canonical form and then match them exactly. It does not permit a loose match: two values whose canonical forms differ are two different names however alike they look.
A normalization that maps two distinct names to one canonical form would make the [=Verifier=] accept a name it was not given. A normalization that fails where it should succeed generally costs only a failed check, since absence means failure at every name but one.
The exception is the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], which is queried under a name built from the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=]. A name built wrongly is a name in some other zone, whose Secure proof of absence is a true answer about a question nobody asked; taking it would turn a pinned [=Originator=] into an unpinned one. This is why requires that name to be built from the canonical form, and an [=Identity=] that cannot be put into canonical form to be a failure rather than an unpinned outcome.
The cost of this rule is availability. A fault in the DNS of any party the procedure consults, including the [=Originator=]'s own zone when the [=Use Case Specification=] consults it, becomes a failed verification rather than an unpinned one. A [=Verifier=] can retry before it concludes that there is no usable answer, and how it does so is its own matter; it does not proceed as though the answer had been absence, which forbids.
An [=Originator=] that pins publishes the record at
_op.<originator>, and from then on only a
change to its own zone can remove it. A CNAME or a wildcard
elsewhere in the zone has no effect on a name that exists, and an
alias at the name itself is read as an Insecure answer would be
and is never followed. No other zone can therefore make the [=Originator=] pinned
or unpinned ().
The names a [=Verifier=] queries are taken from the documents in
the [=Originator Profile Bundle=]: only the labels under _op are fixed
by this document, and the suffix is the name of whichever issuer
the document claims. Anyone who can put an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] in front of a
[=Verifier=] could therefore choose the zones it would query, and
how many. Three parties could be harmed by that, and this
specification answers each differently.
A third party's zone, by reflection. An attacker
who wrote the name of a victim as the issuer of a forged document
and showed it to many [=Verifiers=] would have each of them ask
for _issuer-key._op.<victim>. The queries are sent by
the [=Verifiers=]' resolvers, whose source addresses cannot be
forged, and the answers return to those resolvers, not to the
victim. The victim's authoritative servers receive one small query
per resolver per negative caching period, and answer with a
cacheable proof of absence. The amplification factor is below one.
This is a property of querying through resolvers and holds
whatever order the procedure follows.
The [=Verifier=] itself, by exhaustion. This is the attack that is cheapest to mount against the framework. An [=Originator Profile Bundle=] with many [=Profile Annotations=], each from a different issuer, each with a deep chain, and with names chosen to defeat every cache, would cost a [=Verifier=] a query and a DNSSEC validation per name. Two requirements of answer it.
The first is the order: a [=Verifier=] queries no name it took from a document until that document's signature has been verified through an [=Accreditation Chain=] ending at a [=Root Core Profile=] it accepts. This is possible because the chain is in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and no signature needs the DNS to be verified. A forged document has no such chain, so it produces no query at all, and what it costs the [=Verifier=] is signature verifications, a local cost.
A forged [=Content Attestation=] can be placed beside a genuine [=Core Profile=] and genuine [=Accreditation Chains=] copied from another [=Originator Profile Bundle=]; what keeps it from causing queries is that the [=Verifier=] verifies the attestation's own signature before any query (). A [=Verifier=] that did not would query names of genuine issuers, whose answers are cacheable, so the cost is small but not nil.
The second is the bounds on the number of [=Profile Annotation Issuers=] and on chain depth, which limit that local cost and limit what a party with a genuine chain can ask for. Between them, the cost of one verification is predictable.
When the [=Verifier=] has nothing cached, it issues one query for the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], two for the [=Core Profile Issuer=], one for each [=Profile Annotation Issuer=], one for each [=Profile Annotation=], and three for each step of each chain. Where the [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted, it issues one more. This is the count of the note of . Once the chains are cached, which they can be per issuer (), the queries for the steps of the chains are no longer issued.
The order was changed to obtain this. An earlier version of the design allowed the queries to be issued in parallel with signature verification, so that a forged document cost a query per name and the attacker chose the suffix.
What was given up is the head start of issuing queries as soon as the names are read, the query for the [=Originator=]'s records included, since their names are built from the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries. It is a matter of milliseconds, since the local verification of a chain is fast. The analysis assumes that the chain is in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=]. A [=Use Case Specification=] that had the [=Verifier=] fetch part of a chain, through the DNS or by any other means, on the strength of a document it has not yet verified would reintroduce requests for unverified names and would have to revisit it.
A genuine document, by displacement. The bounds count documents in the order of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] before any signature is verified. A party able to place documents ahead of the genuine ones, such as one that relays or rewrites the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], can therefore push the genuine ones beyond a bound and make the verification fail or leave an annotation out of force. Such a party could as well remove the genuine documents, so the bounds give it no capability it did not have; what it obtains is denial, never a false result.
An issuer's zone, by legitimate load. What reaches an issuer's authoritative servers is the queries of [=Verifiers=] that have verified a genuine chain to that issuer, aggregated and cached by resolvers. Absence is the common answer at the Revocation Record node, and a zone signed with NSEC records lets a resolver that performs aggressive negative caching [[?RFC8198]] answer a query for a name in a gap it has already seen without asking the authoritative server again. A query for a name that does not exist then rarely reaches the issuer.
The same caching keeps a newly published name from being seen until the negative caching period of the zone has passed. This is why has the issuer wait before issuing the document that carries the name. requires the zone to be signed without Opt-Out, so that absence is a Secure proof. Whether it is signed with NSEC or with NSEC3 is a choice on which the operational document [[?OPF-OPS]] gives a recommendation. The load that remains is the ordinary cost of publishing in the DNS, and the availability of an issuer's servers is part of what its registrations are worth ().
Revocation in the framework is not immediate, and the delays are bounded by parameters that the revoking party often does not set (). Three windows follow.
Detection delay. The withdrawal of a key, the revocation of a [=Core Profile=] or the end of a registration is seen when the positive answer cached for the [=Originator Key Record=] or the [=Issuer Key Record=] expires, that is, within its time to live. The revocation of a [=Profile Annotation=] is seen when the cached proof that no [=Revocation Record=] existed expires, that is, within the negative caching period of the [=Profile Annotation Issuer=]'s zone.
That period is commonly set by the zone's DNS provider rather than by the issuer, and can be of the order of a day. This specification accepts this because the use cases defined so far need revocation within days rather than minutes. An issuer that can set the negative caching parameters of its zone, or that delegates its Revocation Record node to a zone where it can, shortens the delay; a use case that needed more than that would have to revisit this part of the specification.
Before any of these three windows, there is also the time a party takes to act: an issuer that learns of a compromise has to publish the change before any of the windows starts to run, and this document bounds none of that time. The caching bounds on the [=Verifier=] () are what keep the windows as short as the zone parameters allow; a [=Verifier=] that held a document or an answer longer would add a delay of its own.
An [=Originator=]'s key. An attacker who holds the [=Signing Key=] that corresponds to an [=Originator Verification Key=] can sign [=Content Attestations=] in the [=Originator=]'s name until the key ceases to be current. The [=Core Profile Issuer=] ends that by removing the key's record from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it, with the detection delay above. The retention that otherwise requires does not apply to a compromised key, and the issuer accepts that content signed with it stops verifying.
The [=Originator=] itself has one means that does not go through its [=Core Profile Issuer=]: the declaration in its own zone that it has no [=Originator Profile=] (). It is coarse, since it stops everything, and it is available only to an [=Originator=] whose zone is signed, and only in use cases where the [=Verifier=] consults the record. An [=Originator=] without it depends on how fast its [=Core Profile Issuer=] acts, which is a service level this document does not set. The asymmetry is inherent: an issuer writes the end of a [=Signature Validity Period=] inside its signature, so an [=Originator=] cannot extend one, and can only cut it short.
Keeping a replaced key. An [=Originator=] that replaces a key has to choose between keeping the replaced key as a [=retired=] key and having its [=Core Profile Issuer=] withdraw it. A retired key's record stays in the [=Originator Key Record=] of each [=Core Profile=] that carries it until that [=Core Profile=] has expired or been revoked (); withdrawing the key removes its record from every [=Originator Key Record=] at once. The choice is an exchange of one property for another. Keeping it keeps every [=Content Attestation=] already signed with it verifiable while that [=Core Profile=] lasts; withdrawing it closes the window in which a compromise of that key could be used.
The window does not narrow with time, because a [=Verifier=] has no trustworthy account of when a [=Content Attestation=] was signed: the only time the attestation carries is one its signer wrote, which excludes from the judgement for that reason. An attacker holding the [=Signing Key=] of a key that is still current can therefore produce an attestation that appears to be old, and nothing in the framework separates it from the genuine old content the key was kept for. A key thought to be compromised is accordingly [=withdrawn=] at once, whatever content stops verifying.
Which of the two ways of dealing with a replaced key suits a use case, retiring it or signing the content again with the new key and withdrawing the replaced one, depends on whether the content can be signed again after it has been delivered. Which to recommend is for the [=Use Case Specification=] to say.
An issuer's key. The compromise of a key in an issuer's [=Issuer Key Record=] reaches every document that key signed. It reaches every [=Core Profile=] of a [=Core Profile Issuer=], those a [=Root Issuer=] issued included, and every [=Profile Annotation=] of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=]. For a [=Root Issuer=] or an [=Accreditation Body=], it also reaches every [=Issuer Accreditation=] it signed with the key, and so every [=Accreditation Chain=] that passes through those accreditations. The means of containing it are of the same shape as for the compromise of an intermediate certification authority in X.509, and there are three.
The first two take effect within DNS caching times; the third takes as long as redistribution does, and until it is complete the affected [=Originators=] cannot be verified. The deadlines within which an issuer acts, and what it must report, are matters for the governance of the framework and are not stated here.
A [=Root Core Profile=]. A [=Root Issuer=] has no [=parent issuer=], so its [=Root Core Profile=] has no accreditation that could be revoked. Its compromise is handled by removing it from the set that [=Verifiers=] accept, through the channel by which verification software is distributed and updated, which is also how the [=Root Core Profile=] arrived (). This is the treatment DNSSEC gives its root trust anchor, and that X.509 root stores give a compromised root.
Removal of the key from the [=Issuer Key Record=] applies to a [=Root Core Profile=] as well, since its [=Root Issuer=] publishes an [=Issuer Key Record=] like any issuer. Removing the compromised key from that record makes every document signed with the key fail within DNS caching times, while the replacement of the [=Root Core Profile=] proceeds through the channel by which verification software is distributed.
A [=Core Profile Issuer=] that issues a [=Core Profile=] for an [=Identity=] it should not have, whether by error, by deception or by compromise, gives the holder a profile that verifies. The [=Issuer Pinning Record=] lets an [=Originator=] say which issuer may issue for it, so that a profile from any other issuer fails at . It is also what lets an [=Originator=] change issuer on its own terms and, in its denying form, stop its profile without its [=Core Profile Issuer=]'s help. None of this is required of an [=Originator=] by this document, and a [=Verifier=] proceeds unpinned when the record is absent.
The reason it can be optional is that, in the use cases defined so far, content is bound to its [=Originator=] by a factor the [=Core Profile Issuer=] does not control. The [=Presented Identity=] comes from the delivery channel, and the binding rule of the [=Use Case Specification=] checks it against the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries before the [=Core Profile=] counts for anything. A wrongly issued [=Core Profile=] is then of use only to an attacker who can also present content under the victim's identity, which is a second, independent failure. What the factor is in each use case, and what keeps it independent of the issuer, is stated by that [=Use Case Specification=].
That reasoning fails where there is no [=Presented Identity=] to check: content read from an archive, offline or from an attachment, or content carried in a container that travels with it, such as a manifest, and presented from somewhere other than its [=Originator=]. Carrying the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the attested content that way is not itself a problem; the signatures and the DNS checks work as they do anywhere. What is missing is the independent identity, so that the only defence against a wrongly issued [=Core Profile=] is the correctness of the issuer, and pinning is what would restore a second factor.
A [=Use Case Specification=] for such a setting therefore either requires the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], putting a second factor back, or lives with the single one. In the latter case has the [=Verifier=] report that the binding was not checked, so that what is missing travels with the outcome rather than being lost in it. Beyond pinning, the measures against wrong issuance are measures on the issuers, and belong to the governance of the framework.
The following are security considerations of the framework that this document does not discuss, because they are decided elsewhere.
The procedure of this document reaches other parties in one way: the DNS queries of . This section says what those queries reveal, to whom, and what this specification does to limit it. It states no requirement. What a party does with what it learns is a matter for the governance of the framework, and what a use case adds, such as which message was read and when, is for the [=Use Case Specification=] ().
Every query the [=Verifier=] sends is seen by the resolver it uses, as any DNS query is. What that resolver sees is the names of : which issuers' [=Issuer Key Records=], and which of their [=Originator Key Records=] and [=Revocation Records=], and, where the use case consults them, which [=Originator=]'s records. This is the exposure a [=Recipient=] has toward its resolver for every name it resolves, and the same measures apply: a resolver the [=Recipient=] chooses and trusts, an encrypted transport to it, and query name minimisation on the resolver's side. This document adds no new party to that channel; what it adds is the issuers' view, stated next.
What reaches an issuer's authoritative servers is what resolvers forward: queries aggregated per resolver and reduced by caching, for names whose [=record label=] is opaque.
A [=Core Profile Issuer=] can thus tell that some verification of a given [=Originator=]'s profile is taking place, at the granularity of a resolver and a time to live, because it assigned the label and knows which [=Originator=] it stands for. It does not learn which [=Verifier=] or which [=Recipient=] asked, since the query comes from the resolver. A [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] learns the same about its annotations. The queries for an [=Accreditation Chain=] tell the issuers along it only that some document of the issuer at which the chain starts was verified, since a chain is the same for every document that issuer signs, and they are the most cached of all.
An observer on the path between a resolver and an authoritative server sees the name of the issuer and an opaque [=record label=]. It can tell that one of that issuer's records is being checked, but not which [=Originator=]'s: the label is opaque precisely so that the [=Originator=] is not written in the query name. That protection is against observers on the path, not against the issuer, which assigned the label. The queries for the [=Originator=]'s own records are the exception: they carry the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], and the query for the [=Permitted Host Record=] carries the host as well. Where a use case consults those records, an observer on the path therefore learns which [=Originator=]'s content is being verified.
The [=Originator=] learns nothing from the queries for the issuers' records, since none of them goes to its zone. Where a [=Use Case Specification=] has the [=Verifier=] consult the records in the [=Originator=]'s own zone, that zone's servers see the same resolver-level aggregate of those queries as an issuer's servers do, and no more; the [=Verifier=] is not identified to the [=Originator=] either. This is a deliberate property: the design rejected having the [=Verifier=] fetch anything from the [=Originator=] over HTTPS, which would have shown each [=Recipient=] to the [=Originator=] whose content it was reading.
Because the names of the records are carried in the documents and are never derived from an [=Identity=], a party that does not hold a [=Core Profile=] cannot ask the DNS whether a given [=Originator=] is registered or with which issuer. A party that does not hold a [=Profile Annotation=] cannot ask whether it has been revoked. Walking an issuer's zone through its denial of existence records yields opaque [=record labels=] and key digests, not a list of the issuer's [=Originators=].
The same property means that a [=Verifier=] issues no query about a document it has not been given and, by , none about a document whose signature it has not verified. A party that presents a forged document learns nothing from the DNS about whether it was examined.
The cost is that a third party cannot audit an issuer's registrations from the DNS alone. Whether and how an issuer publishes its history of changes is a matter for the governance of the framework.
The parties that see the queries, the resolvers and the issuers' authoritative servers, may log them. What is kept, for how long and who may see it are obligations on those parties that this document does not state; for the issuers they are matters for the governance of the framework. What the procedure leaves in such a log is the address of a resolver, an issuer's name, an opaque [=record label=] and a time.
This document requests no registration of its own. The record type and the underscored name on which it depends are requested by [[OPF-DNS]], as the table records. A [=Use Case Specification=] whose way of delivering the documents calls for a registration of its own, such as a media type for a part of a message, requests that registration itself.
The labels _issuer-key, _originator-key,
_revocation and _site appear below
_op and are not registered: the registry named above
holds the globally scoped name, and what is placed below it is
defined by the document that defines the name space
(). This document defines no service
parameters for the SVCB record set of
and therefore asks for no entry
in the registry of those parameters.
This appendix gives one worked example: the zone contents of an
[=Originator=], a [=Core Profile Issuer=] and two [=Profile
Annotation Issuers=], what the documents of the [=Originator Profile
Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] carry,
and the queries and outcomes of each step of
. Names, [=record labels=] and digests are
fictitious, and the digests are shortened. The [=record labels=] are
written as UUIDs: in a name such as
7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example,
the UUID stands where writes
<record-label>. Nothing here adds to
what the body of this document specifies.
| Role | Identity |
|---|---|
| [=Originator=] | news-publisher.example |
| [=Core Profile Issuer=] | cp-issuer.example |
| [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] 1, an industry body | press-assoc.example |
| [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] 2, a fact-checking organization | factcheck.example |
The [=Originator=] holds one [=Core Profile=] carrying one
[=Originator Verification Key=]. It holds one [=Profile Annotation=]
from each of the two [=Profile Annotation Issuers=]; the one
issued by factcheck.example has been revoked before
its expiry, and the other has not.
This [=Originator=] publishes the record of that names the [=Core Profile Issuers=] that may issue for it. The zone is signed; without that the record has no effect.
; optional: this Originator names one permitted Core Profile Issuer _op.news-publisher.example. 3600 IN SVCB 1 cp-issuer.example.
No [=Permitted Host Record=] appears in this example: the content
is presented under a host below the [=Identity=] itself. An
[=Originator=] whose content is presented under a host in another
domain would publish a TXT record set holding
v=op1 at
<host>._site._op.news-publisher.example for that host
().
The zone carries the issuer's [=Issuer Key Record=] and, at a separate name, the [=Originator Key Record=] of this [=Originator=]'s [=Core Profile=]. The fields of the OPKEY record, and the form in which a [=Key Identifier=] is carried in it, are defined in [[OPF-DNS]]; the TLSA record sets are the transitional form of and are published only until a type value has been allocated.
; the Issuer Key Record: the key with which this issuer signs _issuer-key._op.cp-issuer.example. 3600 IN OPKEY 3 1 1 ( c9d1...cip-key-spki-sha256...02 ) _issuer-key._op.cp-issuer.example. 3600 IN TLSA 3 1 1 ( c9d1...cip-key-spki-sha256...02 ) ; transitional ; the Originator Key Record of the Core Profile of news-publisher.example, one record per current key ; (the leftmost label, a UUID, is the record label) 7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example. 3600 IN OPKEY 3 1 1 ( 1f3a...key1-spki-sha256...9c ) 7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example. 3600 IN TLSA 3 1 1 ( 1f3a...key1-spki-sha256...9c ) ; transitional
The [=record label=] 7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91
is opaque and was chosen by the
issuer; a [=Verifier=] takes the whole name from the [=Core
Profile=] and checks only that it lies below
_originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example
(). An issuer that divides its records
into separate zones inserts labels between the two, so that the
same record could stand at
7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91.7f._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example
instead; the [=Verifier=] does the same thing in either case.
Each [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] publishes its own [=Issuer Key
Record=] at the same kind of name as a [=Core Profile Issuer=]. Only
revoked annotations have a record below
_revocation, so the zone of the issuer that has
revoked nothing carries none.
; press-assoc.example: nothing revoked, so no record below _revocation _issuer-key._op.press-assoc.example. 3600 IN OPKEY 3 1 1 ( 55ae...pa1-key-spki-sha256...71 ) ; factcheck.example: one annotation revoked before its expiry (record label 3a9f6d1e-...-e6d7) _issuer-key._op.factcheck.example. 3600 IN OPKEY 3 1 1 ( 8c40...pa2-key-spki-sha256...d3 ) 3a9f6d1e-5c2b-4a7e-9e0d-b4f1c8a2e6d7._revocation._op.factcheck.example. 600 IN TXT "v=op1; revoked=2026-11-15T09:30:00Z"
The content of the record is the form that defines: the version and the time of the revocation. A [=Verifier=] decides on the presence of the record set alone, so the value above changes nothing in the procedure; it is there for the operator who reads the zone and for a later use that may want the time.
The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] hold the following, described by what each property holds rather than by the names of a serialization ().
| Document | What it carries here |
|---|---|
| [=Core Profile=] | issuer dns:cp-issuer.example; subject
dns:news-publisher.example; one [=Originator
Verification Key=], whose [=Key Identifier=] is
1f3a…9c; the [=Originator Key Record Name=]
7f3e1c2a-9b4d-4e8f-a1c5-2d6b8e0f4a91._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example;
a [=Signature Validity Period=] |
| [=Profile Annotation=] 1 | issuer dns:press-assoc.example; subject
dns:news-publisher.example; the [=Revocation
Record Name=]
b2c4e8a0-1d3f-4b6c-8e9a-5f7d2c1b0a94._revocation._op.press-assoc.example;
an identifier of this issuance; a [=Signature Validity
Period=] within that of the [=Core Profile=] |
| [=Profile Annotation=] 2 | as above, with issuer
dns:factcheck.example and the [=Revocation
Record Name=]
3a9f6d1e-5c2b-4a7e-9e0d-b4f1c8a2e6d7._revocation._op.factcheck.example |
| [=Content Attestation=] | issuer dns:news-publisher.example; the [=Key
Identifier=] 1f3a…9c of the key that
signed it; what it covers, as the [=Use Case
Specification=] defines |
| The three [=Accreditation Chains=] | for each of the three issuers, its own [=Core Profile=] and its [=Issuer Accreditation=], and those of each issuer toward the root, up to a [=Root Core Profile=] |
The steps are those of , in the order in which they are numbered there.
| Step | Queried | Outcome here |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Take the inputs | nothing | The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content
Attestation=] are at hand, and the [=Presented Identity=]
is the host under which the content was presented,
www.news-publisher.example |
| 2 Verify the chains locally | nothing | Each of the three chains verifies to a [=Root Core Profile=] the [=Verifier=] accepts. Until this succeeds no query is issued for any name the documents carry |
| 3 Bind the identity | no query in this example | The rule of the [=Use Case Specification=] is satisfied
without a query, the host being below the [=Identity=] the
[=Core Profile=] carries. A host in another domain would
be checked at
<host>._site._op.news-publisher.example |
| 4 Consult the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] | _op.news-publisher.example SVCB |
A Secure answer in ServiceMode whose TargetName
cp-issuer.example is the issuer of the [=Core
Profile=]: the [=Originator=] is pinned. A Secure proof of
absence, or an Insecure answer, would leave it unpinned and
the verification would continue; a failure to resolve would
end it |
| 5 Check the [=Core Profile=] | _issuer-key._op.cp-issuer.example OPKEY |
The signature verifies with the key the issuer's own
[=Core Profile=] carries, the [=Core Profile=] is within
its [=Signature Validity Period=], and the [=Key Identifier=]
c9d1…02 of that key is in the [=Issuer
Key Record=] |
| 6 Check the [=Originator Key Record=] | 7f3e1c2a-…-4a91._originator-key._op.cp-issuer.example
OPKEY |
The name lies below the issuer's Originator Key Record node and the
record set is present, carrying
1f3a…9c: the [=Core Profile=] has not been
revoked and the key is current |
| 7 Verify the [=Content Attestation=] | nothing | The signature verifies with the key of the [=Core
Profile=] whose [=Key Identifier=]
1f3a…9c the attestation names, and that
[=Key Identifier=] is in the [=Originator Key Record=] |
| 8 Check each [=Profile Annotation=] | _issuer-key._op.press-assoc.example OPKEY and
b2c4e8a0-…-0a94._revocation._op.press-assoc.example
TXT; _issuer-key._op.factcheck.example OPKEY and
3a9f6d1e-…-e6d7._revocation._op.factcheck.example
TXT |
Both annotations name the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=]
carries, both signatures verify, the keys that signed them
are in their issuers' [=Issuer Key Records=], and both are within
their [=Signature Validity Periods=]. The first name below
_revocation yields a Secure proof of absence,
so that annotation is in force; the second yields a record
set, so that annotation is not. Neither makes the
verification fail |
| 9 Derive the outcome | nothing | The [=Content Attestation=] verified, for the
[=Originator=] news-publisher.example, which was
pinned; the annotation of press-assoc.example
is in force and that of factcheck.example is
not; the freshness of the checks is that of the answers
above |
Apart from the queries of the three [=Accreditation Chains=], this verification issues seven, counted as in the note of : one for the [=Issuer Pinning Record=], two for the [=Core Profile Issuer=], one for each [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] and one for each [=Profile Annotation=]. Where the [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted, there is one more. The query of step 5 follows step 2 for the [=Core Profile Issuer=]; those of steps 4 and 6 follow, in addition, the verification of the signature on the [=Core Profile=], and those of step 8 follow the verification of the signature on each annotation. Once those signatures have been verified, the queries do not wait for one another and may be issued together. Step 7 issues no query, and step 3 issues none in this example ().