Copyright © 2022-2026 Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP), All rights reserved.
This document is the Email [=Use Case Specification=] of the Originator Profile Framework: the specification that applies the framework to an electronic mail message signed with S/MIME [[RFC8551]]. It defines how an Originator Profile is carried in such a message, what the sending domain publishes in the DNS, how a recipient verifies that profile, and as of what time validity and revocation are judged.
It introduces no new profile document and adds no record to the DNS design of the framework. What it adds is the binding between the sending domain and the originator of the message, and the rules for where and when a message is verified. The general model, the data models and the DNS procedures on which this specification builds are defined in the Architectural Overview [[OPF-AOV]] and the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are not repeated here.
This document is a description of the current design of the Email [=Use Case Specification=] of the Originator Profile Framework (OPF), which is developed by the Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP). It is in DRAFT status, which means it has no official standing of any kind and does not represent the consensus of the OP-CIP Membership.
This is the first draft of this document. It does not itself settle any design question. Points that are deliberately left open are marked as issues in the body and are not resolved here.
What has been checked. The data models and the DNS layer on which this document builds have been exercised in an experimental implementation and measured against signed test zones in a local laboratory. The checks cover the documents of an [=Originator Profile=], the verification procedure and DNS records of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]], and the DNSSEC outcomes this document relies on. A proof of concept composes and signs a message as this document specifies, with DKIM and S/MIME, and verifies it under the procedure of this document against such zones. Those zones include a key and a policy record reached through an alias into an unsigned zone. None of this has run against the public DNS or deployed mail software.
What has not been checked. The mechanisms of the mail system on which this document relies have been implemented only in that proof of concept, which has not been tested against deployed mail software and has sent no message over the Internet. They are DKIM [[RFC6376]] as updated by [[RFC8301]] and [[RFC8463]], DMARC [[RFC9989]], the Authentication-Results header field [[RFC8601]], and internationalized email addresses [[RFC8616]]. The same holds for the carriage of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] in a message signed with S/MIME [[RFC8551]], whose handling by deployed mail clients has not been tested.
What remains to be settled with practitioners. Which of the options those standards leave open this document should take, and how an [=Originator=] and a [=Mail Client=] deploy and operate what it requires, depend on how those standards are deployed, and some of them are recent or revised. Those choices and procedures await substantial review with practitioners of email authentication and of mail operation, which this document has not yet had.
The Originator Profile Framework lets a [=Recipient=] of content learn, from data that the [=Originator=] itself presents, who the [=Originator=] of that content is and what third parties have validated about that [=Originator=]. The Architectural Overview [[OPF-AOV]] describes the general model. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] specifies the part of the framework that every use case shares, and leaves what depends on how content is delivered to a [=Use Case Specification=] for each way of delivering it. This document is the [=Use Case Specification=] for electronic mail.
In outline, the design of this use case consists of four things.
This document is a [=Use Case Specification=] in the sense of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]: it applies that document to one way of delivering content. For that way, it defines the matters the Core Specification leaves to a [=Use Case Specification=]: how the documents of an [=Originator Profile=] are delivered, under what identity the content is presented and how that identity is bound to the [=Originator=], where and when verification happens, and what becomes of the result.
This document does not restate what other documents of the framework define. In particular:
A conforming implementation of this specification is one that presents an [=Originator Profile=] in a message, or verifies one presented in a message, and that meets the requirements this document places on the role in which it acts. The roles are the [=Originator=], which sends the message, and the [=Mail Client=], which verifies it. A [=Receiving Mail Server=] appears in this document only as the party whose recorded DMARC result a [=Mail Client=] honours ().
In normative text, a sentence that uses none of the key words either restates, with a reference to its source, a requirement stated elsewhere, defines a term or a value, or explains; a requirement that is stated nowhere else is stated with a key word. The DNSSEC validation states, which this document takes from the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]], are written in italics, as in Secure and Insecure, also where they qualify a noun.
The terms below that are marked as imported are used in this document with the meaning given to them in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and, for the terms of the web media use case, in [[OPF-WEB-MEDIA]]. They are listed here only so that they resolve within this document; the authoritative definition is the one in the document cited, and where the two differ, that document prevails. The remaining terms are specific to this specification and are defined here.
What an Originator signs, and with which key. An [=Originator=] that presents an [=Originator Profile=] in a message under this specification MUST sign the message with S/MIME [[RFC8551]]. It MUST carry the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] in the form in which a message carries an attachment, as a body part of a multipart entity, within the content that the signature covers. The [=Originator=] MUST sign the message with one of the [=Originator Verification Keys=] of the [=Core Profile=] carried in the message.
The structure of the message. An [=Originator=] MUST give the message the following structure; the forms listed after it are every form that meets it:
application/pkcs7-mime body of smime-type
signed-data, in which a CMS SignedData [[RFC5652]]
encapsulates the signed content; the other is a
multipart/signed body [[RFC1847]], whose first body
part is the signed content and whose second carries a detached
CMS SignedData over it.
multipart/mixed entity that
also holds the body of the message, and the [=Originator Profile
Bundle=] is a body part immediately within that
multipart/mixed entity.
Where the signature is an application/pkcs7-mime body,
an [=Originator=] MUST give that body the smime-type parameter with
the value signed-data, which [[RFC8551]] makes optional.
The forms that meet the structure. The forms of message that meet these requirements are the following, and only these:
multipart/signed body whose first body part, the
signed content, is a multipart/mixed entity holding
the body of the message and the [=Originator Profile Bundle=];
application/pkcs7-mime body of smime-type
signed-data whose SignedData encapsulates a
multipart/mixed entity holding the body of the
message and the [=Originator Profile Bundle=];
application/pkcs7-mime body of smime-type
enveloped-data or authEnveloped-data
[[RFC8551]]: the message is signed and then encrypted. Such a
message can be verified only by the [=Mail Client=] that decrypts
it;
multipart/alternative or
multipart/related. That entity and the [=Originator
Profile Bundle=] are then both body parts immediately within the
signed multipart/mixed entity, and the bundle is not
within the entity of the body.
Which bundle a Verifier uses. A [=Verifier=] uses the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] placed as requires, within the content that the signature covers, and the signature that covers it. A part of the media type of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] () in any other place, the place outside the signed content included, is not an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] under this specification and is not used in verification. A message that carries a part of that media type only in such places is a message whose signed content carries no [=Originator Profile Bundle=] (step 1 of ).
The smime-type parameter. A [=Verifier=] takes the
form of an application/pkcs7-mime body from its
smime-type parameter alone, not from the CMS content it carries: a
body whose smime-type parameter is absent or has another value than
signed-data is not a signature in a form this
specification accepts.
Which signature, and its SignerInfos. The signature this specification refers to is the SignedData whose signed content immediately holds the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], placed as requires. Of its SignerInfos, those that identify a certificate whose key is an [=Originator Verification Key=] of a [=Core Profile=] in the bundle are the signatures of the same signer, the [=Originator=], whatever their algorithm. A [=Core Profile=] can carry keys of more than one algorithm, as during a transition between algorithms, and each of those keys signs as the same [=Originator=]. The key match of is satisfied where there is at least one.
Where that SignedData carries more than one SignerInfo, a [=Verifier=] treats them as follows:
What the bundle carries. An [=Originator=] MUST include in its [=Originator Profile Bundle=] the documents that the Core Specification defines an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] to carry ([[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile Bundle). The format of each of these documents is defined in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].
The whole chain travels with the message. An [=Originator=] MUST carry the whole of each [=Accreditation Chain=] in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=]; a [=Verifier=] is not required to retrieve any part of an [=Originator Profile=] from the network, and the [=Core Profile Issuer=] and every [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] are discovered from the bundle. This is how a [=Verifier=] comes to hold each chain locally before it issues any DNS query, as the Core Specification requires ([[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile Bundle).
One part, labelled with its media type. An
[=Originator=] MUST label the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] with
the media type registered for it; see . An
[=Originator=] MUST NOT place more than one part of that media type
in the signed content. A part within an enclosed
message/rfc822 body belongs to the enclosed message and
is not counted. A [=Verifier=] that finds more than one MUST fail
verification rather than choose among them; a message whose signed
content carries none is not evaluated (step 1 of
).
The key the Verifier matches. A [=Verifier=] MUST derive the [=Key Identifier=] from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo [[RFC5280]] of the certificate that the S/MIME implementation used to verify the signature, normalized as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] requires of the key from which a [=Key Identifier=] is derived. The [=Verifier=] MUST match that [=Key Identifier=] against the [=Key Identifiers=] of the [=Originator Verification Keys=] of the [=Core Profile=]. A message whose signature the S/MIME implementation does not accept fails verification (step 1 of ).
Certificates are outside the Originator Profile. A certificate MUST NOT be placed in a [=Core Profile=]; a [=Core Profile=] carries keys, not certificates, and the signer's certificate is not part of the [=Originator Profile=]. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT treat the certificate path of the signer's certificate as part of the [=Originator Profile=].
Header fields beyond the DKIM h= tag are not
protected here. This specification does not require protection of
header fields beyond
what S/MIME provides, other than the coverage that
requires of the DKIM signature in
its h= tag. The identity that this specification
matches is the [=Sending Domain=], and the binding of a message to
that domain is the work of DMARC [[RFC9989]], not of the S/MIME
signature. S/MIME practice recommends protecting header fields
within the S/MIME signature; this specification does not require it.
A mail client that does not implement this specification, and so is not a [=Mail Client=] in the sense of this document, treats the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] as an attachment of an unknown type and ignores it. The S/MIME signature still verifies, because the bundle is an ordinary part of the signed content. Deployment can therefore proceed one client at a time.
An [=Originator=] can therefore send messages under this specification before its recipients are able to verify them; they are verified wherever the receiving side is able to. On that side verification is expected to arrive at first as a plug-in to an existing mail client, or in a mail client distributed with verification built in.
This specification adds no resource record and no name to the DNS design of the framework. The names, record types and formats are defined in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and in [[?OPF-DNS]]. What this specification fixes is which of those records the [=Originator=] is required to publish, and what their absence means.
Two zones are concerned, and they are kept apart below: the zone of the [=Sending Domain=], which is required to be signed, and the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], which holds the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] (). The [=Sending Domain=] is that [=Identity=] or lies below it (), so the two are the same zone or the first lies below the second. Where the DKIM key and the DMARC policy record are published is a separate matter, set out in . How a [=Verifier=] establishes that a message is aligned, and so which [=Sending Domain=] it takes, is in .
In this specification the DNSSEC states are the four that DNSSEC itself defines for a validating resolver [[RFC4033]] [[RFC4035]], as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] gives them:
Data is authenticated only where the answer is Secure. An authenticated denial is a denial of existence that is Secure, which the Core Specification calls a Secure proof of absence, and the absence it proves is an authenticated absence.
What the Presented Identity is. The identity under which the content of a message is presented is the [=Sending Domain=], namely the domain of the From header field [[RFC5322]] with which alignment under DMARC [[RFC9989]] through DKIM [[RFC6376]] was established. It is the [=Presented Identity=] of this use case, the value with which the [=Identity=] a [=Core Profile=] carries is compared to determine the [=Originator=]. This section states what an [=Originator=] does so that a message is aligned and bound, and how a [=Verifier=] takes the [=Sending Domain=].
Which Core Profile is the Originator's. The signature does not name the [=Originator=]. The [=Originator=] is the party whose [=Core Profile=] in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], other than a [=Root Core Profile=], meets two conditions: it carries the key of the signer's certificate, matched as requires, and its [=Identity=] is the [=Sending Domain=] or a domain below which the [=Sending Domain=] lies, compared by the rule of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].
Alignment through DKIM. An [=Originator=] that
presents an [=Originator Profile=] in a message MUST sign the
message with DKIM under a d= domain identical to the
domain of the From header field, so that the message is aligned
under DMARC through DKIM, in strict alignment.
An [=Originator=] that has another party publish its key MUST have that party's zone signed.
d=
domain is the domain of the From header field, so a key or a policy
record in another zone arises only by such an alias or by a
delegation of the name.
The DKIM signature. An [=Originator=] MUST NOT use
the l= tag [[RFC6376]] in the DKIM signature. An
[=Originator=] MUST include in the h= tag of the DKIM
signature the From, To, Cc, Subject, Date, Reply-To and Message-ID
header fields. It lists the name of each of them once more than the
field occurs in the message, and the name of a field that is absent
once. The [=Originator=] MUST NOT vary the DKIM selector by
recipient or by message.
A DKIM signature that carries the l= tag also
verifies over content appended after the length it covers, which
the S/MIME signature does not protect.
The listing of the header fields in h= is the
practice known as oversigning. DKIM signs the instances of a
header field named more than once in h= from the last
upward, and a name listed beyond the instances present signs the
absence of a further instance, so a field of that name added
afterwards breaks the signature ([[RFC6376]], Signatures Involving
Multiple Instances of a Field; Attacks Involving Extra Header
Fields). A message replayed unchanged to another recipient
() is unchanged only in what the
signature covers; a header field outside h= can be
replaced on the way, and a Reply-To so replaced would redirect the
recipient's reply while every check of this specification passes.
A [=Mail Client=] queries the key published under the selector, and a selector that differs by recipient or by message would let those queries tell the [=Originator=] which message was opened (). A [=Verifier=] cannot detect such use of selectors; the requirement is one on the [=Originator=].
The DMARC policy record. An [=Originator=] MUST
publish, at the domain of the From header field, a DMARC policy
record [[RFC9989]] whose adkim tag requests strict
alignment for DKIM (adkim=s). With a record at that
domain and strict alignment, the evaluation of [[RFC9989]] makes no
DNS Tree Walk, so that every name a [=Verifier=] queries for DMARC
lies under the domain of the From header field.
Keeping the message verifiable. The [=Originator=]
SHOULD keep publishing the key of a DKIM selector it no longer signs
with for as long as messages signed under that selector might still
be verified. Publishing the record with an empty p= tag,
which [[RFC6376]] reads as revoked, ends its publication as removing
the record does. The [=Originator=] SHOULD either omit the
x= tag of [[RFC6376]] from its DKIM signatures or set
it beyond the period during which the message might still be
verified. The length of these periods is not fixed here; it is a
matter for the Operations document of the framework, and no
recommended value has been set yet ().
x= has passed as expired, as
[[RFC6376]] permits (Validate the Signature Header Field); in either
case the message is no longer aligned (step 3 of
).
The Sending Domain. An [=Originator=] MUST send a message under this specification only from a [=Sending Domain=] that is its [=Identity=] or lies below it. An [=Originator=] MUST NOT send under this specification a message whose From header field carries more than one address, or that carries more than one From header field. An [=Originator=] MUST NOT send a message whose [=Originator Profile Bundle=] contains, for more than one [=Identity=], a [=Core Profile=] that carries the key of the signer's certificate and whose [=Identity=] the [=Sending Domain=] is or lies below (step 3 of ). This specification does not use the [=Permitted Host Record=].
example.jp and
mail.example.jp, therefore does not sign mail with a
key that both their [=Core Profiles=] carry: it uses a separate key
for each [=Identity=], or carries only one of the [=Core Profiles=]
in the bundle.
d= domain is the domain of the From
header field, so a mail service provider signs under the
[=Originator=]'s own domain, with the key published there or reached
from there by an alias or a delegation. An [=Originator=] that sends
from a registered domain outside its [=Identity=] presents, for that
domain, a [=Core Profile=] whose [=Identity=] it is.
How a Verifier takes the Sending Domain. A [=Verifier=] MUST put the [=Sending Domain=] into the canonical form in which the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] compares domain names. A [=Sending Domain=] that cannot be put into that form fails verification (step 1), as the Core Specification requires of any value that cannot be put into canonical form. Where the domain of the From header field is an internationalized domain name, as it can be in a message sent under [[RFC6531]], a [=Verifier=] MUST convert it to A-labels as [[RFC8616]] defines for email authentication. That is the form in which alignment under DMARC is also established. This specification defines no other conversion; the comparison itself, including what it means for one name to lie below another, is the Core Specification's rule.
Messages outside the scope. A message whose DKIM signature does not survive its path is outside the scope of this specification. That is the case where a mailing list alters the message, and where a gateway on the receiving side alters it by tagging the subject, adding a notice to the body or rewriting its links. This specification does not rely on ARC [[?RFC8617]] to carry an authentication result across such an intermediary.
The Mail Client evaluates DMARC itself. This
section states how a [=Verifier=] establishes that a message
is aligned, from which the [=Sending Domain=] is taken
(), and which message is not
aligned and so is not evaluated. A [=Mail Client=] MUST evaluate
DMARC [[RFC9989]] itself, from the DKIM [[RFC6376]] signatures of
the message alone and under strict alignment, whatever the
adkim tag of the DMARC policy record requests.
A DMARC result recorded on the way. The [=Mail Client=] MUST disregard Authentication-Results header fields from outside the trust boundary that the authserv-id of [[RFC8601]] defines. A DMARC result that an Authentication-Results header field added by its own [=Receiving Mail Server=] within that boundary records is treated as follows:
fail: the [=Mail Client=] MUST treat the message as
not aligned even where its own evaluation passes (step 3 of
);
pass: it does not take the place of the [=Mail
Client=]'s own evaluation;
none or
temperror: it has no effect on that evaluation.
A [=Mail Client=] that cannot tell which header fields its own [=Receiving Mail Server=] added has no recorded result to honour and proceeds on its own evaluation.
Which DKIM signatures count. A [=Verifier=] establishes alignment only from a DKIM signature that:
d= domain identical to the domain of the From
header field, which is the strict alignment of [[RFC9989]];
l= tag; andh= tag the header fields
requires, as many times as it
requires them.
As [[RFC9989]] provides, one such signature suffices. A [=Verifier=] takes no [=Sending Domain=] from a message that carries no From header field or more than one, or whose From header field cannot be parsed as [[RFC5322]] defines or does not carry exactly one address. Step 3 of gives the result for a message that is not aligned.
What verifies. A signature verifies as [[RFC6376]], as updated by [[RFC8301]] and [[RFC8463]], defines. A signature made with rsa-sha1, or with an RSA key of fewer than 1024 bits, does not verify, and a [=Verifier=] implements ed25519-sha256, as [[RFC8463]] requires of a verifier.
The names and their answers. The [=Mail Client=]
MUST obtain the DKIM key and the DMARC policy record of the domain
of the From header field as authenticated data
(). The key that matters is that
of a signature whose d= domain is the domain of the
From header field; the answer for the key of any other signature
has no bearing on the result. The two names are queried under this
specification and obtained as [[RFC6376]] and [[RFC9989]] define;
the Core Specification's rule on names and aliases, which covers
only the names the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] defines, does not
reach them.
What is not aligned, and what fails. A [=Verifier=] does not evaluate under this specification a message that is not aligned. A message is not aligned where:
x= has passed;
fail, which the [=Mail Client=]
honours as this section states; or
Step 3 of gives the results:
fail where the DMARC policy record, or the key of a
signature whose d= domain is the domain of the From
header field, cannot be obtained as authenticated data, and
none for a message that is not aligned. The first row of
its table that applies decides. A message that has already failed an
earlier step of that procedure has failed, whether or not it is
aligned.
The zone of the Sending Domain. An [=Originator=] MUST have the zone of the [=Sending Domain=] signed with DNSSEC, so that a [=Verifier=] can obtain the records of that zone as authenticated data (). The [=Originator=] MUST have the zone signed so that the absence of a name in it is shown by an authenticated denial: with NSEC records, or with NSEC3 records without the Opt-Out flag [[?RFC5155]].
Present only from a Secure answer, absent only from an authenticated denial. When a [=Verifier=] queries a name in that zone that this specification has it query, a Secure answer alone shows the name present, and an authenticated denial alone shows it absent (). The Core Specification states the same for the names it defines ([[OPF-CORE]], DNSSEC Requirements and Resolution Outcomes).
An unsigned or unauthenticated zone fails verification. Where the zone of the [=Sending Domain=] is unsigned, or the [=Verifier=] cannot authenticate its records, the answer being Insecure, Bogus or Indeterminate, verification fails under this specification, as the first row of the table of step 3 of states. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT treat such a message as one presenting an unpinned [=Originator=] in the sense of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].
The Issuer Pinning Record. In the zone of its [=Identity=], an [=Originator=] MUST name the [=Core Profile Issuers=] permitted to issue a [=Core Profile=] for it, in the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] of that [=Identity=], the record that the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] defines for that purpose. The Core Specification does not require this record of the [=Originator=]; in this use case it is required.
A [=Verifier=] MUST check the [=Core Profile=] it has received against that record. A [=Verifier=] MUST fail verification (step 4 of ) in each of the following cases:
None of these leaves the [=Originator=] unpinned, as the Core Specification's reading of an authenticated absence and of an Insecure answer would.
The issuers' records are the Core Specification's. The records published by the issuers, namely the [=Issuer Key Record=] of each, the [=Originator Key Records=] of a [=Core Profile Issuer=] and the [=Revocation Records=] of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=], are defined in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]. This specification places no requirement on them beyond those of the Core Specification.
This section fixes, for this use case, which party carries out the verification procedure and what becomes of the result. That party is the [=Mail Client=], and the result is presented to the [=Recipient=] (). This specification defines no form in which a result is recorded in the message. A [=Mail Client=] MAY keep a sealed record, or a cache, of its own results (). The time as of which validity is judged is in .
The Mail Client verifies, and evaluates DMARC itself. In this use case the [=Originator Profile=] of a message is verified by the [=Mail Client=] that displays it, which evaluates DMARC itself in order to do so (). A [=Receiving Mail Server=] can evaluate DMARC and record the result in the Authentication-Results header field [[RFC8601]], but this specification does not assume that it does; how a recorded result is treated is stated there. Verification of an [=Originator Profile=] by a [=Receiving Mail Server=] is outside this specification.
When the Mail Client evaluates DMARC. A [=Mail Client=] ordinarily evaluates DMARC when it displays the message. A [=Mail Client=] that evaluates DMARC when it takes the message in, and keeps a record of that evaluation, can use that record as the evaluation as of the time of receipt, as permits.
Order. The queries that a message's [=Originator Profile Bundle=] occasions under this specification are made only after the local checks of . An evaluation of DMARC that a [=Verifier=] makes for every message it takes in, independently of this specification, is not bound by that order.
DNSSEC validation. How a [=Verifier=] establishes the DNSSEC validation state of an answer, by validating itself or through a validating resolver it has assurance of, is the same at the two names this specification has it query as at the names the Core Specification defines. The two names are those of the DKIM key and the DMARC policy record. The Core Specification states this ([[OPF-CORE]], DNSSEC Requirements and Resolution Outcomes). What the state means at those two names is this specification's: an answer that carries no validation state is not authenticated data, and a [=Verifier=] treats it as a record it cannot authenticate ().
Steps numbered as the general procedure. A
[=Verifier=] that verifies an [=Originator Profile=] presented in a
message MUST perform the following steps. The steps follow the
general procedure of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are
numbered as that procedure numbers them. Only the content that is
specific to this specification is given here, and a step that says
"as in the general procedure" is that procedure's step unchanged.
The steps that decide a result of none or
fail under this specification say so; other sections
refer to them.
Which queries wait for what. Each step that queries the DNS is marked (DNS). The order of the queries is that of the general procedure: none for an issuer before its [=Accreditation Chain=] is verified locally (step 2), and none whose name is built from the [=Core Profile=] before its signature is verified (step 5). The queries of this specification's own, for the DKIM key and the DMARC policy record (step 3), follow the local checks of steps 1 to 3.
Take the inputs. Take the [=Core Profile=], the [=Profile Annotations=] and the [=Accreditation Chains=] from the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] within the signed content (). The identity under which the content is presented is the [=Sending Domain=], obtained and put into canonical form as requires; until step 3 has established alignment it is the domain of the From header field, in that canonical form.
The local check of this step. The S/MIME signature MUST be accepted by the S/MIME implementation as [[RFC8551]] requires, the validation of the certificate path included. In the SignedData layer that carries the bundle, at least one SignerInfo of the [=Originator=] MUST so verify, with an algorithm the [=Verifier=] supports (). Such a SignerInfo identifies a certificate whose key is an [=Originator Verification Key=] of the [=Core Profile=] of the [=Originator=] (the key match of step 3). In this use case the S/MIME signature stands for the [=Content Attestation=] ([[OPF-CORE]], Requirements on Use Case Specifications, item 7); it is verified here, and steps 3 and 7 rely on that.
The outcome of this step is as follows; the first case that applies decides it:
none and the procedure ends here.
fail.
fail.
Bind the identity (DNS for alignment under DMARC: the DKIM key and the DMARC policy record).
The key match and the Sending Domain. A message
from which no [=Sending Domain=] is taken
() is not aligned: no match is made, no
name is queried, and the outcome below gives none.
Where the
SignedData layer that carries the bundle has more than one
SignerInfo, the signer's certificate in this step is the
certificate of each SignerInfo in turn
(). The [=Key Identifier=]
derived from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the signer's
certificate equals the [=Key Identifier=] of one of the
[=Originator Verification Keys=] of the [=Core Profile=] of the
[=Originator=], as requires.
The [=Sending Domain=] MUST be the [=Identity=]
of the [=Originator=] or lie below it, compared by the rule of
the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].
Which Core Profile is the Originator's. The [=Originator=] is determined as states. Where [=Core Profiles=] of more than one [=Identity=] meet its two conditions, verification fails. The Core Specification then proceeds on the [=Originator=] so determined: its limit on the number of [=Core Profiles=] about one [=Originator=], and its choice among them, apply to the [=Core Profiles=] whose [=Identity=] is the [=Originator=]'s.
Alignment under DMARC. After the local match of this step, a [=Mail Client=] establishes by its own evaluation, from the DKIM signatures that count under , whether the message is aligned under DMARC as requires of the [=Originator=]. The outcome below gives the result.
The queries of this step. The DKIM key and the DMARC policy record are queried only after the S/MIME signature has been verified (step 1), the [=Sending Domain=] has been compared locally with the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] earlier in this step, and the [=Accreditation Chains=] have been verified locally (step 2). No name taken from an unverified message is then queried.
Outcome. The first row that applies decides it.
Verify the Content Attestation. The S/MIME signature stands for the [=Content Attestation=]; it was verified in step 1 and its key matched in step 3. Check, as in the general procedure, that the key is current for the [=Core Profile=]: that the [=Originator Key Record=] retrieved in step 6 lists its [=Key Identifier=]. In this specification the [=Key Identifier=] is derived by the [=Verifier=] from the signer's certificate () rather than named by a [=Content Attestation=]; in every other respect this step is as in the general procedure.
Check each Profile Annotation (DNS). As in the general procedure, the [=Time of Judgement=] being that of . An annotation whose [=Signature Validity Period=] has ended at the time of verification is not in force, whatever the [=Time of Judgement=], as that procedure states; its having ended is not a failure of verification. Where the [=Time of Judgement=] is the time of receipt, what was in force on receipt is established only from a record made at the time ().
none is presented as such,
distinct from a failure (). A
[=Verifier=] MUST report the
outcome of the framework's checks separately from the outcome of
the S/MIME signature verification.
The queries this procedure adds. The number of DNS queries this procedure makes is that of the general procedure, with the following added in step 3: the DKIM key of the evaluated signature and the DMARC policy record of the domain of the From header field. The evaluation under makes no DNS Tree Walk, so no other name is queried for DMARC. The queries of step 3 are made for every message a [=Mail Client=] evaluates. No [=Permitted Host Record=] is queried ().
What a Mail Client presents. A [=Mail Client=]
presents to the [=Recipient=] the result of its own
verification, and with it what the [=Originator Profile=] says about
the [=Originator=]. Where the result is pass, the
outcome of the general procedure ([[OPF-CORE]], Outcome and Time of
Judgement) also yields the [=Identity=] of the [=Originator=]
and the [=Profile Annotations=] in force, each with its issuer.
Which attributes are shown, and how. What the [=Mail Client=] presents is the [=Validated Attributes=] that the [=Core Profile=] and the [=Profile Annotations=] in force carry about the [=Originator=], or the part of them that this use case calls for. The value alone would say only that an issuer established under a [=Root Core Profile=] the [=Verifier=] accepts has verified the [=Originator=]. Which attributes are shown, and how, for example in stages, is a matter for the design of the [=Mail Client=]'s user experience.
The three results. The result of verification under this specification is one of three values:
pass: every check of
succeeded.
fail: the signed content carries an [=Originator
Profile Bundle=] and a check of
failed, the verification of
the S/MIME signature in step 1 included.
none: the message was not evaluated under this
specification, because it is not signed with S/MIME or its signed
content carries no [=Originator Profile Bundle=] (step 1), or
because it is not aligned (step 3). It is not a failure.
The first step that decides, and how none is
presented. The procedure runs in order; the first step at
which a message fails, or at which it is found not to be
evaluated, decides its result. A [=Mail Client=] MUST present a
message whose result is none as one that this
specification did not evaluate, and not as a failure; the
distinction is part of what the presentation has to carry.
Which DMARC result is presented. The DMARC result on which a [=Mail Client=] relies is that of its own evaluation (). Whether the presentation distinguishes it from a result its [=Receiving Mail Server=] can also have recorded is a matter for the design of the user interface. This specification does not require that it be distinguished.
What the Core Specification already requires of the presentation. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states what a [=Verifier=] is not to present as though an annotation were in force. It also requires the distinction between a pinned [=Originator=], an unpinned one and one whose [=Issuer Pinning Record=] was not consulted to be kept wherever an outcome is passed on; neither is restated here. In this use case the last does not arise.
A result retained as of receipt. A [=Mail Client=] that keeps a sealed record, or a cache, of its own results can use it to retain a result as of the time of receipt, as permits.
The four layers are the Core Specification's, and the Issuer Pinning Record ends one of them too. The four layers of validity within the framework, the key, the [=Core Profile=], the registration of the [=Originator=] and each [=Profile Annotation=], and what ends each of them, are those of the Core Specification ([[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Model and Time Constraints) and are not restated here. One thing specific to this use case is in the registration layer: the removal of the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] also ends validity, since its authenticated absence fails verification ().
The layer outside the framework. The other thing specific to this use case is a layer outside the framework: the X.509 certificate of the signer, whose validity is judged by the S/MIME implementation. It is ended by CRL or OCSP or by a decision not to trust, and is held by the certification authority and the receiving party's policy.
The layers are independent. Each of the four layers within the framework, and the layer outside it, is judged on its own; verification fails if either the framework's checks or the S/MIME verification fails. The only thing that joins them is the identity of the key, so no invariant over time is needed between them: a certificate can be revoked while the [=Originator Profile=] remains valid, and the converse can equally hold.
The Core Specification's invariants apply unchanged. This specification adds no invariant on issuance to those of the Core Specification ([[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Model and Time Constraints), which apply in this use case as they stand. First, the validity of a [=Profile Annotation=] lies within that of the [=Core Profile=] it annotates. Second, the record of a retired key is kept until the [=Core Profile=] that carries it has expired, with the retention margin and the exceptions that document states. Third, an issuer's keys overlap for the period it requires. The second of these governs what can be verified after the fact (): a retired key is not withdrawn, so a message signed with it still passes step 7 of .
Email keeps a replaced key as retired. In this use case an [=Originator=] SHOULD keep a replaced key as a retired key rather than withdraw it, since a message that has been delivered cannot be signed again. A message signed with the replaced key then remains verifiable until the earlier [=Core Profile=], which carries that key, expires or is revoked.
What the Core Specification leaves to the use case. The Core Specification leaves this choice to each [=Use Case Specification=], and states the two ways, keeping the key as a retired key or signing the content again with the new key and withdrawing the replaced one, and what the choice exchanges, the cost of keeping the key included ([[OPF-CORE]], Key Compromise).
A retired key is of use only while its Core Profile is current. The [=Core Profile=] that carries a retired key has itself to be valid at the [=Time of Judgement=], so the key is of use only while that profile is current; verification beyond that point falls into the second and third stages of .
Display, or the recorded time of receipt. For a [=Mail Client=], the [=Time of Judgement=] is either the time of display or its recorded time of receipt, as follows. This is another time that the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] lets a [=Use Case Specification=] name, in place of the time of verification, and it is one the delivery channel gives the [=Verifier=]. The tolerance a [=Verifier=] allows for clock skew is that of the general procedure of the Core Specification.
Either time, and the Mail Client reports which. A [=Mail Client=] MUST judge validity either as of the time at which it displays the message, or as of the time of receipt it recorded when it took the message in, reproducing the judgement that would have been made on receipt. Either is permitted, and a [=Mail Client=] MUST report which it used.
Receipt only with a recorded evaluation. A [=Mail Client=] MAY judge as of the time of receipt only where it evaluated DMARC when it took the message in and kept a record of that evaluation (). A [=Mail Client=] that evaluates DMARC only when it displays the message therefore judges as of the time of display.
Where the time of receipt comes from. A [=Mail Client=] that judges as of the time of receipt MUST take that time from one of two sources. One is its own record of when it took the message in, made together with the evaluation of DMARC that requires of it. The other is a header field that it can establish was added by its own [=Receiving Mail Server=] within the trust boundary that the authserv-id of [[RFC8601]] defines, since a time recorded outside that boundary is one the sender of the message could have chosen. This specification names no such field: a Received header field [[RFC5322]] carries no authserv-id by which that could be established.
The signingTime attribute is not the Time of Judgement. The signingTime attribute of CMS [[RFC5652]] plays no part in a [=Verifier=]'s judgement. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] excludes from the judgement any time value written by the signer, a time carried as an attribute of a signature included, and signingTime is such an attribute.
Three stages. A [=Mail Client=] verifies a message each time it displays it, so verification after the fact is simply that verification repeated at a later time. It succeeds on a best-effort basis and degrades in three stages.
The first stage lasts as long as the Core Profile, and nothing lengthens it. How long a message stays in the first of these stages is set by the [=Core Profile=] that carries the key the message was signed with: it lasts until that [=Core Profile=] expires or is revoked (). Neither the framework nor this specification lengthens it by other means, because the DNS answers only for the moment of the query. The absence of a [=Revocation Record=] carries no time, a record is removed when what it revokes expires, and a registration that simply lapses leaves no trace of having been there. This is why the stages end in such a record and not in a further query.
Forwarded as an attachment. A message enclosed in
a message/rfc822 part can be
verified as a message in its own right; its bundle lies within the
enclosed body and is not counted as a part of the outer message
(). A [=Mail Client=] MUST judge the inner
message as of the time at which it displays it
(), and disregards the
Authentication-Results header fields the inner message carries.
Forwarded inline. A message forwarded inline cannot be verified, because neither the signature nor the bundle survives.
Replayed. A message replayed unchanged to another
recipient remains aligned under DMARC, since its DKIM signature is
unchanged, and verifies for that recipient as it did for the first.
It is unchanged only in what the DKIM signature covers; a header
field outside its h= tag can be replaced on the way,
which the oversigning that
requires guards against. What a replay achieves is that a genuine message of
the [=Originator=] verifies for a [=Recipient=] it was not sent to;
it does not let content be presented under an identity that did not
send it.
The parameters of the general model take effect in this use case as follows. The values given are recommendations offered to guide deployment; they are not requirements, and they have not been validated against operational experience.
The recommended values below are those of the Operations document of the framework [[?OPF-OPS]], which is where such values belong. That document has not been published; until it is, the values that concern this use case are stated here, and a later version of this specification will refer to the Operations document instead.
This section explains what the security of this use case rests on and what it does not cover. It states no requirement: every requirement it relies on is stated in , , and , and this section says why those requirements are there and what an attacker whom they do not stop can achieve.
The security properties of the framework that do not depend on the use case are in the security considerations of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are not repeated here; those that concern the records themselves, their size and their transitional form are in [[?OPF-DNS]]. The security of the mechanisms this specification builds upon, namely S/MIME [[RFC8551]] and DMARC [[RFC9989]] as evaluated from DKIM [[RFC6376]] (), is that of those specifications and is not restated. The strength of the DKIM signature, in its algorithms and key sizes, is that of [[RFC6376]] as updated by [[RFC8301]] and [[RFC8463]]; this specification adds no algorithm to DKIM, and DKIM defines no post-quantum signature algorithm. A message that verifies carries, besides the DKIM signature, the S/MIME signature under a key of the [=Core Profile=] (), whose algorithms are the Core Specification's.
The security and privacy considerations of S/MIME processing itself are taken as given and are not discussed here or in ; what this section and that one discuss is what follows from an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] being carried in a message. What an [=Originator=] exposes by keeping a replaced signing key as a retired key, which is the course this use case takes, is stated where that choice is made () and is not repeated here either.
The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] travels inside the message, as a part of the content that the S/MIME signature covers (), and no part of an [=Originator Profile=] is fetched from the network (). An attacker on the path, or in a store the message passes through, therefore cannot substitute a bundle or add one, because either is a change to signed content. Nor is there a retrieval for such an attacker to block or to watch. For the same reason, the displacement of genuine documents, that is, crowding them out with others, beyond the bounds that the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] describes is open to the sender alone.
What that attacker can do is take the signature and the bundle away together, leaving an ordinary unsigned message. This produces no false result. A message that presents no [=Originator Profile=] is simply not evaluated under this specification, and a client that does not implement this specification behaves the same way (). The framework's endorsement can thus be denied to a message in transit; it cannot be forged onto one.
About a message that presents no profile, this specification says
nothing beyond the result none, which records only that
the message was not evaluated (). That
result is not a judgement of the message. A [=Recipient=] who needs to
know that a domain signs all of its mail does not learn it here.
Delivery also means that whoever can send mail to a [=Recipient=] can put work in front of that recipient's [=Verifier=]. The order of bounds it. A message that carries a bundle and whose S/MIME signature does not verify fails at the first step, so an attacker that cannot produce such a signature reaches no further than one signature verification.
Past that point the ordering of
the general procedure applies, under which no DNS query is made on
behalf of a document whose signature has not been verified locally,
and the consequences are those the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]
states. The queries of the DMARC evaluation fall under the same
ordering: the DKIM selector and the d= domain are
values the sender writes, and they are queried only once the
message has passed the local checks.
The identity under which content is presented in this use case is the [=Sending Domain=], and it is obtained from the message by DMARC [[RFC9989]] (). The assurance that the content arrived under that domain is therefore the assurance DMARC gives, which this section takes as given. What this specification adds is two rules. A [=Mail Client=] evaluates DMARC from DKIM [[RFC6376]] alone and under strict alignment alone (). And whoever can pass DKIM for a domain, and so present content under it, needs in addition a key of the [=Core Profile=] with which to sign that content if it is to verify under this specification ().
This is what makes the binding independent of the [=Core Profile Issuer=], an independence the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] requires each [=Use Case Specification=] to state. A [=Core Profile=] issued for an [=Identity=] it should not have been issued for is of use only to an attacker who can also send aligned mail from that [=Identity=]. That is a second and separate failure, in the hands of a different party.
This use case does not rest on that factor alone. The [=Issuer Pinning Record=] is required here, and its authenticated absence is a failure (). An [=Originator=] therefore holds a means of its own against a profile it did not ask for, and does not depend on the [=Core Profile Issuer=] to revoke one. A [=Sending Domain=] that is not the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and does not lie below it is not admitted, since this specification does not use the [=Permitted Host Record=] ().
The reach of that means stops at the [=Identity=] itself. A subdomain is an identity in its own right, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states, so a name under the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] can hold an [=Originator Profile=] of its own, with its own [=Issuer Pinning Record=]. The [=Issuer Pinning Record=] in the zone of the parent [=Identity=] says nothing about it. What an [=Originator=] delegates below its [=Identity=], it delegates with that consequence.
The comparison between the [=Sending Domain=] and the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries is made on canonical forms and is exact (). Two domains whose canonical forms differ are two different domains however alike they look, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states. A domain registered because it resembles another is therefore bound to itself and to nothing else; what a [=Recipient=] makes of a name that resembles one it knows is not a question the framework answers.
The weight this places on the conversion falls here on one step. The [=Sending Domain=] has to be put into the same form in which alignment was established, which for an internationalized name is the conversion of [[RFC8616]] (). A name produced by any other conversion fails the comparison, so such a mistake ends in a failed verification and not in one that passes.
The requirement of this specification that an authenticated absence be a failure () is a separate matter. The record it concerns is queried at a name built from the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and not from the [=Sending Domain=], so no conversion of the [=Sending Domain=] reaches it.
A message whose From header field does not yield a single domain has
no [=Sending Domain=]. An [=Originator=] does not send such a
message (), and a [=Verifier=]
takes it as not aligned, so that its result is none
().
A message under this specification is covered by two judgements,
that of S/MIME and that of the framework
(), and the only thing that joins
them is the identity of the signing key. Acceptance of the signature
by the S/MIME implementation is a precondition of the framework's
checks rather than a judgement made beside them: where the signature
is not accepted, the framework's result is the fail of
.
requires the two outcomes to
be reported separately.
When the S/MIME signature of a message that carries a bundle fails,
the framework's result is fail, and nothing else it has
to say about the message survives. The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] is
bound to this message by that signature and by nothing else
(). A signature that does not verify
therefore leaves a bundle that may have been lifted from another message
of the same [=Originator=], or that the [=Originator=] never attached
to anything. A [=Verifier=] that reported a passing result for such
a message would be reporting an endorsement over content the
endorsed party had not signed.
When the S/MIME signature verifies and the framework's checks fail, what remains is that the message was signed with the key the certificate carries. It is not established that the key belongs to the [=Originator=] that the [=Core Profile=] names, since that is what failed.
Nor does the framework's failure, as this document leaves it, say which failure it was. A revocation, an expiry, a zone that cannot be reached, and a profile presented from a domain it does not cover all end in the same outcome, because the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] fails closed in each of them. An attack and an operational fault are not distinguished by the result.
The independence also runs over time. What ends the framework's endorsement of a key is the removal of its record from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it, or the expiry of every [=Core Profile=] that carries it (, ). Neither stops S/MIME from accepting the signature, so a party that wants a message to stop verifying altogether has to see it withdrawn on both sides.
A [=Mail Client=] needs a DNSSEC validation state it can rely on. That state is obtained by one of the two means the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] allows: validating with its own trust anchor, or taking a validating resolver's word over a channel that authenticates the resolver and protects the answer. A [=Mail Client=] runs where its user is, on networks it does not control and with whatever resolver its device has been given, and it is for that party that states the requirement explicitly.
Consider an attacker who holds the path between a [=Mail Client=] and its resolver. Where the client meets that requirement, the attacker can prevent answers from arriving but cannot choose them. What it gains is bounded by this use case never reading a failure as absence. Every name the procedure consults fails closed, and a record the [=Verifier=] cannot authenticate is a failure and never an unpinned outcome ().
The downgrade that the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] guards most carefully, the turning of a pinned [=Originator=] into an unpinned one, has no analogue here. The [=Issuer Pinning Record=] is required in this use case and its authenticated absence is a failure, where the Core Specification does not require the record and reads its absence as leaving the [=Originator=] unpinned. A [=Verifier=] following the Core Specification alone proceeds when the record is absent, and that is what this use case does not do ().
Such an attacker can therefore suppress verification for as long as it holds the path. Where the queries reach the resolver in the clear, as they may where the client validates for itself, it can do so for a chosen [=Originator=], since the query names say which one is being verified.
What it cannot do is forge an answer: a record it composes is not authenticated, and a client that meets the requirement does not act on one that is not. It may, however, be able to replay an answer that was authenticated when it was signed, a different attack with a different bound ().
A client that did not meet the requirement has no such bound. Taking an unauthenticated indication of validation, such as the AD bit in a plaintext answer, leaves every DNS answer in the attacker's choice. The framework then adds nothing to what the documents in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] already assert; the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states this as the reason for the requirement.
Suppression is not nothing. A [=Recipient=] who is shown a failure cannot tell an attacker on the path from a zone that is temporarily unreachable, and the same outcome is reported in both cases. Nor is there a weaker check to fall back to. A [=Mail Client=] with neither means cannot verify at all, and every message it is to evaluate under this specification fails. A message that presents no profile is not evaluated in the first place ().
The general form of this attack is in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]. An attacker on the path between a [=Verifier=] and the authoritative servers can replay an answer that was true when it was signed, for as long as the signature over that answer is valid. The answer may be a proof that a [=Revocation Record=] did not exist. The names at which this procedure checks for an absence are not all affected alike by this attack.
At the [=Revocation Record=] of a [=Profile Annotation=], absence is what lets the annotation stand (, steps 2 and 8), and it is the only name of this procedure at which that is so. Replaying an absence there hides a revocation, and the annotation goes on verifying. At every other name of the framework the procedure consults, namely the [=Issuer Key Record=] of each issuer, the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] and the [=Originator Key Record=], what is required is a presence, and an absence is a failure (, ). Replaying an absence there produces a failed verification, and gains an attacker nothing beyond what blocking the query would have given it.
What is particular to mail is that the same message is verified again and again. A [=Mail Client=] verifies each time it displays a message (). An attacker holding the path therefore has an occasion at every reading rather than one occasion at delivery, and a message that is kept is read long after it arrived.
The same fact works in the recipient's favour once the attacker is gone: a message accepted under a replayed absence is verified afresh at the next display, and the revocation then shows. The window remains the RRSIG validity period of the zone that gave that absence, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states, and it does not lengthen because the message is old.
A message forwarded inline, its text quoted in the body of another message, does not carry the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], so nothing about the original message can be checked (). An assertion within such a body that the original was verified is part of the quoted text and is worth exactly what the forwarder is worth.
Where the forwarding message is itself signed under this specification, what verifies is the forwarder. The [=Sending Domain=] is that of the message being evaluated (), so a [=Recipient=] shown a valid result over a message that quotes another holds a valid result about the party that quoted and none about the party quoted. This is the case in which an inline forward is most easily misread, because there is a result to display and it is not a result about the content the reader is looking at.
A message forwarded as a message/rfc822 part is the
other case: the inner message is intact and is verified as a
message in its own right. Its bundle lies within the enclosed body
and is not counted among the parts of the outer message
(, ), and a
[=Mail Client=] disregards the Authentication-Results header fields
the inner message carries (). A message replayed unchanged to
another recipient is a third case, which
describes.
This section states no requirement. What the queries of reveal, to whom, and what the design does to limit it, is in the privacy considerations of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and is not repeated here. What this use case adds is what that specification leaves to a [=Use Case Specification=]: when the queries are made, by which party, and what the queries made in the [=Originator=]'s own zone name.
A [=Mail Client=] verifies a message each time it displays it (). The queries it makes that its cache does not answer are therefore made when a message is opened, and the time of the query is the time at which the message was read.
Apart from the recipient's own provider, which sees the message being fetched, nothing in mail discloses when a message is read. A message is delivered before it is read, the reading happens on the recipient's own systems, and the documents of an [=Originator Profile=] are not fetched from anywhere when it happens (). What is left is the DNS queries. Verifying at display gives them the timing of the reading, so that an event which was visible nowhere outside the recipient's own systems becomes visible to the parties that see those queries.
Among those queries are the ones a [=Mail Client=] makes to evaluate DMARC, which it does for every message it verifies (): the DKIM key of the signature and the DMARC policy record of the domain. A [=Mail Client=] that evaluates DMARC when it displays the message makes them at the time of reading, like the others. One that evaluates DMARC when it takes the message in, as a client that synchronizes in the background may, makes them when the message arrives, independently of when it is read.
The [=Originator Key Records=] and [=Revocation Records=] an issuer publishes are named with opaque labels, so that an observer between a resolver and an authoritative server learns that one of the issuer's records is being checked but not whose. This is the property the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] describes, and it holds here unchanged. It does not extend to the records in the [=Originator=]'s own zone.
The [=Issuer Pinning Record=] is published under a name built from the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], and that name carries the domain itself. This use case requires that record, which the Core Specification does not require (), so the query is made for every message evaluated under this specification. In the general procedure, by contrast, a [=Verifier=] consults that record only if its [=Use Case Specification=] requires it or the [=Verifier=] elects to. No [=Permitted Host Record=] is queried in this use case ().
Taken with the previous section, this means that the resolver a [=Mail Client=] uses sees which domains its user reads mail from, and when. That resolver is the one the user's device has been given, and it is also the resolver the client is required to reach over an authenticated path (). The exposure is toward the resolver the user or the network chose, and the measures against it are those the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] names for any query.
The [=Originator=]'s own zone sees those queries in the aggregate its resolvers produce, reduced by caching, since one record serves every message from that [=Originator=]. It does not learn which [=Recipient=] asked, because the query reaches it from a resolver.
The queries of the DMARC evaluation name the domain of the From
header field, and the DKIM key is queried under a name formed from
the selector and the d= domain of the signature, which
under strict alignment is that same domain. The selector is a value
the sender writes into each message.
Were the selector to differ by recipient or by message, the name queried would identify the message. A query for it reaching the sender's zone would then tell the sender that that message was opened, at about what time, and through which resolver. Caching would not aggregate it away, since no other message shares the name.
forbids the [=Originator=] the use of selectors in that way. A [=Mail Client=] cannot detect such use, so the protection rests on the requirement on the sender and not on anything the client does.
This specification requires one registration. None has been made.
This appendix sets out how this specification differs from the Web Media Use Case Specification [[OPF-WEB-MEDIA]]. The structural conclusion is that the Email use case adds not one line to the DNS design of the framework. The differences fall under five heads: (1) what is required of the [=Originator=]'s own records; (2) how the [=Presented Identity=] is taken, and which document declares the binding; (3) whether an outer certificate layer is present; (4) where verification happens, as of what time it judges, and whether its outcome is kept; and (5) what the [=Originator Profile=] consists of.
This table and the table in the appendix "Differences from the Email Use Case Specification" of the Web Media [=Use Case Specification=] are one table written from the two sides; they are kept consistent, and a row added to one is added to the other.