This document is the Web Media [=Use Case Specification=] of the Originator Profile Framework: the specification that applies the framework to content published on a website and presented to a [=Recipient=] in a web page. It defines how an Originator Profile is carried in such a page, which records in the DNS a [=Verifier=] consults and which of them an [=Originator=] is required, or recommended, to publish. It also defines how a [=Verifier=] verifies the profile, and as of what time validity and revocation are judged.

It adds one document to the [=Originator Profile=], the [=Web Media Profile=], and adds no record to the DNS design of the framework. What it adds is the binding between the origin of the page and the [=Originator=] of the content, and the rules for where and when a page is verified. The general model, the data models and the DNS procedures on which this specification builds are defined in the Architectural Overview [[OPF-AOV]] and the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are not repeated here.

Status of this Document

This document is a description of the current design of the Web Media [=Use Case Specification=] of the Originator Profile Framework (OPF) developed by the Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP). It is in DRAFT status, which means it has no official standing of any kind and does not represent the consensus of the OP-CIP Membership.

This is the first draft of this document. Points that this revision leaves open are marked as issues where they arise in the body. The work of moving into this document what the Originator Profile Blueprints say of web media is in progress ().

Every document of the Originator Profile Framework, this one included, is under development, as is the Internet-Draft [[?OPF-DNS]] on which the framework relies, and no section cited here is yet stable. A reference to a section of a document, whichever document it is, is therefore made by the name of the thing referred to rather than by section number.

Introduction

The Originator Profile Framework lets a [=Recipient=] of content learn who the [=Originator=] of that content is, and what third parties have validated about that [=Originator=], from data that the [=Originator=] itself presents. The Architectural Overview [[OPF-AOV]] describes the general model. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] specifies the part of the framework that every use case shares, and leaves what depends on how content is delivered to a [=Use Case Specification=] for each way of delivering it. This document is the [=Use Case Specification=] for content published on a website and presented in a web page, and it also defines the model for that use case, the [=Web Media Specific Model=].

In outline, the use case consists of three things.

Relationship to Other Documents

This document is a [=Use Case Specification=] in the sense of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]: it applies that document to one way of delivering content and settles the matters that document leaves to a [=Use Case Specification=]. Those matters are:

This document does not restate what other documents of the framework define. In particular:

The scope of this document is web media: content that an [=Originator=] publishes and that is presented in a page whose origin its [=Website Profile=] names. The host of that origin need not be the [=Originator=]'s own [=Identity=], and the relation in which it has to stand to that [=Identity=] is the one that states.

Content supplied for advertising is not within the scope of this document. It is the subject of a separate [=Use Case Specification=] for web advertisement [[?OPF-WEB-AD]], which is expected to override parts of this document; the question of which origin such content is bound to is left to that document.

A conforming implementation of this specification is one that presents an [=Originator Profile=] in a web page, or verifies one presented in a web page, as this document requires of that role. Where a requirement is placed on a particular party, namely the [=Originator=] or the [=Verifier=], it applies to an implementation acting in that role.

In normative text, a sentence that uses none of the key words either restates a requirement stated elsewhere, citing it, defines a term or a value, or explains; a requirement that has no other place is stated with a key word.

The DNSSEC validation states of [[?RFC4035]] are written in italics, as in Secure and Insecure, also where they qualify a noun, and the field names of the SVCB record [[?RFC9460]], such as ServiceMode and TargetName, are written in code type.

Terminology

The terms below that are marked as imported are used in this document with the meaning given to them in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]. They are listed here only so that they resolve within this document; the definition of record is the one in [[OPF-CORE]], and where the two differ, [[OPF-CORE]] prevails. The remaining terms are those of the web media use case and are defined here; the definition of record of each of them is the one in this document.

The imported terms are restated in this document rather than resolved against [[OPF-CORE]] by cross-document reference, because the cross-reference database that would resolve them automatically covers only published specifications, and [[OPF-CORE]] is not in it. Each entry links to its definition in [[OPF-CORE]]. When the publication arrangements for the framework's documents are settled, these entries are to be replaced by cross-document references and removed from this document.

Imported Terms

Accreditation Chain
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Accreditation Chain.
Content
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Content.
Content Attestation
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Content Attestation.
Content Validity Period
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Content Validity Period.
Core Profile
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Core Profile.
Core Profile Issuer
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Core Profile Issuer.
current
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], current.
Identity
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Identity.
Issuer Key Record
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Issuer Key Record.
Issuer Pinning Record
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Issuer Pinning Record.
Key Identifier
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Key Identifier.
Originator
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Originator.
Originator Key Record
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Originator Key Record.
Originator Profile
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile.
Originator Profile Bundle
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile Bundle. In this specification it is carried in the page or at the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] (, ).
Originator Verification Key
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Originator Verification Key.
Permitted Host Record
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Permitted Host Record.
Presented Identity
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Presented Identity.
Profile Annotation
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Profile Annotation.
Profile Annotation Issuer
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Profile Annotation Issuer.
Recipient
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Recipient.
retired
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], retired.
Revocation Record
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Record.
Root Core Profile
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Root Core Profile.
Root Issuer
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Root Issuer.
Signature Validity Period
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Signature Validity Period.
Use Case Specification
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Use Case Specification.
Validated Attribute
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Validated Attribute.
Verifier
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], Verifier.
withdrawn
Imported. See [[OPF-CORE]], withdrawn.

Terms Specific to this Specification

Page Origin
The [=Page Origin=] of a presentation is the origin [[RFC6454]] of the page in which the [=Content=] is presented to the [=Recipient=]. It is the identity under which the [=Content=] arrives, and it is what this specification binds to the [=Originator=]; it is the [=Presented Identity=] of this use case, obtained and put into canonical form as requires.
Web Media Profile
A [=Web Media Profile=] is a set of [=Validated Attributes=] about an [=Originator=] that publishes [=Content=] on a website. It includes domain-specific [=Validated Attributes=] for the web media, such as editorial policy and contact information. In this use case it is part of the [=Originator Profile=], together with the [=Core Profile=] and the [=Profile Annotations=], and the [=Originator Profile=] ceases to be valid when it does.
Web Media Profile Issuer
A [=Web Media Profile Issuer=] is the role of a [=Core Profile Issuer=] when it issues a [=Web Media Profile=] for an [=Originator=] under [=Web Media Specific Policy=]; it is not a separate Entity. The [=Web Media Profile=] of an [=Originator=] is issued by the [=Core Profile Issuer=] that issued that [=Originator=]'s [=Core Profile=], as this specification requires. The issuer is responsible for validating the Attributes included in the profile and ensuring that they accurately represent the [=Originator=].
Web Media Specific Model
A [=Web Media Specific Model=] is a model that extends the Base Model for Web Media use cases, incorporating domain-specific [=Validated Attributes=] and validation mechanisms.
Web Media Specific Policy
A [=Web Media Specific Policy=] is a set of policies that govern the issuance and management of the [=Web Media Profile=], which a [=Core Profile Issuer=] issues, and of the [=Website Profile=], which the [=Originator=] itself issues.
Website Profile
A [=Website Profile=] is Signed Data from Originator, issued by the [=Originator=] itself, that states the websites on which the [=Originator=] publishes its [=Content=]. The [=Verifier=] needs it to bind a web page to the [=Originator=]. This profile includes information such as the origins of the websites. It is not part of the [=Originator Profile=]: like a [=Content Attestation=], it sits outside it. It ceases to have effect when the key that signed it is no longer [=current=], when the [=Core Profile=] that carries that key ceases to be valid, or when its own [=Signature Validity Period=] ends ().

Page Structure

A page that presents an [=Originator Profile=] under this specification carries three kinds of thing: the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], the documents that lie outside that profile and travel with it, and the content itself. This section says what each of them is; what a [=Verifier=] does with them is in .

The Originator Profile Bundle

What the bundle carries. An [=Originator=] MUST include in its [=Originator Profile Bundle=] the documents that the Core Specification defines an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] to carry ([[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile Bundle). The format of each of these documents is defined in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].

What an Originator presents in its bundle. An [=Originator=] MUST present, in its [=Originator Profile Bundle=], at least one of its [=Profile Annotations=]; this is the requirement that the Core Specification has each [=Use Case Specification=] place on the party that assembles the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] ([[OPF-CORE]], Requirements on Use Case Specifications). In this use case the [=Originator Profile=] includes the [=Originator=]'s [=Web Media Profile=] (), and an [=Originator=] MUST also present its [=Web Media Profile=] in its [=Originator Profile Bundle=], in the page or at the well-known resource ().

The whole chain travels with the page. The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] MUST carry the whole of each [=Accreditation Chain=]. A [=Verifier=] is not required to obtain any part of an [=Originator Profile=] beyond what the page and the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] carry (). The [=Core Profile=] of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] and of each [=Profile Annotation Issuer=], each with its [=Accreditation Chain=], is in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], except a [=Root Core Profile=] the [=Verifier=] holds.

A document a Verifier does not use is not a failure. As the Core Specification requires ([[OPF-CORE]], Originator Profile Bundle), a [=Verifier=] does not treat the verification as failed because the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries a document that it does not use or does not recognize. That is what allows a later revision to add a document to the page, or to obtain part of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] by another route, without breaking [=Verifiers=] already deployed.

The Documents Outside the Originator Profile

Two documents outside the profile, and the Web Media Profile within it. Two documents lie outside the [=Originator Profile=] and travel with it: the [=Content Attestation=] and the [=Website Profile=]. The [=Content Attestation=] attests that the [=Content=] of the page originated from the [=Originator=]. The [=Website Profile=] names the origins on which the [=Originator Profile=] may be presented, and it is the document that compares the [=Page Origin=] with. The [=Web Media Profile=], which carries information specific to the [=Originator=]'s web media, is in this use case part of the [=Originator Profile=], as the Core Specification allows a [=Use Case Specification=] to provide; the procedure of checks its issuer, its signature and its [=Signature Validity Period=], and this revision does not define what else a [=Verifier=] does with one.

Who issues the Website Profile, and with which key. A [=Website Profile=] MUST be issued by the [=Originator=] itself, its issuer being the [=Identity=] of that [=Originator=]. The [=Originator=] signs it and the [=Content Attestation=] with an [=Originator Verification Key=] of its [=Core Profile=].

Who issues the Web Media Profile, and with which key. A [=Web Media Profile=] MUST be issued by the [=Core Profile Issuer=] that issued the [=Core Profile=] of the [=Originator=] it is about, not by the [=Originator=] itself, and signed with a key of that issuer's own [=Core Profile=]. That issuer signs it as it signs a [=Core Profile=]; this specification calls that role the [=Web Media Profile Issuer=]. A [=Web Media Profile=] is issued under the [=Web Media Specific Policy=]; what that policy requires of the issuer is stated in the Operational Governance Requirements [[?OPF-GOV]], not here.

Validity follows the profile and the signing key. Neither of these two documents is registered in the DNS and neither has a revocation mechanism of its own; their validity follows the [=Originator Profile=] and the key that signed them, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states for documents outside an [=Originator Profile=]. The [=Web Media Profile=] has no record in the DNS and no revocation mechanism of its own either, and it and the [=Originator Profile=] end together (the layers each of the three is subject to: ; what the position of the two documents outside means for retracting a claim on one site: ).

What allowedUrl may name. The [=Originator=] MUST write each URL Pattern string [[URLPATTERN]] in the allowedUrl of a [=Content Attestation=] with the scheme https, or http where the host is localhost, and with a fixed host name. The host name is fixed in the sense of [[RFC1123]], Section 2.1, and its only permitted wildcard is a leading *. label. What else allowedUrl names is bounded by the Operational Governance Requirements [[?OPF-GOV]].

The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] leaves it to a [=Use Case Specification=] to define what a document outside an [=Originator Profile=] contains and what a [=Verifier=] does with it, and this revision does not yet do so. For each of those documents, and for the [=Web Media Profile=] that this use case adds to the [=Originator Profile=], the list below gives what this document settles, the page of the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] that describes it as the Blueprints stand, and what is not yet defined here.

  • [=Website Profile=].
    • Settled here: it carries a representative URL of the site and one or more origins in the sense of [[RFC6454]], namely scheme, host and non-default port. Its issuer and the key that signs it are stated in this section.
    • In the Blueprints: Website Profile. There a value is written as the ASCII serialization of an origin, without path, query or fragment, and with a default port omitted, as the URL Standard [[URL]] serializes an origin. The comparison of is defined so that a value written otherwise still names the origin it parses to.
    • Not yet defined here: the property names, the cardinality and the form in which an origin is written, which are to be taken from the Blueprints.
  • [=Content Attestation=].
    • Settled here: the one property this revision names is allowedUrl, and it names it to state what it may name (this section) and to require a [=Verifier=] to check it (). The key that signs it is stated in this section.
    • In the Blueprints: Content Integrity Descriptor. For a web page the Blueprints register three kinds of Content Integrity Descriptor, in the sense of [[OPF-AOV]]: an HTML fragment (its outerHTML), the text within a DOM subtree (its textContent), and an external resource. A fourth, the visible text within a DOM subtree (its innerText), is deprecated there. Apart from allowedUrl, what a [=Content Attestation=] is to carry remains as the Blueprints state it.
    • Not yet defined here: which of those kinds a [=Content Attestation=] carries, and in what form, and, from that, how a [=Verifier=] checks a [=Content Attestation=] against the [=Content=] of a page.
  • [=Web Media Profile=].
    • Settled here: its issuer and the key that signs it, stated in this section, and what a [=Verifier=] checks of it ().
    • In the Blueprints: Web Media Profile. There it carries [=Validated Attributes=] specific to the [=Originator=]'s web media that are not organization registration information, such as its editorial policy, privacy policy, contact information, logo and official URL.
    • Not yet defined here: its contents, and from them what a [=Verifier=] does with a [=Web Media Profile=] beyond the checks of .

How the Originator Profile Bundle and the Content Attestation Reach the Verifier

The [=Originator Profile Bundle=], which in this use case carries the [=Web Media Profile=], and the two documents that lie outside the [=Originator Profile=], namely the [=Website Profile=] and the [=Content Attestation=] (), reach a [=Verifier=] by two routes: the page carries the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=], and the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] carries the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Website Profile=]. Documents a [=Verifier=] carries with it can be added to them. No part of an [=Originator Profile=] is fetched from the DNS. The documents of all these sources are taken together, in the order of ; the meaning of that order is the one the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] gives it.

The subsections below say:

Documents Carried in the Page

A page carries these documents in script elements [[HTML]]. Such an element MUST carry a type attribute, whose value is application/ca-set+json where the element carries a Content Attestation Set and application/op-set+json where it carries an Originator Profile Set. The element takes one of two forms, and a page MAY use either.

  • Embedded: the content of the script element is the JSON object itself.
  • Referenced: the element names the object by a URL in a src attribute, and the [=Verifier=] retrieves the object from that URL. This specification does not require an integrity attribute [[?SRI]] on such an element, and places no requirement on a [=Verifier=] with respect to one that is present. Browsing software does not itself retrieve the URL of such an element, since it processes no script element whose type it does not know [[HTML]]; the retrieval is the [=Verifier=]'s.
The values application/ca-set+json and application/op-set+json are those the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] require. The Blueprints deprecate the values used before them, application/cas+json and application/ops+json, which they stop supporting on 1 November 2027; until then a page should not use them, and a [=Verifier=] should treat each as the value that replaces it. Whether this specification takes over that transition is not settled. What the media types are finally to be is under consideration, and where they are to be registered is a separate question ().

What this specification leaves open about the page. This specification lays down none of the following:

  • where in the page such an element stands, in the head or in the body;
  • beyond when a [=Verifier=] reads the page (), the procedure by which it takes the documents out of a page it is given;
  • what each of the two kinds of set contains, any more than it defines the contents of the individual documents ();
  • whether a single Originator Profile Set gives a single order for the [=Profile Annotations=] it carries. That follows from the form of that set rather than from anything this specification states; the revision that defines that form is to settle it and, where it gives none, to state the order here.

What each form lets the page determine. Where this specification speaks of a document as carried in the page, it covers both forms. They differ in what the page determines. In the embedded form the page determines the document itself. In the referenced form it determines only the URL: whoever serves that URL chooses what the retrieval yields, and may return no document, an earlier one or another one, although anything it returns that does not carry its issuer's signature fails to verify (what that does and does not establish: ).

The authenticity of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] rests on the signatures the documents in it carry, and on nothing else. Serving the page over HTTPS establishes the [=Page Origin=], which is what needs, but it says nothing about the [=Originator=]: whoever controls the origin controls what the page carries. No signature outside the documents protects the content and the presence of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] together, which is part of why requires more than the [=Website Profile=]'s own word. Because the authenticity of each document rests on its own signature, no integrity attribute is required on an element that refers to the documents: whoever can replace what it refers to gains no more than a page that does not verify, the denial that describes.

When the Page Is Read

Reading begins when an element is inserted. A [=Verifier=] MUST begin to look for the documents of an element whose type is application/ca-set+json when that element is inserted into the Document [[HTML]], whether the parser or a script inserts it. An element within the content of a template element, or within a shadow tree, is not inserted into the Document in this sense and is not read. A service that retrieves the page runs no script, so it reads the elements of the source it retrieved.

The input of one attestation's procedure. The documents that the procedure for one [=Content Attestation=] uses MUST be taken from a single Document as it stands at a single moment. They come from the elements of that Document, from the well-known resource of its [=Page Origin=] where it is a top-level document (), and from what the [=Verifier=] carries with it. No element of a parent or a sibling document is used. The URL of the page that compares is the URL of that Document at that moment.

A result ends when what it relied on changes. A [=Verifier=] MUST invalidate the result for a [=Content Attestation=] once any of the following happens:

  • an element that carried a document the procedure used no longer stays in the Document;
  • what that [=Content Attestation=] covers changes;
  • the check of allowedUrl is to be made again ().

After invalidating a result, a [=Verifier=] MAY verify that [=Content Attestation=] again. An invalidated result is not a failed verification, and is not presented as one.

What a page that builds its content by script does. A page whose script builds the [=Content=] that a [=Content Attestation=] covers MUST insert the element that carries the Content Attestation Set only after it has built that [=Content=]. It MUST insert the elements that carry the Originator Profile Sets that the verification of that attestation needs no later than that element.

When, after an element is inserted, the input of the procedure is taken from the Document is not settled in this revision.

Both Routes, and the Documents a Verifier Carries

Both routes are used, and neither takes precedence. The well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] is the resource at the path /.well-known/sp.json [[RFC8615]] of that origin, in the form the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] give that resource. That resource carries an Originator Profile Set and [=Website Profiles=]; it carries no [=Content Attestation=], which reaches a [=Verifier=] only in the page or among the documents the [=Verifier=] carries with it. A page carries no [=Website Profile=], which reaches a [=Verifier=] only from that resource or among the documents the [=Verifier=] carries with it. A [=Verifier=] MUST use the documents carried in the page, in either form, together with the documents at that resource. Neither route takes precedence over the other: each document is verified on its own as states, and every document that verifies is used, whichever route it came by. A document one route leaves out is therefore not missing where the other route carries it.

A route that yields nothing. Where the page carries no such element, or the well-known resource cannot be obtained, that route yields nothing, which is not by itself a failure of the verification. Where a page carries a [=Content Attestation=] and the [=Core Profile=] of its [=Originator=] comes from neither route and is not among the documents the [=Verifier=] carries with it, the verification of that [=Content Attestation=] fails. That follows from the procedure of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]], in which a check that does not succeed is a failure. Where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied, a [=Website Profile=] comes only from the well-known resource or from the documents the [=Verifier=] carries with it, so that where neither yields one the binding of fails.

Both routes before any query. A [=Verifier=] MUST take the documents of both routes before it issues any DNS query, as a [=Verifier=] is required to hold the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] before querying [[OPF-CORE]]. A route the [=Verifier=] has abandoned yields nothing, and a document that arrives after the queries have begun is not added to that verification; when to abandon a route is for the [=Verifier=] to decide. In a setting that supplies no [=Page Origin=] (), and for a page whose origin is opaque, there is no well-known resource, and the documents are those the page carries and those the [=Verifier=] carries with it.

Documents a Verifier carries with it. A [=Verifier=] MAY in addition use documents that it carries with it. Each of them is verified on its own in the same way and is used only where it verifies, and they are taken after the documents of the two routes, in the order of .

The Order in Which the Documents Are Taken

A [=Verifier=] MUST take the documents of these sources, the documents of among them, in the following order, which is the order in which the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] has the [=Verifier=] take the documents of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and apply its bounds to them. The documents the [=Originator=] publishes come first, and documents a [=Verifier=] carries with it come after all of those:

  1. the documents at the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=];
  2. the documents carried in the page, in the order of the elements in the page;
  3. documents a [=Verifier=] carries with it.

Within one route or one element, the documents are taken in the order in which it gives them.

The order of processing is the order of priority within the bounds of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]], and that priority is the [=Originator=]'s to give. A document a [=Verifier=] carries with it is therefore not to displace one the [=Originator=] presented. For an [=Originator=] other than the one that controls the [=Page Origin=], such as the [=Originator=] of a syndicated article, the order at the well-known resource is that of the controlling party, which can do with it no more than the denial that describes.

Duplicates, and what the order governs. A document that has already been taken is not taken again where it appears a second time, from the same source or from another, so that it counts once toward the bounds. A document is the same as one already taken where its signed form is identical to that one's, character for character. This order governs what a [=Verifier=] processes within the bounds and nothing else; the order in which a [=Verifier=] presents what it has verified is not governed by it ().

Choosing Among Issuances of One Document

Where the documents that verify include more than one issuance of one document, a [=Verifier=] uses one of them and treats the others as documents the procedure does not use. Which issuances are of one document, and which of them is used, is as follows.

Issuances of a Profile Annotation. Two [=Profile Annotations=] are issuances of one document where they are of the same kind and issued by the same [=Profile Annotation Issuer=] about the same [=Originator=]. Where the documents that verify include more than one such issuance, a [=Verifier=] MUST use the one whose [=Signature Validity Period=] begins latest among those whose [=Signature Validity Period=] contains the time of judgement (). The [=Verifier=] treats the others as documents the procedure does not use. Where two begin at the same time, the one taken first under the order of is used.

Website Profiles of one site. The same holds of more than one [=Website Profile=] issued by the same [=Originator=] for the same representative URL of a site: those are issuances of one document. [=Website Profiles=] that the same [=Originator=] issues for different sites are separate documents, and each of them is used.

Web Media Profiles of one Originator. The same holds of more than one [=Web Media Profile=] issued by the same [=Core Profile Issuer=] for the same [=Originator=]: those are issuances of one document, and the one used is chosen among those that pass the checks of .

What the choice decides. The choice is made among documents that verify and are valid at the time of judgement, so that a document that does not verify, or is not valid at that time, cannot displace one that is. Among those, the beginning of the [=Signature Validity Period=] serves only to choose between issuances, and the representative URL only to tell which issuances belong to one document ().

The Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]], as they stand, distribute a [=Profile Annotation=] or a [=Website Profile=] in several languages as separate documents side by side. Under this section such documents, having the same kind, issuer and subject, or the same issuer and representative URL, are issuances of one document, and a [=Verifier=] uses one of them. Whether the language of a document is to tell one document from another is not settled.

Several Originators on One Page

A page can carry the documents of more than one [=Originator=]: a page that carries articles syndicated from other [=Originators=], or an aggregator's page. Each [=Content Attestation=] names its [=Originator=] and travels with the [=Content=] it covers, so there is no doubt which [=Originator Profile=] it is verified against. The procedure of is run for each [=Content Attestation=], with the [=Core Profile=] whose [=Identity=] is the issuer that attestation names, and the bounds of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] apply to each [=Originator Profile=] separately.

What one attestation's procedure counts. In the procedure run for one [=Content Attestation=], the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] of that procedure is the documents tied to that attestation. Those are the documents of the [=Originator=] it names, together with the [=Accreditation Chains=] of the issuers of its [=Core Profile=] and [=Profile Annotations=], whichever route or element of the page they come from. A document of the page that is tied only to other attestations is not counted toward the bounds of that procedure. A document that serves a chain of this attestation is counted for it even where it is also a document of another [=Originator=] of the page.

The Originators of a page are independent. A [=Verifier=] MAY carry out the procedure for the [=Originators=] of one page in parallel, since they are independent of one another; within one [=Originator=]'s procedure the order of stands. Where the procedures for several [=Content Attestations=] of one Document use the same [=Originator Profile=], a [=Verifier=] MAY verify it once and use that result in each of them while the result has not been invalidated (). The outcome is reached for each [=Content Attestation=], as the Core Specification provides.

Requests for the Well-Known Resource and Referenced Documents

Every Verifier requests the well-known resource. A [=Verifier=] MUST request the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] of a page whether or not the page carries any of the documents of this section, since a page that carries a [=Content Attestation=] but not the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] would otherwise fail. A [=Verifier=] MAY use a response held in an HTTP cache [[RFC9111]]. What it obtains is kept within the bounds of .

When a Verifier within browsing software may make the request. A [=Verifier=] within browsing software MUST NOT make that request before the browsing software has begun to navigate to the page, so that no request reaches an origin the [=Recipient=] has not chosen to visit. In particular, it does not do so while an address is still being typed, nor for a page that the browsing software has prepared in advance of a navigation the [=Recipient=] has not yet made. This specification does not otherwise fix when the request is made.

No credentials with the requests. A [=Verifier=] MUST NOT send credentials with the request for a referenced document or for the well-known resource: the request is made with the credentials mode "omit" [[FETCH]], so that it carries no cookie and no authorization header field. The header fields a request ordinarily carries, which are not credentials, are sent as usual (). For a referenced document, whose URL the page chooses, a request made with credentials would deliver the [=Recipient=]'s credentials to a host of the page's choosing.

A service that retrieves pages. A service that retrieves pages on request SHOULD refuse to retrieve a referenced document from a URL whose host is, or resolves to, a non-public address, such as a loopback, link-local or private-use address or an address of the service's own infrastructure. It SHOULD apply the same rule to the page itself and to every URL reached by following a redirection of either request.

A [=Verifier=] requests the well-known resource from the [=Page Origin=]. Whether it is to follow a redirection returned for that request, and in particular one to another origin, is not settled in this revision. Where a [=Verifier=] follows a redirection to another origin, whoever serves that origin chooses what the [=Verifier=] receives from this route () and learns that a verification is taking place ().

Content Presented in a Frame

The documents obtained from the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] of a top-level document [[HTML]] MUST NOT be used in verifying [=Content=] presented in a frame, that is, in a document nested within that top-level document.

Which origin is the [=Page Origin=] of [=Content=] presented in a frame, and whether a [=Verifier=] obtains the well-known resource of the frame's origin, is not settled in this revision. The answer may also depend on the treatment of advertising, which the [=Use Case Specification=] for web advertisement [[?OPF-WEB-AD]] is expected to give ().

The Presented Identity and the Originator's Records

This specification adds no resource record and no name to the DNS design of the framework. The names, record types and formats are defined in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and in [[?OPF-DNS]]. What this specification fixes is which of those records a [=Verifier=] consults in this use case, which of them an [=Originator=] is required to publish, and what their absence means.

The Presented Identity

What the Presented Identity is. The identity under which the [=Content=] of a page is presented is the [=Page Origin=], namely the origin [[RFC6454]] of the page in which the [=Content=] is presented: its scheme, its host, and its port where that port is not the default for the scheme. It is the [=Presented Identity=] of this use case.

Settings that supply no Page Origin. Content published under this specification can also be read outside a navigation of browsing software, as it is in an archive viewer, in an offline reader or in the viewer of a mail attachment. Those are the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=], in which the delivery gives no [=Presented Identity=] ([[OPF-CORE]], Procedure, step 3), and this specification covers them. A page that browsing software presents is not among them, even under an opaque origin; such a page is treated in the block "Hosts that cannot be put into canonical form" of this section.

The host is the name compared. The [=Presented Identity=] is compared through its host: before the comparison, a [=Verifier=] takes the host of the [=Page Origin=], and that host is the name that this specification compares with the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries. A [=Verifier=] MUST put that host into the canonical form in which the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] compares domain names. Parsing the URL of the page produces that form, a domain host in a parsed URL being a lower-case ASCII name, except that a parsed URL may keep a trailing dot; a [=Verifier=] removes that dot before the comparison, since the canonical form has none.

The comparison itself is the Core Specification's. The origin as a whole is compared as states. Beyond that, this specification defines no conversion of its own, and the comparison itself, including what it means for one name to lie below another, is the rule of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].

Hosts that cannot be put into canonical form. A host that is not a domain name, such as an IP address literal, cannot be put into that form. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] makes a value that cannot be put into canonical form a failure of the check that needed it, so the binding of fails for a page whose origin has such a host. An opaque origin, such as that of a page read from a local file, from a data: URL or within a sandboxed frame, has no host that can be put into canonical form. The binding therefore fails for a page presented under one as well, and no query is made for it.

Were a page under an opaque origin counted among the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=], whoever assembles a page could choose the path on which the binding is reported as not checked. A sandboxed frame or a data: URL is of the page's making; an archive viewer or an offline reader is not.

Binding the Page Origin to the Originator

What a Verifier establishes. A [=Verifier=] MUST establish all of the following before it treats the [=Content=] of a page as that of the [=Originator=] whose [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries.

When the Page Origin is one of the named origins. The [=Page Origin=] is one of the origins the [=Website Profile=] names if, and only if, its serialization as an origin ([[HTML]]) equals that of the origin of the URL obtained by parsing, as a URL [[URL]], a value the [=Website Profile=] carries. The trailing dot that a [=Verifier=] removes from the host before the comparison of is not removed for this comparison. A value that does not parse, or whose origin is opaque, names no origin.

A host outside the Identity that its zone does not permit. Where the host of the [=Page Origin=] is not the [=Identity=] of the [=Originator=] and does not lie below it, an authenticated absence of the [=Permitted Host Record=] and an Insecure answer both cause verification to fail. They do so as the Core Specification requires ([[OPF-CORE]], Records Published by the Originator) and as any failure to resolve does. An Insecure answer is one from a zone that is not signed. Such a host MUST NOT be treated as one presenting an unpinned [=Originator Profile=] (): the [=Website Profile=] has claimed the host, and the failure is that the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] does not bear the claim out.

Which name the Permitted Host Record is consulted for. Where the [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted, a [=Verifier=] consults it for the host of the [=Page Origin=], in the canonical form of . Which names a record covers, and how its presence and absence are read, are the Core Specification's ([[OPF-CORE]], Records Published by the Originator), and a [=Verifier=] applies them here unchanged.

An attacker who obtains a [=Core Profile=] issued in error for the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] can sign a [=Website Profile=] naming a site of its own, because a [=Website Profile=] is issued by the [=Originator=] itself. Were the comparison with the named origins the whole of the binding, that single failure would be enough for impersonation. The requirement that the host stand in a relation to the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], witnessed either by the name itself or by a record in the [=Originator=]'s own zone, is what makes a second failure necessary.

The representative URL takes no part. The [=Website Profile=] also carries a representative URL of the site. That URL takes no part in the binding or in any judgement of verification; it is information for presentation, and serves otherwise only to tell which issuances of a [=Website Profile=] are versions of one document ().

The Originator's Records and Its Zone

Where the records are published. Both of the records that an [=Originator=] can publish are published in the zone of the [=Originator=]'s own [=Identity=], at the names the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] defines. The zone of the host of the [=Page Origin=], where that host is not the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and does not lie below it, carries no record of this framework and is not required to be signed with DNSSEC.

The Issuer Pinning Record is optional, and when it is consulted. An [=Originator=] is not required to publish its [=Issuer Pinning Record=], the record that names the [=Core Profile Issuers=] permitted to issue for it, and is therefore not required to sign the zone of its [=Identity=] at all. Whether a [=Verifier=] consults that record depends on the setting: where the setting supplies no [=Page Origin=], a [=Verifier=] MUST consult it, and where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied, a [=Verifier=] MAY consult it. A [=Verifier=] that consults the record treats its outcomes as the Core Specification requires ([[OPF-CORE]], Records Published by the Originator).

The outcomes are the Core Specification's. An authenticated absence and an Insecure answer, and an answer reached through an alias, leave the [=Originator=] unpinned, and verification goes on. Every other outcome either pins the [=Originator=] or fails the verification, as the Core Specification states ([[OPF-CORE]], Records Published by the Originator; [[OPF-CORE]], DNSSEC Requirements and Resolution Outcomes), and this specification adds nothing to them. How a [=Verifier=] that obtains the validation state from a resolver sees an Indeterminate outcome, and why the state does not arise under the assurance of , is noted there as well.

The recommendation to publish the record. An [=Originator=] the zone of whose [=Identity=] is signed with DNSSEC SHOULD publish its [=Issuer Pinning Record=]. A record has effect only where the answer is authenticated. A record in a zone that is not signed, or in a zone delegated at _op.<originator> without a DS record in the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], therefore has none. This specification requires no [=Originator=] to sign that zone, so that an organization that cannot sign it can still take part ().

The rest of the zone. A wildcard or a DNAME elsewhere in the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], and what publishing the record does to them, are as the Core Specification states; how an [=Originator=] checks the name is in [[?OPF-OPS]].

When the Originator's zone has to be signed. A [=Permitted Host Record=] is needed only in the case that gives, namely for a host that the [=Website Profile=] names and that is not the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and does not lie below it. It follows from that an [=Originator=] that names such a host has to sign the zone of its [=Identity=], since a [=Verifier=] acts on that record only where the answer is authenticated. An [=Originator=] that names only hosts that are its own [=Identity=] or lie below it does not.

The issuers' records are the Core Specification's. The records published by the issuers, namely the [=Issuer Key Record=] of each, the [=Originator Key Records=] of a [=Core Profile Issuer=] and the [=Revocation Records=] of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=], are common to every use case and are defined in the Core Specification ([[OPF-CORE]], Issuer Key Record; [[OPF-CORE]], Originator Key Records; [[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Records). This specification places no requirement on them beyond those.

Verification

This section fixes, for this use case, which party carries out the verification procedure of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]], what that party needs to hold in order to establish a DNSSEC validation state where it runs, how it checks the [=Web Media Profile=] and matches the URL of the page with allowedUrl, and what becomes of the result. The time as of which validity is judged is in .

The Verifying Party

Two placements of the Verifier. The party that verifies is the party that presents the page to the [=Recipient=], or a service that retrieves the page and verifies it. This specification gives no name of its own to that party: the term for the role is [=Verifier=], imported from [[OPF-CORE]] (), and the two placements differ in what they are able to obtain rather than in what they have to check. Whether a service conveys the outcome it reaches to another party that then presents the page, and what that party may rely on in it, is not settled ().

Two means of establishing the validation state. A [=Verifier=] establishes the DNSSEC validation state of every answer it acts on as the Core Specification requires ([[OPF-CORE]], DNSSEC Requirements and Resolution Outcomes), by validating with its own trust anchor or over a channel that authenticates a validating resolver and protects its answer. Where it relies on a resolver, it has assurance, by configuration or by test, that the resolver validates. A [=Verifier=] that can do neither cannot carry out the procedure at all, as the Core Specification states.

An answer from a resolver that does not validate is not Insecure. An answer from such a resolver carries no validation state, and a [=Verifier=] does not read it as Insecure, as [[OPF-CORE]] requires. In this use case the reading matters because, for the [=Originator=]'s [=Issuer Pinning Record=], an Insecure answer leaves the [=Originator=] unpinned (; [[OPF-CORE]], DNSSEC Requirements and Resolution Outcomes).

A Verifier within browsing software carries its own means. A [=Verifier=] that runs within browsing software, as an extension does, MUST NOT treat an answer obtained through the resolution that the browsing software performs for its own purposes as authenticated data on that ground alone. Browsing software does not in general validate DNSSEC, and an indication that an answer was validated, if that indication itself arrives unauthenticated, can be written by anyone on the network path. Such a [=Verifier=] therefore carries one of the two means with it: a validator of its own, or an authenticated channel to a validating resolver.

A service that retrieves the page. Either means is a matter of the service's own deployment, with what it does with the result in and what it learns about the [=Recipient=] in .

Verification Procedure

Steps numbered as the general procedure. A [=Verifier=] that verifies an [=Originator Profile=] presented in a page MUST perform the following steps. The steps follow the general procedure of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are numbered as that procedure numbers them; only the content that is specific to this specification is given here. A step that says "as in the general procedure" is that procedure's step, with only what the step adds.

Which queries wait for what. Each step that queries the DNS is marked. As in the general procedure, no query is made for an issuer until that issuer's [=Accreditation Chain=] has been verified locally; for a [=Root Issuer=], its [=Root Core Profile=] serves as that chain. The names queried in steps 3 and 4 are built from the [=Identity=] the [=Core Profile=] carries. Those two queries are therefore made only after the chain of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] has been verified locally and the signature on the [=Core Profile=] has been verified with that issuer's key. The verification of the [=Website Profile=] and the comparison of the [=Page Origin=] with the origins it names need no query and need not wait for the chain.

  1. Take the inputs. A [=Verifier=] holds, before it begins, what the general procedure requires of it: the [=Root Core Profiles=] it accepts, a means of establishing a DNSSEC validation state (), and a clock. It takes the [=Originator Profile Bundle=], the [=Content Attestation=] and the [=Website Profile=], as defines them, from three sources:

    • the page, which carries the first two and embeds them or names them by a URL;
    • the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=], which carries the first and the third;
    • what it carries with it.

    It retrieves nothing besides. It takes the documents of both routes before any DNS query, as requires, and a route it has abandoned yields nothing.

    What binds the Content, and the documents not used. In this use case the [=Content Attestation=] is itself what binds the [=Originator Profile=] to the [=Content=] ([[OPF-CORE]], Requirements on Use Case Specifications, item 7), and there is no signature outside the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] for a [=Verifier=] to verify first. Of the [=Web Media Profile=], which is part of the [=Originator Profile=] in this use case, the steps below check the issuer, the signature and the [=Signature Validity Period=] (step 5). This revision does not define what else a [=Verifier=] does with one (). The presence in the page of a document that this procedure does not use is not a failure.

  2. Verify the Accreditation Chains locally (DNS for the checks that follow the local verification). This step is as in the general procedure, and precedes any DNS query for the issuer concerned. Everything the local verification needs is in the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] (), so nothing is retrieved to perform it beyond what step 1 obtains, and a chain that does not verify locally costs no query at all.

    The checks in the DNS, and a chain already kept. The checks in the DNS that the general procedure requires for each step of a verified chain are made as that procedure states, and this specification adds nothing to them. A [=Verifier=] that has already verified and kept a chain, as the Core Specification permits ([[OPF-CORE]], Accreditation Chain Verification and Caching) within the bounds of , repeats none of those queries.

  3. Bind the identity (DNS in one case). Establish each of the conditions of :

    • that the [=Website Profile=] verifies under an [=Originator Verification Key=] of the [=Core Profile=], is issued by the [=Originator=] whose [=Identity=] that profile carries, and is within its own [=Signature Validity Period=] at the time of judgement ();
    • that the [=Page Origin=] is one of the origins the [=Website Profile=] names;
    • that the host of the [=Page Origin=] stands in the required relation to that [=Identity=].

    The [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted only where that host is not the [=Identity=] of the [=Originator=] and does not lie below it; where it is consulted, the failures that states apply.

    Settings that supply no Page Origin. Where the delivery gives no [=Page Origin=] (), the conditions of cannot be established and this step is not carried out. The [=Verifier=] reports the binding as not checked, which the general procedure provides for and which is not by itself a failure of the verification; the remaining steps are carried out, step 4 among them, which is then required.

    A page under an opaque origin. A page that browsing software presents under an opaque origin, such as one read from a local file, from a data: URL or within a sandboxed frame, does supply a [=Page Origin=]. Its host cannot be put into canonical form (), and the binding fails.

  4. Consult the [=Originator=]'s [=Issuer Pinning Record=] (DNS, after step 2 for the [=Core Profile Issuer=] and the verification of the [=Core Profile=]'s signature, since the name is built from the [=Identity=] that profile carries).

    When the record is consulted, and its outcomes. Where the setting supplies no [=Page Origin=], so that step 3 is not carried out, the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] in the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] is consulted; where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied, consulting it is the [=Verifier=]'s choice, as requires (why the two settings differ: ). In neither case is an [=Originator=] required to publish the record in this use case. A [=Verifier=] that consults it treats each outcome as requires, and whether the [=Originator=] was pinned or unpinned, or that its [=Issuer Pinning Record=] was not consulted, is carried into the outcome.

  5. Check that the [=Core Profile=] is current (DNS). As in the general procedure ([[OPF-CORE]], Procedure, step 5), the time of judgement being that of . The key of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] is taken from that issuer's own [=Core Profile=] in the [=Accreditation Chain=] of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] or in a [=Root Core Profile=] the [=Verifier=] holds, and nothing is fetched to obtain it. The check that the general procedure then makes, that the key which signed the [=Core Profile=] is one that issuer currently publishes, is made in the DNS.

    The Web Media Profile. Check also the [=Web Media Profile=] of the [=Originator=] as states. Where the Bundle carries none, where none passes the checks of its issuer and its key, or where none that passes is valid at the time of judgement, this step fails.

  6. Check the [=Originator Key Record=] (DNS). As in the general procedure: the [=Originator Key Record=] whose name the [=Core Profile=] carries is present. This specification adds nothing to that step.
  7. Verify the [=Content Attestation=].

    The key that signed the Content Attestation. As in the general procedure: the key that signed it is an [=Originator Verification Key=] of the [=Core Profile=], selected by its [=Key Identifier=], and is [=current=] for that [=Core Profile=], as [[OPF-CORE]], Procedure, step 7 requires. A key is [=withdrawn=] by removing its record from the [=Originator Key Records=], so the key is [=current=] only while the [=Originator Key Record=] of that [=Core Profile=] lists its [=Key Identifier=].

    The key of the Website Profile, and the [=Signature Validity Periods=]. The key that signed the [=Website Profile=] on which step 3 relied MUST be [=current=] in the same sense, since a document outside an [=Originator Profile=] is of use only while the key that signed it is [=current=] (). The [=Content Attestation=] MUST be within its own [=Signature Validity Period=] at the time of judgement. A [=Content Attestation=] or a [=Website Profile=] whose [=Signature Validity Period=] does not contain that time is a document the procedure does not use ().

    The URL of the page and allowedUrl. The [=Verifier=] MUST check, as states, that the URL of the page in which the [=Content Attestation=] is presented matches the allowedUrl property of the [=Content Attestation=], which the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] define. Its value is a URL Pattern string [[URLPATTERN]] or an array of such strings. A [=Content Attestation=] whose allowedUrl the URL of the page does not match MUST NOT be used for that page.

    A [=Content Attestation=] fixes the [=Content=] it covers, and nothing else in it fixes the page on which it may be presented. A [=Verifier=] that omitted the check would therefore accept a genuine [=Content Attestation=] on a page that merely reproduces that [=Content=] ().
  8. Check each [=Profile Annotation=] (DNS). As in the general procedure, the time of judgement being that of : the [=Signature Validity Period=] of an annotation contains that time, a [=Content Validity Period=] it carries contains its [=Signature Validity Period=], and no [=Revocation Record=] for the annotation is present. This specification adds nothing to that step.
  9. Derive and report the outcome. As in the general procedure, whose requirements on what an outcome distinguishes and on reporting the freshness of the checks of presence and absence apply here unchanged; the outcome then goes to and .

The query this procedure adds. The number of DNS queries this procedure makes is that of the general procedure, with at most one query added: the [=Permitted Host Record=], in the case where the host of the [=Page Origin=] is not the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and does not lie below it. A revisit to a site whose chains are already verified and kept makes fewer ().

Step 7 requires the [=Verifier=] to check allowedUrl. A [=Content Attestation=] of an older form may carry only allowedOrigin and no allowedUrl. Whether such a [=Content Attestation=] is not to be used, is to be checked against allowedOrigin instead, or is accepted for a transitional period that ends on a stated date, is not settled. Whether such documents are in circulation is not established here.
Step 3 is not carried out in the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=] (). It is not settled what the check of then does: whether it is likewise not carried out and reported as not checked, is made against a URL that the setting records for the page, or causes the [=Content Attestation=] not to be used.

Checking the Web Media Profile

What is checked of a Web Media Profile. In step 5 of , a [=Verifier=] checks that the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] carries a [=Web Media Profile=] of the [=Originator=] (). Of each one it carries, it checks that it is issued by the [=Core Profile Issuer=] that issued the [=Core Profile=] that step verified (), and that its signature verifies with a key taken from that issuer's own [=Core Profile=] in the [=Accreditation Chain=] or in a [=Root Core Profile=] the [=Verifier=] holds. It checks also that this key is one that issuer currently publishes, using the [=Issuer Key Record=] that step obtained, with no further query. A [=Web Media Profile=] that fails any of these checks is a document the procedure does not use.

The [=Signature Validity Period=] of a Web Media Profile. Of the [=Web Media Profiles=] that pass the checks of their issuer and their key, the [=Signature Validity Period=] of one has to contain the time of judgement, since the [=Originator Profile=] ends with its [=Web Media Profile=] (). Nothing else of a [=Web Media Profile=] is checked ().

Matching the URL of the Page with allowedUrl

Step 7 of requires a [=Verifier=] to check that the URL of the page matches the allowedUrl of the [=Content Attestation=]; this section states how the match is made.

How the URL of the page is matched. The URL of the page is the URL of the Document from which the input is taken (), with all its components, the query and the fragment among them. For a service that followed a redirection, it is the URL of the Document it was finally given. The URL matches a string where it matches the pattern constructed from that string, and an array where it matches any one of its strings. A [=Verifier=] MUST treat a string that does not parse as a pattern, or that does not meet the constraints of , as matching no URL.

A change of URL within the Document. Where the URL of the Document changes without a new Document, as in a navigation to a fragment, the [=Verifier=] MUST make the check of allowedUrl again against the new URL. A result that rested on the earlier match ends ().

What Becomes of the Result

No place in which a result is recorded. The delivery channel offers no place in which a result could be recorded, and this specification defines neither a form for a recorded result nor a means of sealing one. A page is a document that a [=Verifier=] reads, not a message to which the parties that handle it add fields of their own, and nothing a [=Verifier=] writes travels with the page to the next party that reads it. A [=Verifier=] therefore judges afresh at each presentation ().

Whether an outcome passes between parties. Where the party that verifies is the party that presents, which is the case of a [=Verifier=] within browsing software, no result passes between parties at all: the outcome is derived and presented (), and nothing survives the presentation. Where a service verifies and the party that presents the page is another, the outcome reaches that party by whatever arrangement holds between the two. This specification does not define that arrangement.

The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] requires a [=Use Case Specification=] to say what a party that receives an outcome from another party may rely on. Three things that bear on it are not settled in this revision:

  • Whether a service that retrieves the page conveys its outcome to another party that presents the page. admits a service as one of two placements of the [=Verifier=]. This section says only that the outcome reaches the party that presents by whatever arrangement holds between the two, without saying whether they are the same party.
  • Where they are not, the form in which the outcome is conveyed and what the receiving party may rely on.
  • Whether a boundary of trust is needed within which an outcome passed from one party to another may be relied on. This use case defines none.

This use case records no outcome and so defines no values in which one is recorded; it has no means of keeping one ().

Presentation

What the Core Specification already requires of what is presented. The outcome of a verification is presented to the [=Recipient=] alongside the [=Content=] it concerns. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states what a [=Verifier=] is not to present as though a [=Profile Annotation=] were in force, and what an outcome distinguishes about pinning, namely a pinned [=Originator=], an unpinned one, and one whose [=Issuer Pinning Record=] was not consulted. Neither is restated here. In this use case an [=Issuer Pinning Record=] goes unconsulted only where a [=Page Origin=] was supplied and the [=Verifier=] did not elect to consult the record ().

A binding that was not checked. The Core Specification also requires that an outcome report a binding which was not checked as such. In this use case that holds for the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=]. A page presented in browsing software has one and its binding is checked, whereas content read in one of the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=] () has none, and the outcome then carries that the binding was not checked.

A judgement of the time it was made. What a [=Verifier=] presents is a judgement made at the time it verified, and it is not a statement about any other time (). The things a [=Verifier=] may keep from one verification to another are listed in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and in ; an outcome is not among them.

The current implementation. In the current implementation the [=Verifier=] is a browser extension, which also presents the outcome to the [=Recipient=]; it is the user interface of the demonstrations. Modifications to browsing software itself, to give the [=Recipient=] key visual information, are being explored.

This specification does not evaluate a page that carries no [=Content Attestation=] (). The Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]], as they stand, verify the [=Website Profile=] such a page obtains from its well-known resource and present the [=Originator=] that operates the site. Whether a [=Verifier=] may present anything for such a page, and on what conditions, is not settled.

Validity, Revocation and Time

This section records how the layers of validity of the general model appear in this use case and what invariants issuance is subject to. It also records whether a replaced key is kept as a retired key or withdrawn here, as of what time validity is judged, and what a [=Verifier=] may carry from one presentation of a page to the next.

The Layers of Validity

The four layers are the Core Specification's. In this use case no layer of validity lies outside the four of the Core Specification ([[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Model and Time Constraints), since nothing outside the documents carried with the page signs it. Two things are particular to this use case. The key layer covers the key with which the [=Content Attestation=] and the [=Website Profile=] are signed. The declaration by which an [=Originator=] ends its registration has effect only where a [=Verifier=] consults its [=Issuer Pinning Record=] ().

The documents outside the profile form no layer. The [=Content Attestation=] and the [=Website Profile=] carry no name in the DNS and no revocation mechanism (). They cease to have effect in one of three ways:

The Web Media Profile and the Originator Profile end together. The [=Web Media Profile=] ceases to be valid when the [=Originator=]'s [=Core Profile=] does, and the [=Originator Profile=] ceases to be valid when the [=Signature Validity Period=] of its [=Web Media Profile=] ends. A [=Verifier=] checks that end (). This adds no layer: the [=Web Media Profile=] carries no name in the DNS and no revocation mechanism of its own. It also ends when the [=Core Profile Issuer=] no longer publishes the key that signed it ().

A Website Profile is not subordinate to the Web Media Profile. The two documents can be arranged and carried together, but the validity of a [=Website Profile=] does not depend on that of the [=Web Media Profile=], and the three ways listed above are the only ways in which a [=Website Profile=] ceases to have effect. Where the [=Web Media Profile=] has ended, the verification of each [=Content Attestation=] of that [=Originator=] fails at step 5 of , whatever its [=Website Profile=]. The [=Website Profile=] itself is unaffected, and serves again once the [=Originator Profile=] carries a [=Web Media Profile=] that is valid.

A claim on one site cannot be retracted by itself. Since those three ways are the only ones, the retraction of a claim about a site is folded, in this use case, into the revocation of a key or of a [=Core Profile=]. There is no third thing to revoke. That is a simplicity and it is also a coarseness, since an [=Originator=] that wishes to stop presenting its [=Originator Profile=] on one of the origins its [=Website Profile=] names has no means of retracting that one claim; what follows from it is in .

A [=Verifier=] that holds the erroneous issuance and a later one uses the later (), which is what corrects the error; the earlier one goes on verifying until its [=Signature Validity Period=] ends. A [=Core Profile Issuer=] that cannot wait for that end revokes the [=Core Profile=], which ends both.

Invariants on Issuance

The Core Specification's invariants apply unchanged. This use case adds nothing to the invariants the Core Specification places on issuance ([[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Model and Time Constraints). First, the validity of a [=Profile Annotation=] lies within that of the [=Core Profile=] it annotates. Second, the record of a [=retired=] key is kept until the [=Core Profile=] that carries it has expired, with the retention margin and the exceptions that document states. Third, an issuer keeps a [=Key Identifier=] in its [=Issuer Key Record=] for as long as [[OPF-CORE]], Revocation Model and Time Constraints requires. A [=Verifier=] checks the [=Signature Validity Periods=] of both in any case, so the first is a rule on issuers not to issue documents that contradict one another, rather than a simplification for [=Verifiers=].

How long content signed with a replaced key verifies. A [=retired=] key is not [=withdrawn=]: its record remains, so a document signed with it still passes step 7 of . How long already published content signed with a replaced key remains verifiable is therefore bounded by the [=Signature Validity Period=] of the [=Core Profile=] that carries the key, and is cut short if the key is [=withdrawn=], as it is where an [=Originator=] chooses to withdraw the key rather than retire it ().

The [=Signature Validity Period=] of a Website Profile bounds a claim the Originator has stopped making. One requirement this specification does place on issuance concerns the [=Signature Validity Period=] of a [=Website Profile=]: an [=Originator=] SHOULD make that period no longer than the delay it can accept between ceasing to name an origin and that claim ceasing to be presentable. That period bounds how long an origin the [=Originator=] no longer names can still be presented, since a [=Website Profile=] has no revocation mechanism of its own.

No length is fixed. This requirement is a bound on one period rather than a relation between two. This specification fixes no length and none follows from the framework; no recommended value has been set yet (), and the reasoning is in .

A replacement Website Profile does not expire first. A second requirement concerns a [=Website Profile=] issued to replace another. An [=Originator=] that issues a [=Website Profile=] to replace another for the same site SHOULD NOT let its [=Signature Validity Period=] end before that of the one it replaces. Once the replacement has expired, a [=Verifier=] uses the one it replaced again, and an origin the [=Originator=] had ceased to name becomes presentable again. A [=Verifier=] does so because it uses the issuance that begins latest among those whose [=Signature Validity Period=] contains the time of judgement ().

No further invariant. Beyond the two requirements on a [=Website Profile=], this specification adds no invariant. In particular the framework places none between the [=Signature Validity Period=] of a document outside the [=Originator Profile=] and that of the [=Core Profile=], and none is needed. Such a document is of use only while the key and the [=Core Profile=] are current, whatever its own [=Signature Validity Period=] says ().

Keeping a Replaced Key as Retired or Withdrawing It

Web media signs again and withdraws the replaced key. In this use case an [=Originator=] that replaces a signing key SHOULD sign the documents it presents afresh with the new key: the [=Content Attestations=] of the content it publishes and the documents of that it signs itself. It SHOULD then have its [=Core Profile Issuer=] withdraw the replaced key. Content published on a site is served by the [=Originator=] itself and can be signed again after it has been published. That is what the Core Specification makes the choice turn on ([[OPF-CORE]], Key Compromise), and what makes this course available here.

The choice the Core Specification leaves to the use case. An [=Originator=] that replaces a signing key chooses between two ways. It can keep the replaced key as a [=retired=] key, whose record stays in the [=Originator Key Record=] of each [=Core Profile=] that carries it until that [=Core Profile=] has expired (). Or it can have its [=Core Profile Issuer=] withdraw it, which removes its record from every [=Originator Key Record=] that lists it. The Core Specification states what the choice exchanges and leaves it to each [=Use Case Specification=] to say which way suits it.

A Core Profile is not altered once signed. A [=Core Profile=] that carries the replaced key therefore stays in force until it expires. The [=Core Profile=] issued for the new key is not to carry the replaced one, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] recommends to the [=Core Profile Issuer=].

Keeping the key as retired leaves a window that does not narrow. What keeping the replaced key as a [=retired=] key would cost is stated in the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]]. For as long as a [=Core Profile=] that carries the key is in force, whoever holds its private half can sign a [=Content Attestation=] that a [=Verifier=] cannot tell from a genuine older one. That is because the [=Verifier=] has no trustworthy account of when that attestation was signed (). The window does not narrow with time. A key thought to have been compromised is accordingly [=withdrawn=] at once, whatever content ceases to verify as a result, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states.

The Time of Judgement

Validity is judged as of the time of verification. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] judges validity as of the time of verification unless a [=Use Case Specification=] defines otherwise, and confines any other time to one the delivery channel gives the [=Verifier=]. This specification does not define otherwise: validity is judged as of the time at which the verification is performed, and every check of a [=Signature Validity Period=] in is made against that time. The channel gives no other time that could be named. The tolerance a [=Verifier=] allows for clock skew, at either end of that period, is that of the general procedure of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]].

What a page carries is written by the party that publishes it, and a time that party wrote is one the general rule excludes, since the party whose documents are being judged would choose its value. Nor is there anything in which such a time could be preserved ().

A judgement made by a service. Where a service verifies and the party that presents the page is another, the judgement is the one made at the time that service verified. How old it may be when it is presented belongs to the arrangement that leaves open.

No outcome is kept, so none shows validity at publication. This use case has no means of keeping the outcome of a verification, and none is defined for it. Neither an archived copy of a page nor a later verification of it can therefore show, within this framework, that a profile was valid at the time the page was published. Where such a showing is wanted, it is to be had from outside the framework. How an archived copy of a page is to be treated is a separate question, which this specification does not settle.

Caching and Revisiting a Page

The bounds are the Core Specification's, and a cache of verified chains outlives the execution context. The bounds within which a [=Verifier=] may keep what it obtains are those of the Core Specification ([[OPF-CORE]], Caching; [[OPF-CORE]], Accreditation Chain Verification and Caching), and this specification does not extend them. A [=Verifier=] that runs within browsing software SHOULD keep its cache of verified [=Accreditation Chains=] in storage that outlives the execution context in which a verification ran.

The execution context in which a verification ran is commonly stopped when it falls idle, so a cache held in its memory alone is empty again at the next presentation. The value of the cache is that a later verification need not repeat the queries of an earlier one, and that value is realized only if the cache survives.

A revisit repeats fewer queries. On a revisit to a site whose issuers' chains are already verified and kept, the queries that concern those chains are not repeated. What remains are the queries about the [=Originator=] and its [=Core Profile=] and those about each [=Profile Annotation=], and any of those may in turn be answered from a cache of DNS answers within its time to live.

A page in the cache of the browsing software carries no judgement. Verification of a page held in the cache of the browsing software is performed again at each presentation, since no outcome is kept (), so a revocation takes effect at the first presentation whose answers are not read from a cache still within its time to live. The delay with which a revocation is detected is bounded by those times to live, as it is in the general model, and the long-lived caching of a page does not lengthen it.

It is not settled in this revision whether a [=Verifier=] may reuse the outcome of a verification for a later presentation, for example on a reload or on another page of the same origin. Any such reuse would end no later than the earliest of the ends of the [=Signature Validity Periods=] of the documents, and of the times to live of the DNS answers, on which the outcome rests (). The Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]], as they stand, allow reuse only while what is verified, and every input to it, is unchanged and the earliest of those ends has not passed, and they allow the outcome for the documents at the well-known resource to be reused for another page of the same origin.

Parameters

The parameters of the general model take effect in this use case as follows. The values given are recommendations offered to guide deployment; they are not requirements, and they have not been validated against operational experience.

The recommended values below are those of the Operations document of the framework [[?OPF-OPS]], which is where such values belong. That document has not been published; until it is, the values that concern this use case are stated here, and a later version of this specification will refer to the Operations document instead.

Parameter Effect in this use case Recommended value
[=Signature Validity Period=] of a [=Core Profile=] or [=Profile Annotation=] Whether the time at which a page is presented falls within the period. A page may be presented long after it was published, so the period bounds how long a page continues to verify unless the [=Originator=] presents a new [=Core Profile=], or a [=Profile Annotation=] issued again, with it. At most 398 days and typically one year for a [=Core Profile=], a provisional figure to be reviewed. A [=Profile Annotation=]'s is bounded by its [=Core Profile=]'s, a requirement of the framework restated in rather than a recommended value
Time to live of an [=Originator Key Record=] The delay before the removal of a key reaches the resolver the [=Verifier=] uses. The revocation of a single [=Core Profile=], by the removal of its [=Originator Key Record=], is delayed by the same time. One hour
Negative caching time of a [=Profile Annotation Issuer=]'s zone The delay before the revocation of an annotation is detected. Depends on the issuer's DNS provider; the recommended target is one hour, and at most one day
Time to live of the [=Originator=]'s own records: the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] and the [=Permitted Host Record=] How soon a change in the [=Core Profile Issuers=] an [=Originator=] permits, or a declaration that it has no [=Originator Profile=], takes effect for a [=Verifier=] that consults the [=Issuer Pinning Record=] (); and, once the record for a host is removed, how soon that host stops being permitted (). A record first published is seen only after the zone's negative caching time has passed, a time the provider commonly sets. The records are static, which admits a long time, while how quickly a declaration of having no [=Originator Profile=] takes effect argues for a short one. The recommended value is one hour
[=Signature Validity Period=] of a [=Website Profile=] How long a claim on a site that the [=Originator=] has stopped making can still be presented. The [=Website Profile=] has no revocation mechanism of its own, so this period is what bounds the retraction of a claim on one site (, ). Bounded by what requires of an [=Originator=]. No recommended value has been set yet; the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] recommend one year or less
[=Signature Validity Period=] of a [=Web Media Profile=] Ends the [=Originator Profile=] in this use case (); checks it, with the issuer and the key of the [=Web Media Profile=]. No recommended value has been set yet

Security Considerations

This section explains what the security of this use case rests on and what it does not cover. It states no requirement: every requirement it relies on is stated in , , and .

The security properties of the framework that do not depend on the use case are in the security considerations of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are not repeated here; those that concern the records themselves, their size and their transitional form are in [[?OPF-DNS]].

How the Originator Profile Bundle and the Content Attestation Are Delivered

The [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the documents that travel with it reach a [=Verifier=] by the routes of : embedded in the page, named by it under a URL, or obtained from the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=]. A [=Verifier=] can add documents it carries with it. None of it is fetched from the DNS. Where the documents are embedded, a [=Verifier=] holds what the page gives it before it queries anything, and the only retrieval left for an attacker to block or to watch is the request for the well-known resource, which is made in any case ().

The subsections below take up:

What the Routes Establish

Where the documents are referenced or obtained from the well-known resource, there is a retrieval, and whoever serves the resource, or can interfere with the retrieval, chooses what the [=Verifier=] receives. It can withhold a document, return an earlier issuance of it, or return documents in another order, which is the denial of ; but whatever it puts in place of a document does not verify unless that document's issuer signed it.

What a route establishes has to be kept apart from what the signatures establish. No route establishes anything about the [=Originator=]: an attacker who can alter the page can alter the references in it as freely as it can alter what is embedded in it, and whoever serves a referenced resource or the well-known resource chooses what it returns. The authenticity of each document rests, whatever the route, on the signature that document carries and on the binding of , and that is why the routes make no difference to anything else in this section.

What this use case does not have is a signature over the page, and the transport establishes the [=Page Origin=] and nothing about the [=Originator=] (, the note on what the transport protects). What holds the documents to the page is the signatures those documents carry, the binding of and, for the [=Content Attestation=], the check of the URL of the page (). When the framework's checks fail there is no second judgement left standing: the whole of what a [=Recipient=] is told under this specification falls at once.

Denial, Not a False Result

An attacker who can alter the page can take the documents away, leaving a page that presents no [=Originator Profile=]. That produces no false result. Where the [=Originator=] also serves the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] from the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=], taking it out of the page does not remove it, since a [=Verifier=] obtains that resource whether or not the page carries it (); the [=Website Profile=] is served only there. Taking the [=Content Attestation=] out of the page leaves a page that presents no [=Originator Profile=], which is the case the next paragraph describes.

A page that carries a [=Content Attestation=] presents an [=Originator Profile=], even where the [=Core Profile=] of its [=Originator=] cannot be obtained; the verification then fails (), and the page is not left unevaluated. A page that carries no [=Content Attestation=] presents no [=Originator Profile=], whatever the well-known resource of its [=Page Origin=] carries: the outcome is reached for each [=Content Attestation=] (), and a page that carries none has no outcome. Such a page is not evaluated under this specification, and this specification says nothing about it, so the absence of a result is not itself a result. The framework's endorsement can thus be denied to content on its way to a [=Recipient=]; it cannot be forged onto content.

Denial, and not a false result, is also all that is open to every party that carries or assembles the documents on their way to a [=Verifier=], and not only to one that can alter the page. Such parties include whoever answers for the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] or for a URL a page names (), a party that distributes [=Content Attestations=] for an [=Originator=], and whoever supplies the documents a [=Verifier=] carries with it. Each of them can change the order in which the documents of an [=Originator Profile Bundle=] reach the [=Verifier=], and which of them reach it; none of them can alter a document, since each is signed on its own.

What such a party gains is denial and not a false result. Changing the order or the selection amounts to withholding a document, as the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states of the order of the [=Profile Annotations=], and a document it adds a second time does not push another out of the bounds, since takes it once. Removing the [=Web Media Profile=] from the page and from the well-known resource likewise yields a failure (, step 5), not a false result.

Moving the Documents to Another Page

The documents cannot be moved to another page either. An attacker that copies the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] from a genuine page of the [=Originator=] onto a page of its own, and the [=Website Profile=] onto the well-known resource of its own origin, is stopped by rather than by any signature over the page. The [=Page Origin=] of that page has to be one of the origins the [=Website Profile=] names, and the host of it has to be the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=], or lie below it, or be permitted by a record in the zone of that [=Identity=].

The [=Content Attestation=] is also held to the page by a second check: the URL of the page has to match the allowedUrl that the [=Content Attestation=] carries (). That check stops a genuine [=Content Attestation=] placed on a page whose URL it does not name. It does so even where the page reproduces the [=Content=] the attestation covers, a case the attestation's own content cannot stop, and even where the page is on an origin the [=Website Profile=] names.

What the check of allowedUrl gains depends on how narrowly allowedUrl is written: a pattern that names a whole host admits every page of that host. Writing it no wider than the content needs is a discipline of the [=Originator=] and of the operator that signs on its behalf, which the Operational Governance Requirements [[?OPF-GOV]] place on them. A pattern written wider than needed and then abused is a failure of operation, not of the check.

How far the [=Content Attestation=] carried on a page assembled from another's documents would also be found not to cover its content cannot be answered in this revision, because what a [=Content Attestation=] contains is not defined here. The kinds of Content Integrity Descriptor from which it is to be defined are those the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] describe (). Until it is, the binding and the check of allowedUrl are the whole of what this document states against a page assembled from another's documents.

The Cost of Verification

Delivery also means that whoever can bring a page before a [=Verifier=] can put work in front of it. This use case has no precondition that stops an attacker before the checks of the Core Specification begin, since there is no signature outside the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the [=Content Attestation=] to verify first (, step 1). A [=Verifier=] evaluates whatever page it is brought.

What bounds the cost is the order of the general procedure, under which the [=Accreditation Chains=] of the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] are verified locally before any DNS query is made for the issuer concerned (, step 2). A page carrying a fabricated [=Originator Profile Bundle=] therefore costs local verification and no queries, the queries for the [=Originator=]'s own records included, since their names come from the [=Core Profile=] and wait for its chain. The consequences are those the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] states.

Who can make a [=Verifier=] do that work differs with the placement of the [=Verifier=]. A [=Verifier=] within browsing software is brought pages by the [=Recipient=]'s own browsing, so an attacker has first to bring the [=Recipient=] to a page; a service that retrieves pages on request is brought pages by whoever may ask it ().

A referenced document is retrieved from a URL the page chose, and a service that retrieves on request occupies a network position that the page's author does not hold. A URL whose host is or resolves to an address inside the service's network, or a credential sent along with the request, would turn the retrieval into a request made on the page's behalf from the [=Verifier=]'s position. The rules of on credentials and non-public addresses prevent that.

Where a page carries the documents of more than one [=Originator=] (), the cost of a verification is incurred once for each [=Content Attestation=]. Documents copied from the genuine pages of other [=Originators=] verify locally, but the comparison of , which needs no query, fails for them. A [=Verifier=] that makes that comparison before it issues the queries of the other steps for that attestation therefore spends no query on them.

A page that gathers content from many [=Originators=], such as the front page of a news aggregator, can carry a large number of [=Content Attestations=]. A page designed to take content in dynamically carries as many as the content it takes in brings with it, a number that can vary from one presentation to the next. Each attestation adds the cost of its own verification, so the number on one page bears directly on the cost of verifying it. The operator of such a page can take that into account when it chooses how the page gathers its content.

Obtaining and Binding the Presented Identity

The identity under which content is presented in this use case is the [=Page Origin=], and a [=Verifier=] takes it from the URL of the page it is evaluating (). Nothing in the framework establishes that the content arrived under that origin; that is the work of the transport, and it is the only other layer this channel has. Where the page is served over HTTPS, the assurance that the host is the one named is that of the transport and of the authorities it rests on, and it establishes the [=Page Origin=] and nothing more ().

Where a page is served without TLS there is no such assurance at all, and an attacker on the network path chooses the content and the documents that travel with it alike. The scheme is part of the origin that compares, so for an [=Originator=] whose [=Website Profile=] names only origins whose scheme is https the binding fails on a page served without TLS. The [=Page Origin=] of such a page is not one of the origins named.

Putting the identity into the form in which it is compared costs next to nothing here. Parsing the URL of the page has already produced a lower-case ASCII host, apart from a trailing dot that a [=Verifier=] removes, so this specification defines no conversion of its own (). The class of mistake that a conversion opens is confined here to the few names on which the conversion the URL parser applies and the A-label form of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] differ.

What the Core Specification places on the comparison holds unchanged ([[OPF-CORE]], Resolution Failures and the Pinning Downgrade): it is made on canonical forms and is exact. A host registered because it resembles another is therefore bound to itself and to nothing else, and what a [=Recipient=] makes of a name that resembles one it knows is not a question the framework answers.

The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] requires each [=Use Case Specification=] to say what binds content to its [=Originator=] independently of the [=Core Profile Issuer=], so that a [=Core Profile=] issued for an [=Identity=] it should not have been issued for is not by itself enough. In this use case the factor that binds content to its [=Originator=] independently of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] is the relation that requires between the host of the [=Page Origin=] and the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=].

The holder of a [=Core Profile=] issued in error has to present its page under one of two kinds of host. One is a host that is that [=Identity=] or lies below it, which requires control of a name in the [=Originator=]'s own namespace and of the means of serving it. The other is a host that the [=Originator=]'s own zone permits, which requires control of that zone. Either is a second failure, separate from the first and in the hands of a different party. The [=Website Profile=] is not that factor, for the reason the note in gives: the factor is the name, not the document.

A host that lies below the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] binds the page only as strongly as the [=Originator=] controls every name below that [=Identity=]. A name below it that the [=Originator=] has delegated, handed to its users, or left pointing at a service it no longer holds, can be served by another party without any change to the [=Originator=]'s zone. Such a party that also holds a wrongly issued [=Core Profile=] meets the binding.

The means an [=Originator=] itself has against a [=Core Profile=] issued in error for its [=Identity=] are a different question from what the binding establishes. The Core Specification does not require the record naming the permitted [=Core Profile Issuers=] and lets a [=Use Case Specification=] require it, in which case every [=Originator=] holds a means of its own ([[OPF-CORE]], What Pinning Protects, and Why It Is Optional). This use case does not require it (), and where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied a [=Verifier=] need not consult it.

An [=Originator=] that has not published its [=Issuer Pinning Record=] depends on its [=Core Profile Issuer=] to revoke a [=Core Profile=] it did not ask for. One whose zone is signed is recommended to publish it, and thereby to hold such a means wherever the record is consulted (). The binding of is unaffected by which of the two an [=Originator=] is: it holds for pinned and unpinned [=Originators=] alike.

Where a host is admitted by a [=Permitted Host Record=], it is admitted by the [=Originator=] and not by the [=Core Profile Issuer=], and the security of that admission is the security of the [=Originator=]'s zone. A record set at the name of the [=Permitted Host Record=] which holds no record of the form the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] defines, such as one synthesized from a wildcard elsewhere in the zone, is read as absence ().

The zone of the admitted host carries no record of this framework and is not required to be signed (), so this framework asks nothing of the party that runs it; what that party can do is what anyone who serves a host can do. The [=Originator=] permits the host, and stops permitting it, in its own zone alone, and what stopping reaches and what it does not is in .

Where the Verifier Is Placed, and How It Obtains DNSSEC Validation

Both placements of need a DNSSEC validation state they can rely on, by one of the two means the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] allows, and they differ in how readily they have it. A [=Verifier=] within browsing software runs where the [=Recipient=] is, on networks the [=Recipient=] does not control and with whatever resolver the device has been given. Browsing software does not in general validate DNSSEC, and an indication that an answer was validated, if that indication itself arrives unauthenticated, can be written by anyone on the network path. That is why states the requirement explicitly and rules out that ground.

A service that retrieves the page holds either means as a matter of its own deployment and is the easier of the two in this one respect. What it costs is elsewhere, in what it learns about the [=Recipient=] () and in the result having to reach the party that will present the page ().

What matters most here is that an unpinned path exists at all. The Core Specification lets a [=Verifier=] proceed unpinned only where the [=Use Case Specification=] accepts an unpinned [=Originator=]; one that requires the record makes its absence a failure, and then no unpinned path exists ([[OPF-CORE]], What Pinning Protects, and Why It Is Optional). This use case does not require the record. An authenticated absence and an Insecure answer both leave the [=Originator=] unpinned, and verification goes on (); an answer reached through an alias is read as an Insecure answer. Where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied, a [=Verifier=] need not consult the record at all (), and then no answer is read for it.

The [=Permitted Host Record=], the second of the [=Originator=]'s two records, admits no unpinned outcome: for it, an authenticated absence and an Insecure answer are each a failure. Such a host is not treated as presenting an unpinned [=Originator Profile=] (), because there the [=Website Profile=] has claimed the host and something is expected to bear it out. One of the two records admits an unpinned outcome and the other does not, and that asymmetry is what an attacker meets.

What an attacker on the network path can do with the unpinned outcome is what the Core Specification describes ([[OPF-CORE]], Resolution Failures and the Pinning Downgrade). Neither outcome that leads to the unpinned path can be fabricated, and a disrupted resolution is a failure and never absence (). What is left to the attacker is to replay a proof of absence made before the [=Originator=] published its [=Issuer Pinning Record=], or its denying form, until the signatures in it expire. A resolver that does not validate would make every answer look Insecure, and the assurance requires is what excludes it.

The same replay works in the opposite direction for a [=Permitted Host Record=]. An authenticated answer that carried the record, made before the [=Originator=] removed it, can be presented until its signatures expire, and for that long hides that the host is no longer permitted ().

Apart from replaying an authenticated answer, an attacker on the network path cannot turn a pinned [=Originator=] into an unpinned one. It can suppress the verification, and that is all. A [=Recipient=] shown a failure cannot tell such an attacker from a zone that is temporarily unreachable, the same outcome being reported in both cases. Where the queries reach the resolver in the clear, the names say which [=Originator=] is being verified, so the suppression can be aimed at one.

The bound on what an attacker on the network path can do holds only for a [=Verifier=] that meets the requirement of . A [=Verifier=] that took an unauthenticated indication that an answer had been validated at face value has no bound at all. Every answer is then in the attacker's choice, including one it would read as an absence, so for such a [=Verifier=] the unpinned path is the attacker's to open; the framework adds nothing to what the documents carried with the page already assert. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] gives this as the reason for the requirement.

The requirement falls hardest on the placement this use case is most likely to see, since a [=Verifier=] within browsing software is the one that has no validating resolver of its own to fall back on. A [=Verifier=] that holds neither of the two means cannot verify at all, and there is no weaker check for it to fall back to.

What the unpinned path costs is, apart from the replay window, not what an attacker can take from it but that it is the path ordinarily followed. Publishing the record is not required of an [=Originator=] and is recommended only where the zone of its [=Identity=] is signed (). For the [=Originators=] that publish nothing, the second factor against a [=Core Profile=] issued in error is simply absent, and the binding of carries the whole of it (). The same holds for every [=Originator=] where a [=Page Origin=] is supplied and the [=Verifier=] does not consult the record.

Whether the [=Originator=] was pinned, was unpinned, or was not consulted is carried into the outcome ([[OPF-CORE]], Outcome and Time of Judgement), so a party that receives one can see that it was unpinned, or that the record was not consulted. What it cannot see is which of the two authenticated outcomes produced that: an [=Originator=] that publishes no such record in a signed zone, or one whose zone is not signed at all. The two are different validation states and a [=Verifier=] knows which it obtained, but this document gives it no occasion to tell them apart, since the general model carries neither into the outcome.

The placement decides one further thing, which is who holds the assurance. A [=Verifier=] within browsing software obtains its own answers and knows what it validated. Where a service verifies and the party that presents the page is another, the assurance about the DNS is the service's, and the presenting party has none of its own: it holds what the service tells it. What it may rely on in that is not settled (), and it is the question the Core Specification requires a [=Use Case Specification=] to answer and this use case leaves open ([[OPF-CORE]], Requirements on Use Case Specifications).

Why Naming the Core Profile Issuer Is Recommended and Not Required

Publishing the record that names the permitted [=Core Profile Issuers=] is optional in this use case, so the second and independent factor against a [=Core Profile=] issued in error is present for some [=Originators=] and absent for others. Publishing it cannot be made a requirement. The record lives in the zone of the [=Originator=]'s own [=Identity=] and a [=Verifier=] acts on it only where the answer is authenticated, so requiring it would require that zone to be signed with DNSSEC, and this use case declines to require that ().

The cost of signing falls on the [=Originator=] and on the zone of its [=Identity=] alone. A host that a [=Permitted Host Record=] permits carries no record of this framework, so an [=Originator=] with many sites has one zone to sign and not one for each site.

What publishing the record can be, and what makes it, is a recommendation to the [=Originators=] for whom publishing costs nothing further, namely those whose zone is already signed. For those [=Originators=] the second and independent factor is then present wherever the record is consulted, and an [=Originator=] that cannot sign its zone is not shut out of the use case by it.

A [=Verifier=] is not required to consult the record in every setting either. Where the setting supplies a [=Page Origin=], the binding of is itself a second factor, independent of the [=Core Profile Issuer=] (), and this specification leaves the consultation to the [=Verifier=]. Where the setting supplies none, the binding is not checked and the record is the only such factor, so a [=Verifier=] is required to consult it ().

A [=Verifier=] that does not consult the record makes one query fewer (), and forgoes both the pin and the declaration of the record's denying form. The recommendation of therefore has its effect in the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=] and with the [=Verifiers=] that elect to consult the record.

Publishing the record does not protect against every attacker at once. A proof of absence served before the record was published can be replayed until its signatures expire (), so an [=Originator=] that pins itself is protected against an attacker on the network path only from then on. The same holds for the declaration of the denying form. How long that takes is the RRSIG validity period of the [=Originator=]'s zone, which is commonly set by its DNS provider. Once the record is published, only a change to the [=Originator=]'s own zone can remove it, and no other zone can supply or remove a pin, as the Core Specification describes ([[OPF-CORE]], Resolution Failures and the Pinning Downgrade).

The same record carries the other thing an [=Originator=] can say for itself. In its denying form it declares that the [=Originator=] has no [=Originator Profile=] at all, and a [=Verifier=] that reads that declaration as authenticated data fails the verification wherever it meets it. The Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] defines both forms at the one name, and records the declaration among the means by which a [=Core Profile=] ceases to be valid.

The declaration is subject to the condition it shares with the pinning: it has effect only where the zone is signed. It has a second condition in this use case: it has effect only where a [=Verifier=] consults the record, which is in every setting that supplies no [=Page Origin=] and, in the others, where the [=Verifier=] elects to.

An [=Originator=] whose zone is signed holds a means, independent of its [=Core Profile Issuer=], of stopping the use of its [=Originator Profile=] on the web wherever the record is consulted. An [=Originator=] whose zone is not signed holds none and depends on its [=Core Profile Issuer=] to remove the registration. That is the consequence that leaves to this section. It concerns an [=Originator=]'s [=Originator Profile=] as a whole; retracting the claim on one site while the rest stands is a different matter and is in .

Retracting the Claim on a Single Site

The [=Website Profile=] has no revocation mechanism of its own, so an [=Originator=] that wishes to stop presenting its [=Originator Profile=] on one of the origins it has named cannot do so by revoking that claim alone. It has to issue a new [=Website Profile=], and the one it replaces goes on being verifiable until its own [=Signature Validity Period=] ends.

The answer to the coarseness of retraction is the length of the [=Signature Validity Period=], not a new mechanism. Where a [=Website Profile=] is valid for a short time, a claim it makes is retracted, in effect, by not making it again in the [=Website Profile=] that replaces it. The interval over which the old claim can still be presented is then the remainder of that period. The framework adds no resource record for this, so the coarseness of retraction in this use case is a matter of how long an [=Originator=] makes a [=Website Profile=] valid for.

The two recommendations that follow from the length of the [=Signature Validity Period=], on how long it is and on a replacement that is not to expire first, are in , which is where this section's reasoning takes effect. What the length should be is an operational value and is not fixed here; it is a matter for the Operations document, no value has been set yet, and records it among the parameters of this use case.

One asymmetry remains and is not removed by shortening the validity. Removing a [=Permitted Host Record=] stops permitting the host that record permitted. It takes effect as soon as the removal is seen, that is, after the time to live of the record set has run out and, against an attacker on the network path, after the signatures on the earlier answer have expired (). It does nothing for a host that is the [=Originator=]'s own [=Identity=] or lies below it, since no such record was consulted for it (). An [=Originator=] that wishes the faster retraction for a site can obtain it only for the sites whose hosts lie outside its own [=Identity=].

Privacy Considerations

This section says what verification in this use case reveals, to whom, and what this use case does to limit it. It states no requirement. What the queries of reveal in general, and the measures against it, are in the privacy considerations of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and are not repeated here. What this use case adds is what that document leaves to a [=Use Case Specification=]. That is when the queries are made, what obtaining the documents discloses, by which party and where that party runs, what the queries made in the [=Originator=]'s own zone name, and what a [=Verifier=] that retrieves the page comes to know.

When the Queries Are Made

The queries are made when a page is presented. No outcome of a verification is kept and the judgement is made afresh each time (, ). A page held in the cache of the browsing software is therefore verified again when it is displayed again (), and the timing of the queries that the caches do not answer is the timing of the [=Recipient=]'s browsing.

Caching narrows what the timing of the queries reveals without removing it. A revisit to a site whose chains are already verified and kept repeats none of the queries about those chains, and an answer from the DNS may be used until its time to live runs out (). What the queries mark is therefore a first visit, and a visit after the caches have expired, rather than every reading of a page.

What Obtaining the Documents Discloses

The queries reach the [=Originator=] only through the servers of its zone, and only in the aggregate those servers receive; what the retrieval of the documents discloses depends instead on the route by which the documents are obtained. Where the documents are embedded in the page, nothing beyond the request for the well-known resource is retrieved to obtain the [=Originator Profile=].

Where the documents are obtained from the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=] (), the [=Verifier=] retrieves them from the server that serves the page, which already knows that the page was obtained. No party learns of the reading that did not know of it before, and what the retrieval adds is that the [=Recipient=] is using a [=Verifier=]. The same holds where the page names a document by a URL on the host that serves the page. Where that URL is on another host, the [=Verifier=] retrieves the document from it, and that host, which does not serve the page, learns that a page naming it is being verified.

Because the request for the well-known resource is made whether or not a page carries an [=Originator Profile=] (), the fact that the [=Recipient=] is using a [=Verifier=] is disclosed to every site the [=Recipient=] visits, including sites that take no part in the framework. That fact can serve to distinguish one [=Recipient=] from another.

The request is not made before the [=Recipient=] has chosen to visit the page. It carries what the browsing software ordinarily sends, such as the languages the [=Recipient=] prefers, and where a response is held in an HTTP cache, no request is made at all.

Which Party Makes the Queries

Which party makes the queries, and where that party runs, decides who sees them. A [=Verifier=] within browsing software runs on the [=Recipient=]'s own device and uses the resolver that device or its network was given, or validates for itself. Either way that resolver, or the authoritative servers it reaches, see which [=Originator Profiles=] are being verified and when: which of the sites that present an [=Originator Profile=] the [=Recipient=] reads, and when it reads them.

A [=Verifier=] within browsing software that carries its own channel to a validating resolver () thereby chooses that resolver, which sees every query of this procedure from the [=Recipient=]'s own address; the choice is the [=Verifier=]'s and not the [=Recipient=]'s. In this use case no party takes this exposure away from the [=Recipient=] by aggregating it unless a service verifies.

What the Queries Name

What the queries name follows the same division as in the general model. The [=Originator Key Records=] and [=Revocation Records=] an issuer publishes carry opaque labels, so an observer between a resolver and an authoritative server learns that one of the issuer's records is being checked and not whose; that property is the Core Specification's [[OPF-CORE]] and holds here unchanged. It does not extend to the records in the [=Originator=]'s own zone, whose names carry the domains themselves.

That an [=Originator=] is not required to publish the record naming its permitted [=Core Profile Issuers=] does not reduce the exposure, because a [=Verifier=] that consults that record queries it whether or not it is there. A [=Verifier=] is required to consult it only in the settings that supply no [=Page Origin=] and may consult it in the others (). One that consults it in every verification makes the query, and the [=Originator=]'s zone sees it, for every page it evaluates; one that consults it only where it is required makes none for a page presented in browsing software.

The zone's servers see the query only in the aggregate that the resolvers querying them produce, reduced by caching, since one record serves every page of that [=Originator=]. They do not learn which [=Recipient=] asked, the query reaching them from a resolver. A [=Permitted Host Record=] is consulted only for a host that is not the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] and does not lie below it (), and its name carries that host.

What a Service That Retrieves the Page Learns

A [=Verifier=] that retrieves the page learns something a [=Verifier=] within browsing software does not. To verify, it has to have the page, so it has the URL of that page and learns which page is being verified, and not merely which [=Originator=]. Where the service retrieves the page because a [=Recipient=] is about to be shown that page, the service learns of the reading at the time it happens; whether that is how such a service is placed is not settled (, ). A [=Verifier=] within browsing software learns nothing beyond what the [=Recipient=]'s own device already holds.

The exchange runs the other way at the resolver: a service verifies for many [=Recipients=], so what its resolver and the zones it queries see is aggregated across them, whereas a [=Verifier=] within browsing software, on the [=Recipient=]'s own device, aggregates nothing. The two placements of thus differ in privacy as they do in security (), and the exchange is between exposure to a resolver and exposure to the service itself.

This specification places no limit on what a party that verifies for another may do with the pages it retrieves, or with the knowledge of which [=Recipient=] was about to read which page, and the framework gives that party no standing of any kind. The arrangement between it and the party that presents the page is left open (), and this specification defines no boundary of trust within which such a party stands. Whether this specification should require anything of such a party, or whether the matter belongs to the governance of the framework rather than to this document, is not settled in this revision. It is the privacy half of the question raises about reliance.

IANA Considerations

This specification makes no registration request. It uses one well-known URI, which is not registered, and requires no other registration.

The well-known resource of is at the path /.well-known/sp.json. The suffix sp.json is not registered in the Well-Known URIs registry that [[RFC8615]] establishes.

This specification defines no name and no resource record in the DNS: the names, the record types and their formats are those of the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] and of [[?OPF-DNS]], and this specification adds none of its own ().

This specification has no result to record either: this use case has no place in which a result is recorded and defines no form for one (), so there is nothing for which a method name would be registered. Nor does it deliver the documents as a part of a message or of another multipart object (), so it requests no media type for such a part, which the Email [=Use Case Specification=] [[OPF-EMAIL]] requires. The documents themselves have one format in every use case, which no [=Use Case Specification=] defines; a registration for that format is made once, with the work on the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]], and is not a registration this specification requires.

The way a page carries the [=Originator Profile Bundle=] and the documents that travel with it is fixed, and it identifies what a script element carries by one of two media types, application/ca-set+json and application/op-set+json (), whose final form is under consideration. Neither is registered, as the Originator Profile Blueprints [[?Originator Profile Blueprints]] state, and which document is to register them has not been established. The form of the two values is that of the standards tree of [[RFC6838]], whose registrations are made through a recognized standards body.

Two things can be said. The two types name objects this specification does not define, so neither registration is one this specification makes on its own account. The media type of the part that carries an [=Originator Profile Bundle=], which the Email [=Use Case Specification=] requests [[OPF-EMAIL]], is a registration of this kind, and may turn out to be one of these two. The revision that establishes where the registration belongs is to state the answer here.

Differences from the Email Use Case Specification

This appendix sets out how this specification differs from the Email [=Use Case Specification=] [[OPF-EMAIL]]. The structural conclusion is that the differences are five:

  1. whether DNSSEC on the [=Originator=]'s own zone and the naming of its permitted [=Core Profile Issuers=] are required;
  2. how the [=Presented Identity=] is taken and which document declares the binding;
  3. whether an outer certificate layer is present;
  4. where verification happens, as of what time it judges, and whether its outcome is kept;
  5. what the [=Originator Profile=] consists of.

Everything on the issuers' side of the DNS is common to the two use cases, and that is what the Core Specification [[OPF-CORE]] carries.

This table and the table in the appendix of [[OPF-EMAIL]], Differences from the Web Media Use Case Specification, are one table, each written from its own side; the two are to be kept consistent, and a row added to one is added to the other. The columns are headed as they are there, so that the two can be read against each other: the column headed Web media is this specification's.

Aspect Web media Email
What carries the binding The [=Content=] is signed with an [=Originator Verification Key=] of the [=Core Profile=] in a [=Content Attestation=], and the [=Website Profile=], signed with such a key too, names the origins on which the [=Originator Profile=] may be presented () The message is signed with S/MIME under a key of the [=Core Profile=], and the From header field is bound to the domain by DMARC
The identity the content arrives under The [=Page Origin=], namely the origin [[RFC6454]] of the page () The Sending Domain
Relation to the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] The host of the [=Page Origin=] is the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] or lies below it, or a [=Permitted Host Record=] in the zone of that [=Identity=] permits it () The [=Identity=] itself or below it; the [=Permitted Host Record=] is not used
DNSSEC on the [=Originator=]'s own zone Not required, except of an [=Originator=] that names a host outside its own [=Identity=], which has to sign the zone of that [=Identity=] for the [=Permitted Host Record=] to have effect () Required
[=Issuer Pinning Record=] Not required; recommended where the zone of the [=Originator=]'s [=Identity=] is signed (). An authenticated absence and an Insecure answer, an answer reached through an alias being read as the latter, leave the [=Originator=] unpinned and verification goes on. Consulted in every setting that supplies no [=Page Origin=], and at the [=Verifier=]'s choice where one is supplied () Required; an authenticated absence and an Insecure answer, an answer reached through an alias being read as the latter, are each a failure
An outer certificate layer None. Nothing outside the documents carried with the page signs it, so the layers of validity are the four of the general model () The X.509 certificate of the signer, joined to the framework only by the identity of the key, and withdrawn by other parties through other means
Where verification is performed A [=Verifier=] within browsing software, such as a browser extension, or a service that retrieves the page () The Mail Client. The requirement on the resolver is the same as for web media
The time as of which validity is judged The time of verification, for every party () The time of display, or the Mail Client's own recorded time of receipt
Recording of the outcome None. The channel offers no place in which a result could be left, and the judgement is made afresh at each presentation () None in [[OPF-EMAIL]]; a Mail Client may keep a record of its own results
Putting the [=Presented Identity=] into canonical form Nothing to do: apart from a trailing dot, parsing the page's URL has already produced a lower-case ASCII host () The domain of the From header field, whose labels are converted to A-labels as [[RFC8616]] defines
Keeping a replaced signing key as retired or withdrawing it The content can be signed again with the new key, so the old key can be withdrawn () A message already delivered cannot be signed again, so the old key is kept as a retired key, and old messages verify until the earlier [=Core Profile=], which carries it, expires or is revoked
What the [=Originator Profile=] consists of The [=Core Profile=] and its [=Profile Annotations=]. In the web media use case the [=Originator Profile=] also includes a [=Web Media Profile=], which the Web Media [=Use Case Specification=] adds and requires, and the [=Originator Profile=] ceases to be valid when the [=Web Media Profile=] does () The [=Core Profile=] and its [=Profile Annotations=]. The Email [=Use Case Specification=] adds no document to it
What is carried with the content The whole [=Originator Profile=] and its chains, in the page or at the well-known resource of the [=Page Origin=], the two taken together () The whole [=Originator Profile=] and its chains, within the S/MIME signature
Names and records in the DNS The same in both; neither [=Use Case Specification=] defines a name or a record of its own